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Abstract  
 
The intended contribution of this work is to systematically discuss a selection of 
methodological topics and some of the empirical and technical issues that have been 
driving the measurement of inequality in Mexico so far. This discussion has two strands: 
firstly, the general case, and second, the particular case of Mexico. The general case 
include some philosophical concerns, along with a review of the traditional inequality 
measurement, the most common operational decisions in empirical calculations, and the 
recent methodological contribution of development literature that is mostly centered 
around the capability approach of Sen (1985b). The philosophical part contrasted with 
other approaches and rejected the Marxist view of economic inequality, which is mostly 
viewed as an outcome of exploitation. The distributional judgments are compared with 
more ancient schools of thought in regards to justice. Another methodological issue is 
such that social inequality, approximated by income inequality, might be considered as an 
additional functioning that measures the degree of social cohesion in the country, this 
finding is an implication that comes from the definition of functionings within the 
capability approach; then, social inequality is a functioning that is different in nature from 
other measures of destitution, and it is also different from the destitution that is captured 
by absolute poverty measurement. Our general case includes a review of the most popular 
ways to measure inequality, such as normative and pragmatic inequality measures that are 
mentioned with their properties, with their rankings of the distributions provided by the 
use of stochastic dominance and quantile comparisons, and the construction of statistical 
models and some graphic representations of income economic inequality; the approach of 
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inequality concerns included in the measurement of relative poverty is rejected for the 
sake of clarity. Then this general view would guide us to a better understanding of the 
Mexican literature for the consideration of income distribution. The measurement of 
destitution provided by governmental offices is necessary to discuss, because there might 
be some lack of coherence between the design of the measurement and the complex legal 
system in Mexico. We also consider a set of regulatory concerns that might not be unique 
to the Mexican law, but may be generalized for developing countries as a whole. Some of 
the methodological discussions that show how the Mexican research has been influenced 
by the international literature about human destitution will be good to clarify, looking at 
the value judgments that have been automatically accepted by the researchers. A 
sensitivity analysis was performed to the empirical calculation of inequality in Mexico, so 
the measurement showed to be different in regards to a variety of operational concerns: 
the recipient unit, the different data from income and consumption-expenditure surveys, 
various non-responses and underreported biases, the inclusion of a regional price index, 
among other things. In this work was also covered the reasons why it might be the case 
that destitution and poverty assessment was studied more deeply than inequality itself, so 
the possible ambiguity of inequality with poverty measurement is challenged in this work 
with a variety of theoretical remarks and empirical arguments. The final topic for the 
particular case of Mexico is to shed light in regards to the context of the capability 
approach and the use of equivalence scales, because these methodological approaches 
consider respectively directly and indirectly the assessment of distributional judgments. 
This discussion is followed by an empirical assessment of inequality measures that is 
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related with a set of functionings and services, where a direct relationship of measures of 
inequality with other measures of destitution is made clear. 
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• Part I. General Introduction 
 
A variety of recent inequality studies in Latin America show an increasing 
concern for this subject matter, as it is evidenced by the publication of De Ferranti et al. 
(2004), published by the World Bank, where the issue of inequality, as a separate aspect 
of destitution is discussed along with the serious consequences of this phenomenon. But 
for Mexico in particular, the present decade has been devoted to the study of absolute 
poverty measurement and human development assessment (CTMP, 2002, Székely, 2005, 
Lopez-Calva and Székely, 2006). During the recent years, the measurement of income 
inequality has been indirectly addressed in Mexico, or has been tried to be included in 
more complex measures, such as poverty measures or human development indices. In 
these types of measures, the consideration of inequality is done through distributional 
sensitiveness analyses. These gaps on the research about economic inequality in Mexico 
have provided the reason for this dissertation. So, the consideration of the unequal 
distribution are been increasingly studied again in Mexico with a renewed interest as in 
the past, but now the emphasis is different than of liberalization issues or the effects of 
crises.1 
It is the interest of this work to shed light on some of the distributional concerns 
in regards to the inequality measurement in Mexico, focusing on the descriptive part of 
inequality, and this will be done following two general strands, first a general view, and 
second, the particular Mexican case. The general view is necessary to study in order to 
highlight the value judgments, the traditional ways to measure inequality and the 
operational decisions that need to be made for an accurate calculation of income 
                                                 
1 As is done by Székely (1995, 1998). 
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inequality. The case of inequality measurement in Mexico is addressed not only in 
regards to the legal system that defines the ways to measure destitution, but also 
considering the variety of traditions on inequality assessment, and also including the 
relationship of inequality measures with other measures of deprivation. Both approaches, 
the general view and the particular case of Mexico, are discussed either through narrative 
exercises, theoretical discussions or empirical analyses, whatever seems to be more 
appropriate. 
 
 I Motivation. 
 
The measurement of social inequality is a recent concern in our society. 
Economists are usually asked for their opinion about the consequences of higher levels of 
social inequality and the best way to measure it. François Bourguignon, as a Chief 
Economist and Senior Vice President of the World Bank, commented in a seminar in 
Spain in 2006 that highly ranked authorities of the Chinese government were deeply 
concerned about the effects of high inequality in their society. We know that the attitude 
of the Chinese is similar to each government’s concern in the rest of the countries, mostly 
because of the link that social inequality itself has with rebellion and social problems 
(Sen, 1973; 1999). Not only governments are concerned with the effects of high 
inequality in the society, but also a number of very influential non-governmental 
institutions, such as the case of the Roman Catholic Church. In a series of worldwide 
media interventions in 2008, 2 the Catholic Church announced a set of seven new ‘sins’ 
                                                 
2 This new was widely circulated around the world, so all the sources cited the comments of the Bishop 
Gianfranco Girotti, an Official of the Apostolic Penitentiary. He made his comments during an interview 
with the Vatican's official newspaper L'Osservatore Romano. He said that priests must take into account 
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through the Supreme Tribunal of the Apostolic Penitentiary.3 These new sins not only 
include issues such as drug abuse, environmental pollution or genetic manipulation, but 
also, for our interest, these also include three additional ‘obscene’ practices that are 
related with destitution, such as causing poverty, social inequality and injustice, and 
accumulating excessive wealth. The latter ‘sins’ have direct implication with issues of 
inequality measurement.  
The present concern of the Catholic Church about justice matters was ratified by 
Pope Benedict XVI on April of 2008 in his speech to the United Nations, specifically 
addressing the desire of eliminating the gap between the rich and the poor among groups 
and countries.4 This and the previous reference from the Catholic Church should not be 
taken lightly. On the one hand, the influence of the Catholic Church on the stipulation of 
social norms accounts with hundreds of millions of followers. On the other hand, this 
issue makes an historical shift from the ancient definition of morals developed during the 
Middle Ages and maintained until now. The categorization of sin was historically made 
in two kinds: mortal and venial sins; this proposal was originally made by Pope Gregory I 
during the 6th century, and later on was supported by the work of Thomas Aquinas (1274) 
in his Summa Teologica, which is the most quoted source in this regards (O’Neil, 1912). 
The seven mortal sins are known to be: pride, avarice, gluttony, lust, sloth, envy and 
anger. The newer definition of sin mentioned above might replace rather than enlarge the 
understanding of what is wrong. In this case, it might be considered an individual 
                                                                                                                                                 
“new sins which have appeared on the horizon of humanity as corollary to the unstoppable process of 
globalization” (CNN, 2008, among many others). 
3 The role of this institution includes the definition of sin, the practice of excommunication and the rules for 
the dispensation of forgiveness (Ojetti, 1912). 
4 “The promotion of human rights remains the most effective strategy for eliminating inequalities between 
countries and social groups, and for increasing security” (Pope Benedict XVI, 2008). 
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responsible for social injustice more sinful than an individual committing the sin of lust 
(e.g. a pornographer). The fact that the Catholic Church is emphasizing other sources of 
evil is noticeable. So we will expect that the discussion of inequality issues will include 
not only scientific background, but also moral, ethical and religious concerns.5
Within economic science, there are traditions that in fact seem to ignore the 
consideration of social inequality, and they see this issue as a process that should be 
indirectly resolved with the efficient use of resources, so problems with income 
distribution should be solved as the long run consequence of economic growth, as is 
argued by Kuznets (1955). Institutions from developed countries sometimes are 
overconfident in indirect benefits of economic growth in developing economies, so they 
rely on the ‘trickle down’ effect. In this sense, the institutions put their faith in the better 
distribution of income due to the automatic mechanism of the market, so they focus the 
effort of measurement of well-being on growth rates rather than on welfare analysis. 
However, growth is not always a solution for impoverishment or for high inequality, as 
has been argued by several authors since some time ago (Chenery, 1974, p. xviii; 
Ahluwalia, 1974, p. 3; Ghai, 1977, p. 2), so inequality measurement should be important 
per se, and not only as the undesired ‘natural’ part of the process of economic growth.   
The present concern of economic science with the higher levels of income 
inequality is because of a vicious circle of underdevelopment: there is an entangled 
relationship that needs to be understood, where higher levels of inequality do impact 
negatively on the spreading of growth benefits to the more destitute, and also high 
                                                 
5 We do not know yet to what extent the concern of the Catholic Church relies in their care for the 
individual well-being rather than in their lost power attached to the accumulation of wealth because of the 
increasing secularization of society. It has been known that the Catholic Church has found its power, 
among several things, on the political provision of material accumulation (Durant, 1950). 
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inequality levels prevent the effectiveness of poverty alleviation programs (De Ferranti et 
al. 2004, p .25; Bourguignon, 2002, among others). It has also been shown that higher 
levels of inequality in certain countries obstruct the benefits of economic growth for the 
most destitute (Bourguignon, 2002; among others). For both previous reasons, the level 
of inequality can be considered as some kind of indicator of how much economic growth 
is affecting people at the lower end of the distribution. Inequality can also be the measure 
of ‘efficiency’ of poverty alleviation programs. That is one of the reasons we care not 
only about inequality as a social phenomenon, but as a phenomenon that has to be 
measured.  
 
 II The Methodological Side. 
 
Trying to narrow down the discussion about inequality, some authors have 
constrained the study of social inequality to economic science, in the sense that they 
focus their attention on the study of inequality mostly on the income space (Sen, 1973, p. 
2). 6  Even thinking only in economic grounds, it is difficult to separate economic 
inequality from other important human and social perspectives. As an example, an 
income distribution x might be suggested with an ‘equal’ allocation for two persons, we 
can say one unit for each individual. If there are only two units available in this economy, 
the economic researcher might assume that this is a desirable allocation of resources 
looking through the lenses of the egalitarian perspective. If we include a personal 
                                                 
6 Similarly, destitutions has been tried to be measured in the space of capabilities, where income is only a 
particular space of the whole set of vectors. Sen (1980), in his Equality of What?, is more devoted to reject 
the Utilitarian and the Rawlsian approach, rather than to define an space for inequality measurement. His 
main concern is to claim that the measurement of destitution should be done in the ‘capability’ space, 
taking as given that all the goods should be distributed in an ‘equal’ manner, regardless the space of 
consideration (Sen, 1992, pp. ix-x).  The consideration of inequality as a special destitution will be 
discussed along this work. 
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characteristic, saying that one of these persons is blind, the ‘equal’ allocation of resources 
seems to be unfair in this very simple income distribution. The traditional economic 
framework usually remains silent about the fairness of such distribution. This is just an 
example. On the implications of fairer distributions, the responsibility of who should be 
in charge of making the transfers of unfair allocations is questioned: usually the 
government is held responsible. There is no responsibility attached to the individuals that 
belongs to society, because those are assumed to be self-interested individuals that are 
resource-maximizers. Altruism, social responsibility or justice affairs seem to be out of 
the scope of traditional economic science, but this practice in the research is not 
desirable. If we expand the understanding of the traditional economic framework, digging 
in some of the assumptions in regards to justice, we might look at the philosophical 
foundations embedded in this setting, such that the economic researcher can be able to 
say something to the policy maker. The first part of this work sheds light on the 
measurement of inequality, not proposing new things, but exploring the philosophical 
traditions that have been so widely used on the consideration of inequality, touching on 
the issue of justice and fairness. Economic science has been relying on a set of ‘fixed’ 
value judgments used for a long period of time, so there is no reason that prevents us 
from exploring these value judgments, and realize that these assumptions are not outside 
the economic science, as it is usually argued.  
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 a) Philosophical issues. 
 
There are several strands in the methodological consideration of social inequality, 
because inequality is a concept that has a relationship with many forms of human 
deprivation. The first idea that is usually attached to discussions of inequality is related to 
some sense of justice. On these grounds, the legacy of the Marxist tradition, which is one 
of the most referred beliefs in the context of social deprivation, explains the existence of 
social inequality as a product of a continuous process of exploitation from the rich to the 
poor. That view includes a value judgment that has an underlying consideration of 
inequality as unfairness, a view that has been followed in the justice and economics 
literature by Rawls (1971) and Sen (1973, 1992, 2000) respectively. On the mathematical 
side, inequality is a phenomenon that can be measured in a variety of spaces; inequality 
uses suitable methods of comparison in order to make a relation between different 
measurement values attached to at least two different entities. The apparently simple rules 
embedded in the mathematical foundations have some limits, so these foundations neither 
explain social concerns, nor can consider economic implications and historical reasons 
related with the processes of social inequality altogether. 
In order to level our ground for the discussion of economic inequality, in the first 
chapter of this work, we use the methodological definition of economic inequality 
contained in Wright (1987), in order to separate theoretical components of inequality. We 
focus on the possible spaces of inequality, its processes, and the value judgments that are 
embedded in such comparisons. The first term might be expressed as a mathematical 
idea, once the space is defined. The processes tell the story of how inequality arises and 
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the theoretical interactions among the different factors related to such a process. The 
value judgments are intrinsically related with the perception of inequality made by a 
society and by the researcher. This last discussion has deep implications in the 
philosophical arena; such implications have been largely discussed many centuries ago by 
a variety of traditions of thought. The most evoked implication of inequality is in regards 
to social justice, and as I mentioned, a sense of unfairness strongly tied with inequality is 
assumed. In this view, inequality is usually rooted in the existence of social classes, but 
this epistemological approach misses the presence of natural inequalities present in every 
day life –though sporadically this theme is mentioned, and also misses the fact that 
inequality should be seen as a responsibility of every individual in the society, and not 
only as the responsibility of the government. Poverty alleviation programs needs the 
function of the government in order to allocate the poorest in the community, but the 
alleviation of inequality is different in the sense that this could be a task for everyone, 
because as long as each person detects another person in a worse-off condition, that is a 
matter of opportunity to help. 
The right understanding of the value judgments is important. The effort of 
obtaining lower inequality for the sake of doing so might have some problems. A 
pragmatic approach for inequality assessment is not sufficient. The Marxist 
understanding of inequality has been used with drastic negative consequences. The 
eleventh point of the Nationalist Socialist Program held by the Nazi party contemplated 
the abolition of unearned (work and labor) incomes,7 mostly referring to the wealth 
accumulated by the Jews, which were seen for Hitler as a menace. The socialist 
movement led by Hitler required also equality in other senses, such as equality of 
                                                 
7 US Office (1946). 
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thought,8 or equality of race;9 but this movement had disastrous consequences rooted in 
the inability to recognize natural individual heterogeneity. Lenin focused on the Marxist 
understanding of the source of injustice on the unfair allocation produced by all the rich 
people in the world: “It is not the Jews who are the enemies of the working people. The 
enemies of the workers are the capitalists of all countries” (Lenin, 1919).10 These points 
of view seem to see the existence of capital accumulation as a disease that should be 
abolished. Because of the previous examples, economic science can not blindly trust in 
fixed interpretations of certain ideologies, which are made by policy makers in order to 
build ‘equal’ societies. For instance, these ideals might lead again to a misunderstood 
desire for equality of race or to an absurd egalitarian possession rather than to the pursuit 
of equality of rights for every individual. The existence of inequalities in the world 
should not be seen anymore as a problematic disease, but as a measure of social 
responsibility held by every person in the community. In this sense, the issue of 
inequality might be philosophically understood, in the Confucian context, as the harmless 
care of not doing badly to the people around ourselves, but more than that, in the helpful 
and effective behavior towards neighbors in the same way that every individual wants to 
be treated, as the ancient Golden rule of Jesus stated. So, the inequality concept rather 
than to lead to rebellion, should lead to an idea of opportunity. There is only one person 
that might not be responsible for that task, and that person is the poorest person in the 
                                                 
8 “Only when we in the party, with the cooperation of everybody, make it the highest embodiment of 
National Socialist thought and spirit, will the party be an eternal and indestructible pillar of the German 
people and of our Reich. Then, eventually, the magnificent, glorious army, those old, proud warriors of our 
nation, will be joined by the political leadership of the party equally-tradition-minded and then these two 
institutions together will educate and strengthen the German man, and carry on their shoulders the German 
state, the German Reich.” (Hitler, 1934, emphasis added). 
9 In the US Office’s (1946) document, point 2 and 4. 
10 The effect of the Marxian philosophy also influenced the government of Stalin, but Marxists believers 
usually disentangle their creeds from the age of terror of Stalin, and imputes the responsibility of all 
wrongdoing to Stalin’s own personality. 
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community, the rest of the people have the obligation to share in order to alleviate the 
issue of inequality. 
 
 b) Economic Methodology. 
 
The second part of the first chapter touches on two main concerns in regards to 
social inequality that are taken as axioms in economic science: these axioms might make 
things problematic and are enumerated here. The first issue was tackled by Sen (1980), 
among others, with the critique of the utilitarian space on the consideration of well-being; 
the space of measurement used to be defined only in regards to the hedonic view of 
Bentham (1789). The second issue was the motivation underlying the concept of 
inequality. The deep influence of Rawls (1971) and his consideration of justice as 
fairness was a legacy of passiveness in issues of inequality, looking at inequality mostly 
as a Kantian device for moral reflection (Sen, 2000). It is true that in Rawls ideology, 
each individual is responsible to be part of the formation of a just city, taking the Platonic 
ideal of the construction of a just polis, but, as Sen argues, this concern lacks of 
pragmatic application. Therefore, even though there is a much defined normative 
framework that compels every individual to share with the most destitute, this framework 
remain silent about what should happen when individuals are not taking their 
responsibility in the alleviation of injustice seriously enough to act. Summing up, 
economic science deals with a space that was challenged by Sen, knowing that neither 
utility, nor income, would be an appropriate space in order to measure social inequality, 
but remains the issue of individual responsibility in the hands of the government, taking 
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over the task from people’s hands to put into practice, and putting the government in a 
position to be criticized every time that inequality is not alleviated. On the pragmatic 
sense, and for the consideration of the following part, the measurement of inequality has 
been done in income space, which is the starting point for most of the empirical work in 
recent years. 
 
 III Inequality Formulae, Operational and Technical Decisions of Data Sets. 
 
Traditional inequality measurement focuses on the monadic and relative attributes 
of the usual income space. Even with these theoretical restrictions, there are a variety of 
considerations that might change the perception of inequality shown by the different 
traditional inequality measures. The second and the third chapter of this work focus on 
social inequality, using the measure of inequality contained in the income space as an 
approximation.  
 
 a) Formulae. 
 
The first part of the second chapter describes the variety of inequality measures 
in standard literature. Considering the seminal work of Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973), 
among many others (Foster and Sen, 1997, Dutta, 2002, Cowell, 1995), we consider the 
usual definition of measures in the normative and the pragmatic sense. The Gini 
coefficient and the Theil Index are reviewed, highlighting some of their individual 
properties. Properties such as population independence, scale invariance and sub-group 
consistency are discussed. Going beyond the ‘completeness’ of these inequality measures 
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(Sen, 1973, p. 47), which might impose severe restrictions on the measurement, the 
inequality ranking embedded in the stochastic dominance is discussed as well (Foster and 
Sen, 1997). This tool will allow the introduction of a set of more general ranking tools 
that would allow distribution comparisons.  
 
 b) Poverty vs. Inequality. 
 
The last part of the second chapter touches upon an important issue in regards 
to inequality as a measure of destitution, because a similar concept of distributional 
judgment is somehow induced by measures of relative poverty. In economic science, 
particularly in welfare economics, poverty alleviation has been the main target for the 
solution of human underdevelopment. It is argued that there is no sense in caring about 
the egalitarian distribution of Rolls Royce in the community if there are people still 
lacking basic goods for subsistence. The school of the ‘absolutist’ poverty measurement 
usually maintains that the consideration of inequality as a measure of destitution does not 
account with basic subsistence judgments, among other things. Authors that try to find 
some resemblance between poverty and inequality measurement might be more flexible 
using formal arguments to prove that as long as inequality measures include some sort of 
transfer ‘sensitiveness’, such that transfers done at the lower end of the scale are the most 
important, inequality consideration should be as important as the transfers made for 
poverty alleviation, under particular circumstances (Foster and Shorrocks, 1988a). 
In some European traditions, inequality concerns are usually embedded in the 
measurement of relative poverty. The use of the fraction of the median (or the mean) as a 
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cutoff point for the definition of who is poor, and the endogenous consideration of the 
income distribution when this is done, may send the signal to the inexpert reader that 
measuring poverty in this way also takes into consideration some sort of inequality 
measurement. This might be so in abstract terms, but inequality is a pragmatic aspect of 
deprivation that is tackled fully neither by relative nor by absolute measures of poverty. 
In the articulated consideration of inequality and poverty measurement it is shown that, 
through the Sen-Townsend discussion, the consideration of relative poverty neither 
tackles the issue of human destitution clearly, nor enlightens the shape of social 
inequality with accuracy. 
The argument of this paper is not to privilege the use of inequality as ‘the’ 
measure of destitution; this paper argues that inequality measurement has practical 
implications that differ from poverty measurement. Inequality is a social phenomenon 
that shows a different face of human destitution, so it is better treated separately from 
poverty measurement. On the one hand, poverty alleviation programs can indeed be a 
measure of governmental efficiency, as long as poverty consistently decreases. On the 
other hand, the usefulness of inequality measurement tells us which sectors within a 
society should be provided with the opportunity to benefit from a fairer distribution; in 
extreme cases, very high levels of inequality warns the society about social unfairness 
and injustice, with the possibility of rebellion (Sen, 1973, p. 1). 
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 c) Operational Decisions. 
 
Once an empirical approach is selected for the measurement of social inequality, 
there are a variety of decisions to be made in regards to the treatment of the information 
in the data set. That is the purpose of the third chapter of this work. The information 
provided by the survey data usually comes from three sources: census data, income 
(employment) surveys, and consumption-expenditure surveys. These data sets have their 
own properties and limitations, so our approach discusses the benefit of measuring 
inequality using income data that comes from employment surveys. The limitations are 
mentioned as well, such as possible problems in the calculations due to a variety of biases 
(e.g. non-response, underreporting, or selection issues, among others), so these issues 
affect the measurement of inequality. Other implications of the methodology of the 
survey are also considered, such as the inclusion of regional prices, the choice of sub-
groups on the reports of the calculations, and the different treatment between individual 
and household measurement through the use of equivalence scales. 
 
 IV The Case of Mexico. 
 
Some things had changed since the start of this dissertation. This thesis started 
with a concern about the possibly neglected literature in regards to the assessment of 
inequality in Mexico. When the author of this work started to inquire about these issues 
in 2004, the literature was centered around poverty measurement rather than about the 
assessment of distributional judgments. The effort of the Mexican government for the 
definition of a reliable poverty measurement took almost five years to be completed, 
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since the first round of seminars organized by the Secretariat of Social Development 
(SEDESOL) in the year 2000 (CTMP, 2002, Cortés, 2005). Nowadays, the focus of the 
attention is on the measurement of multidimensional deprivation with the use of Human 
Development Indices (Székely, 2006), and there is some inclusion of distributional 
sensitiveness in these type of measurement that is applied for the case of Mexico (Foster 
et. al. 2005). The present multidimensional focus is mainly due to the influence of Sen 
and his capability approach, and the multidimensional measurement also follows the 
tradition of Human Development Reports that started to be published by the United 
Nations in the year 1990. Nowadays, there is a lot of interest in Mexico in 
multidimensional measurement with the use of the principal component analysis 
methodologies, and also the use of geospatial tools available through the use of GIS 
(Geographical Information Systems) technology. The National Population Council 
(CONAPO) has been working hard in the production of marginalization indices and 
geospatial maps in order to assess destitution using the philosophy of social exclusion. 
SEDESOL has been also busy on the proper allocation of resources to the poor. Among 
other things, they have been selecting with increasing efficiency a variety of technical 
tools to target the 5 million households that receive governmental transfers from the 
program OPORTUNIDADES.  
Unfortunately, Mexico belongs to a tradition where the levels of inequality are so 
high and pervasive that it makes development difficult, as is the case for almost all Latin 
American countries. The next five chapters discuss the consideration of income 
distribution for Mexico, where several gaps in the area of research can be seen. This 
research is not trying to be comprehensive, because the amount of effort in order to cover 
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all the possible issues in regards to inequality measurement is very vast. This work only 
highlights what according to this author are the more important issues that are pertinent in 
the consideration of inequality, and because of that, in the assessment of social inequality 
that might be considered to be a separate side of human welfare.   
The fourth chapter presents a sensitivity analysis of inequality measurement, 
considering some of the different operational and technical procedures. This chapter 
provides an intuition for the researcher that the consideration of measures of inequality 
should be treated with caution. The reported Gini coefficients, which are usually 
presented in every source of development literature, vary in regards to the operational 
decisions taken to measure them, but unfortunately, as it is common for every Latin 
American country, which methodology is considered for the assessment of those 
inequality results is not usually spelled out explicitly (Medina, 2001). The empirical 
exercise proves that inequality measurement is sensitive to the recipient unit chosen, is 
sensitive to regional price consideration, is also sensitive to the type of survey data used 
(e.g. income vs. expenditure surveys), and varies in regards to the survey coverage, which 
is a function of the budget spent on the survey, among other things. This exercise should 
not discourage the measurement of inequality, but it should compel the researcher to 
make the assumptions clear in order to provide not only good, but comparable estimates 
of inequality ‘across papers’.  
The fifth chapter explains the natural disarray of measurement of destitution that 
is common in developing countries. The particular case of Mexico shows a variety of 
measures of destitution that are stipulated in several regulations in the Mexican legal 
system. The measurement that follows the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) approach is 
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the official measure, but it is not the only one, there are other measures that consider the 
principal component analysis methodology or some ad-hoc measurement in order to 
allocate federal resources. In the same chapter is discussed the political implications for 
the measurement of poverty, the resource allocation that are related with these kind of 
measurement, and the possible conflicts between governmental offices that measure 
human destitution. On the technical side, the type of measures chosen might pose a 
problem in order to make the results comparable, but more than that, these measures 
would give a different view of where and how many the most destitute are in a 
community, and will also give a different idea of the intensity of these destitutions, so, 
the allocation of resources for them might become a discretionary issue, with the danger 
to leave out from governmental programs specific sections of the most destitute 
population.  
There are some reasons that have been clearly identified behind why inequality 
measurement was not included in the recent research agenda in regards of destitution 
assessment in Mexico. These issues are tackled in detail in the sixth chapter. The 
Mexican literature referred to an ambiguous relationship of inequality with the main 
indicator of destitution, which is poverty measurement (CTMP, 2002). Referring to the 
work of recognized Mexican researchers (Cortes and Rubalcava, 1991), they discussed 
that it was possible that inequality levels could decrease with an increase in the number of 
the poor people. It is argued in this work that the finding of this ambiguous relationship is 
difficult to support controlling for the mean income. It is difficult to support this finding 
in the light of newer techniques for inequality assessment, and also with the use of better 
data sets. The finding was based on an empirical analysis with the constraint of having 
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only an aggregated data set, and the analysis was done relying on the intuition provided 
by sociological literature of that time explaining awkward behavior of householders 
during crisis. With the use of theoretical relationships and a variety of empirical 
correlation tests it is shown that the empirical finding of Cortes and Rubalcava (1991) 
could be misguided. The main issue here would be that the supposedly ambiguous 
relation of poverty and inequality found in CTMP (2002) would be a product of a set of 
measurement errors on the information available; therefore, the introduction of inequality 
judgments in the Mexican income distribution should be included again on the research 
agenda. 
The seventh chapter is not entirely devoted to the case of Mexico in particular, 
only the last part. The first part of the chapter touches on the definition of inequality 
measurement in the context of the capability approach of Sen, and also touches the 
consideration of natural intrahousehold inequality with the theory of equivalence scales, 
which assigns weights to each individual in regards to their gender, age, and also in 
regards to the number of individuals within the household.  The discussion of the 
capability approach centers the attention on the definition of the destitution spaces, with a 
proper identification of dimensions. In the light of the right that any community has in 
order to define what is good for them, the fixed approach of Nussbaum (2000) is rejected, 
and the ‘incomplete’ definition of functionings of Sen (1992) that is enlarged by Robeyns 
(2005b) seems to be more appropriate, but in both approaches, the consideration of 
inequality as a destitution is clearly defined. As we have said, the last part of the chapter 
discusses the Mexican literature, but contextualized on the inequality considerations 
included both in the capability approach and also in the equivalence scales literature. The 
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Mexican literature has progressively included these inequality concerns in the research, 
and it is normal that some concepts have been misunderstood, but this is understandable 
because the development literature in these regards is not yet conclusive. 
The eight and final chapter is an empirical application of the capability approach 
using Mexican data, comparing inequality levels with the different functionings in the 
community. The main argument is that inequality levels, when those are rightly 
measured, are related in such a way that whenever there is deprivation on other 
functionings it is expected that the levels of inequality would be higher as well. Our 
exercise proved that in a more unequal community it is expected to see higher levels of 
deprivation in regards to income, services, and overall higher levels of destitution. The 
results are statistically significant with the construction of an empirical model using 
traditional OLS, followed by a variety of robustness checks, and the results are also clear 
with the graphical interface provided by dispersion analysis charts. 
 
 V Conventions of this work 
 
In economic literature, there are several terms that are interchangeably used to 
describe the concepts of well-being. Following Sen (1985b, pp. 2-3; 1985d, pp. 1-2) 
literature, I will refer to the use of the word ‘welfare’ in a broader sense, not only in the 
utilitarian framework. Welfare is mostly related to individuals or households. The word 
‘well-being’ might be used interchangeably with ‘welfare’ as well. The word ‘well-being’ 
is also used in psychology literature, referring to mental states, but in order to stress the 
difference and to avoid the confusion, any subjective perception would be specifically 
addressed as ‘subjective well-being’ or ‘subjective welfare’, such as the terminology used 
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to define happiness. Another idea that has been used in this dissertation is ‘the standard of 
living’; we will assume that standard of living considers the overall welfare of the 
community, particularly focusing on the quality of life. The reverse phrase, which is ‘the 
living standard’, would communicate the idea of a certain characteristic of welfare 
attached to some particular state of an individual. 
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Part II. Chapters 
 
11   Inequality and Distributive Justice: Methodological Definition and Ethical 
Views in Economics. 
 
1.1 Abstract. 
 
Four components of inequality are explored using the Methodology of Wright (1987): 
attributes, processes, space and value judgments. Exploring those components might help 
us to understand why the perception of inequality can not be ‘objectively’ described, but 
only ‘subjectively’ perceived. To understand the link between the perception of 
inequality with that of fairness is important, because they are closely associated. Certain 
typologies in the methodological study of inequality are very important to understand the 
plurality of ideas in regards to inequality, such as those used in the Marxian or the 
Rawlsian theory, both related with Kantian philosophy, and also the approach explored 
nowadays of Capabilities and Functionings of Professor Sen. The present concept of 
inequality comes from some branch of the Greek tradition, and in this chapter is 
contrasted with other approaches within the same Greek tradition and with other ancient 
backgrounds, such as the one developed in the Jewish literature. It is argued here that the 
importance of the sense of injustice attached to the idea of inequality relies, not in the 
very existence of classes as the Marxian theory suggests, but in the artificial modification 
of the natural conditions and the responsibility of the inhabitants in this matter, as is 
argued in the Jewish literature. 
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1.2 Introduction.  
 
This chapter discusses the methodological basis of inequality measurement, and 
tackles the issue of the perception of inequality as unfairness. There are practical 
implications that are derived from the philosophical foundations of inequality, and it is 
argued that the sense of justice attached to inequality might be related to the chosen 
foundational system of thought. This concept also varies in regards of how the ancient 
traditions conceptualize the issue of justice and unfairness. More recently, the Marxian 
inheritance has been proven to be very influential in our present concept of inequality, 
based on the conception of historical materialism, but it is argued that it is not necessary 
to endorse this doctrine in order to urge both the government and the society about the 
pervasive and negative effects of high inequality in the society. In order to make some 
positions clear, other traditions in regards of justice assessment say that it is not only 
responsibility of the government sector to solve the problem of an unequal society; to 
solve the issue it is required social participation in order to break the vicious circle of an 
unequal society. A corollary of these positions is that the government should focus on 
artificial changes that produce inequality such that those artificial processes might be 
prevented,  leaving to individuals their responsibility in order to tackle the issue of 
inequality, which can also come from normal processes. But before making policy 
recommendations, it is necessary to define clearly what the foundations of inequality 
assessment are. 
There are several reasons for considering the issue of economic inequality. In 
policy analysis, higher degrees of inequality are usually associated with social problems 
42 
or with people’s discontent (Sen, 1973, p. 1; 1999, p. 93). The sense of deprivation might 
not be related only with the lack of basic necessities expressed as in a certain 
representation of the poverty line, but also with the assessment that every individual 
makes when s/he compares his/her own well-being with others (Foster and Sen, 1997, p. 
185). This made us think that the study of inequality is important by itself, and not only 
because it is related to other kinds of deprivation or because the value judgment is used to 
assess deprivation. One of the most cited quotes on the idea of inequality in economics 
can be traced back to Adam Smith. In 1776, in the Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations, Smith emphasized the role of commodities as ‘necessities’, being 
the same in nature but varying from culture to culture depending on the customs: 
 
“By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are 
indispensibly necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the 
country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be 
without. … . The poorest creditable person, of either sex, would be ashamed to 
appear in public without them”. (1776, WN, 5.II). 
 
The perception of some basic goods can only be understood when they are taken 
into account within the environment and within the community where the individual 
lives. So in the community, it happens that the pattern of consumption is influenced by 
the income of others. Therefore, the assessment of the individual to appear in public 
without shame, can be understood if and only if we think that she is able to compare 
herself with others, and for that we assume that she possesses certain value judgments to 
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make those comparisons. The fact is that people make comparisons using their own 
criteria, and this matters since this is an important social phenomenon. That is the reason 
why social inequality has been a matter of concern not only for the economists or 
politicians, but for the sociologists and philosophers as well. Inequality is a form of 
deprivation that, in some particular spaces, might even be ‘objectively’ measured, but 
regardless of these precise measurements, inequality will always be subjectively 
perceived, because we do not know for sure how much inequality is harmful to society. 
To sketch some ideas of how people make those comparisons and which basis they use is 
the purpose of this chapter. 
Once we know the importance of the study of inequality, it is necessary to explore 
the definitions and the roots of this concept. The linguistic nature of the word inequality 
might give rise to a variety of ideas, so it is necessary to define the context of the 
discussion. That word inequality usually has attached to it certain value judgments, and 
also philosophical positions. Inequality is not only an issue of mathematical comparisons. 
If the meaning of the concept is explored, it is possible to level the ground to avoid 
linguistic confusion for discussion. For instance, it can be the case that some people argue 
about the causes that produce inequality, stressing the underlying relationships, but there 
might be others who may think on inequality as a ‘bad’ thing by itself, not looking at the 
causes but about the ethical values behind it. We might consider the question: ‘Inequality 
of what?’, thinking on the space where inequality is measured, or the alternative question: 
‘Inequality among whom?’ Because it should not be forgotten that inequality is 
something that is contextualized to a recipient unit, where the social unit might be 
individuals, groups of individuals (e.g. households), countries, communities, or 
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geographical groups within a society, just to mention some examples. It is discussed in 
this chapter why it is very frequently taken as given that the value judgment assumed is 
that inequality is a ‘bad’ thing, always a social disease, following the Marxian tradition. 
Sometimes the strong position, that emphasizes the struggle among classes, makes it 
difficult to understand that inequality might come from natural differences. The artificial 
change of those conditions might explain the unfair and undesired inequality, but not the 
very existence of those conditions. In the rest of the chapter, it will not be assumed that 
the concept of inequality is ‘equally’ understood by all. It will be explained, using a 
particular methodological framework: the dissection of the inequality concept of its 
attributes and processes under certain value judgments. 
 
••   Overview 
 
The definition of inequality is first addressed in section 1.3, followed by the 
theoretical components of inequality, which are separated in section 1.4, as are a) its 
attributes or dimensions, and b) what generates inequality and due to which process. The 
suitable space where inequality is calculated is discussed in section 1.5. The ethical and 
moral values underlying the concept of inequality are mentioned and opened for 
discussion in section 1.6. Using the previous discussions, the approach of traditional 
economic theory is analyzed in section 1.7, finalizing with some concluding remarks in 
the light of the material presented. 
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1.3 Definition.  
 
There are several issues in regards to ‘inequalities’, so it is appropriate if we try 
first to define what inequality is. The root is the Latin word in- + aequalis (equal), 
meaning ‘non-equal’, or “Lack of equality, as of opportunity, treatment, or status”.12 
Inequality does not have a meaning by itself, so it is a negation of another word. So in 
order to pursue this further, it can be convenient to look instead at the definition of 
‘equality’ rather than inequality. Equality means that the object of appreciation 
corresponds among some particular group of objects, persons, processes or 
circumstances, sharing at least one specific attribute. A stronger version of this word will 
be ‘identity’ (total correspondence of the object to the other(s) object(s) in all attributes), 
and a weaker version could be ‘similarity’, a partial correspondence (Gosepath, 2007). 
Identity implies equality, and equality implies similarity, but not the other way around. 
Inequality means, in this sense, a non correspondence to some degree in at least some of 
the attributes. In economics, we can think that the word inequality entails in its notion 
some preconception of a non-balanced ideal situation, so inequality arises when this 
model changes due to a certain process, as will be discussed later. How the ‘ideal’ 
situation is preconceived in this model is a matter of philosophical debate, and it will be 
commented upon in detail in section 1.6.  
Equality and inequality are ideas that need some kind of context. It is important 
that an author mentions clearly what kind of inequality or equality she is making 
reference to, in order to avoid confusion. For instance, income inequality explores the 
non-correspondence among particular groups of people or households (called recipient 
                                                 
12 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (2000) and Wiktionary. (2008). 
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units). Those groups share the particular attribute of having access to some particular 
amount of earning, usually called income. On the epistemological context, the use of the 
term inequality is for our purposes, mostly descriptive rather than prescriptive. But it is 
possible to discuss the prescriptive use of this term if we touch on the ethics and morals 
behind the concept of inequality. In the same setting, ethical value and the morality of 
inequality are closely linked with concepts of justice and fairness. Now that the 
etymological concept is defined, in the following section some particular attributes of 
inequality will be explored in the context of economics. 
 
1.4 Typology of inequality: Inequality as an abstract concept.  
 
 I Inequality Attributes.  
 
The typology of inequality in economics, as described by Wright (1987), can be 
helpful to explain two of its components: a) the attribute of social inequality and b) the 
kind of process that leads towards that state of inequality. This typology will be 
convenient for two purposes, to shed light over the space where inequality is calculated, 
and maybe the unit measure, and also to separate the observed value of inequality from 
the process that generates it. The study of the typology will also make clear another 
difference: that inequality is always making reference to a relevant group in the society 
and to a relevant attribute as well, so that every group (individual, community, etc.) might 
have a different amount of some of this attribute (income, weight, power, etc.). It will be 
shown that when this distribution is the same for all units, this leads to equality, and when 
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not, to inequality. It will be explained which form the attributes can take, and later, how 
these processes can take place, in other words, how inequality arises.  
The attributes can be divided into two kinds: ‘monadic’ and ‘relational’. The 
former are the ones that, in order to describe their magnitude, should not need reference 
to anything else. The latter might have a reference (or a relation) to something else. 
Monadic attributes can be, for instance, food or material goods; their quantification does 
not need a reference to anything else. 13  The same happens to the consideration of 
personal characteristics, such as gender, weight, size, and similar things, which do not 
need reference to anything else. On the other hand, the ‘relational’ attributes have 
reference to something else; this can be the idea of freedom, which might be narrowly 
defined by the absence of constraints on opportunities. Another example of a relational 
attribute is power, which might be possessed in large amounts by politicians in a society, 
but in a very limited amount by the rest of the individuals. It is difficult to define power, 
but if we define it as the ability to obtain things from others, power is a ‘relational’ 
attribute, which depends on the number of people that are controlled by the one with 
power.  
Now it can be understood better that when income is emphasized as the space of 
inequality, the argument is done with respect to a ‘monadic’ attribute, because the 
attribute is usually focused in terms of material goods, food, or the equivalent in money. 
However, we know that income does not capture all the people’s well-being, so it is 
difficult to find in this space other things that, though necessary, are not in the goods 
                                                 
13 We could think that material goods are quantified in terms of money, and that could be related with 
relative prices, or the exchange value of money, so in that sense, the ‘monadic’ characteristic of the 
attribute would be violated because of its reference to ‘something else’. Knowing that is needed to have a 
starting point, it assumed that prices are given, and because of that, material goods are well defined in that 
space. 
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market. For the definition of some of the non-monetary goods, such as democracy or 
freedom or access to education, we do not need a monadic focus on attributes, we need to 
focus on the ‘relational’ attributes, as it can be clear that such examples of human rights 
make reference to something else. It is possible to have a mixture of relational and 
monadic spaces, for instance, the capability approach of Sen that uses a variety of spaces. 
This approach recognizes the complexity of the space where well-being is measured. The 
(achieved) functioning bundles are mostly related with monadic attributes (e.g. food, 
clean water supply, access to education), and capabilities (or freedoms) are mostly related 
with relational attributes (e.g. democracy, participation, etc.). Now let’s go to the 
processes. 
 
 II Inequality Processes.  
 
The classification of the processes goes in the same fashion as the attributes: we 
have monadic processes and relational processes. In the monadic processes, the unit in 
consideration relates to self-contained processes, in other words, the attribute in the 
monadic process is not related with any other process that drives inequality. It is difficult 
to find a pure monadic process, but for instance, if we consider the distribution of air that 
is breathed in a community, it is a function of the amount of the required air only by 
individuals in regards to their needs. The individual’s life cycle can be considered, but the 
amount of air required is not constrained by something else, there is plenty of it. 
Following the same example, the quantity of air that is breathed by a small baby is not the 
same as that for an adult; the quantity changes according to personal characteristics of the 
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individual.14 It is important to understand the role of personal characteristics, because 
those are usually attached to monadic processes. Each individual possess a number of 
characteristics that are not related to something else, personal characteristics only belong 
to each person. Understanding this link, it can be clear for the government that some 
distribution of services will depend on each person’s characteristics. For instance, the 
distribution of health services has a part that is intrinsically related to personal 
characteristics (e.g. maternal care, child vaccination), and because of that, the distribution 
of health service can be seen as a monadic process. 
As opposed to the monadic process, we have relational processes that are related 
to some other process or attribute. Using the same health service example, a relational 
process that is associated with something else is a transferable disease, because we need 
to think in terms of a distribution of health care that it is due to some (negative) 
interaction among the people. In this case, the form of health care distribution will be a 
function of the interaction between the members of the community, and the likely 
spreading of some particular microorganism.  In this case, part of the health distribution 
is a relational process. 
Both relational and monadic processes can produce changes in relational and/or 
monadic attributes. For instance, a poor health distribution (relational and monadic 
process) might produce a more unequal income distribution (monadic attribute), because 
of lack of opportunities (relational attribute). Some relational processes are self 
reinforced. If we think on power as a process and not only as an attribute, the person that 
has been gaining power over others, in the meantime he/she will be more powerful if 
                                                 
14 In this case we should ignore that the amount of people in the community is related with the interactions 
of reproduction among them, and we also ignore the influence of others personal characteristics such as 
genetic inheritance, so none of this is considered for our monadic ideal definition. 
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nothing stops this process. This will produce a more unequal distribution of the attribute 
as well. If we think in a different example, the number of income transfers (monadic 
process) from the rich to the poor might be considered a self-propelling mechanism to 
alleviate the unequal distribution (monadic attribute), because the poor might be feeling 
compelled to make transfers to the poorest as well.  
 
 III Monadic and Relational Issues in Modern Measurement.  
 
Using the typology described above, if we deal with the historical reasons that are 
behind the causes of inequality, we will be dealing with the ‘relational’ process of 
inequality, while if we focus in the personal characteristics, and how those show today 
the levels of inequality, we will be dealing with the ‘monadic’ process of inequality. 
Finally, it is clear that a mixture of these processes can occur. A suitable example might 
be gender inequality. In this case the ‘monadic’ processes, due to the natural sexual 
personal characteristics, and the ‘relational’ processes, due to the customs and norms 
enacted by the society in regards to this differentiation, both can explain the overall 
process of inequality in a particular space. 
Having in mind the two dimensions of the typology of inequality (its attributes 
and its processes), we know that the traditional measurement of income inequality deals 
with the study of its ‘monadic’ attributes that come mostly from a ‘relational’ process. 
Because of practical issues, inequality measurement usually focuses on the measurement 
of the monadic attribute, but not on the relational process that causes it. For the sake of 
clarity, we can see in Table 1-1 some examples that are based on the classification just 
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presented (Wright, 1987). The types of inequality that are usually studied in the 
assessment of welfare are highlighted in bold letters, which is the focus of most of the 
empirical research on inequality.  
 
Relational Relational/Monadic Monadic
Relational Power, Status Participation Income
Relational/Monadic
Authority based on 
achievement 
(democracy).
Functioning 
Bundles and 
Capabilities.
Income with 
equivalence scales, 
Epidemiology.
Monadic Natural Talent. Personal Achievment Personal Health, Weight, Height.
Form of the unequal attribute
Form of the 
distribution of 
Processes
 
Table 1-1. Typology of Inequality 
 
It is necessary to know the limitations of the inequality type of measurement. For 
instance, on the one hand, when we deal with traditional formulations that calculate 
income inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, it can only be possible to explore the 
monadic attribute of income that is measured in cardinal units. The relational process that 
caused inequality might be explored at some extent with Entropy measures, because the 
regional composition is feasible to explore with such a measure, but on the Gini 
coefficient that process is not visible. On the other hand, another way to consider 
inequality is the use of equivalence scales, which consider individual heterogeneity. In 
this case the same monadic attribute of income is considered, but now focusing on the 
monadic processes that are due to the personal characteristics of individuals. Nowadays 
there is no type of measure that can explore all forms of distribution processes and all 
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unequal attributes at once because the data is not available, but a multidimensional 
measure might serve as a beginning. 
When income inequality across some period of time is studied, we explore the 
processes that drive the course of the distribution of income. This relationship is not 
usually captured in full by the standard measures, such as the Gini coefficient or Theil 
index. In this standard measurement, we can not see which might be the cause that is 
driving the cited inequality, which likely comes from a mixture of ‘relational’ and 
‘monadic’ processes. In spite of the focus on the monadic attributes of income, it is 
possible to use some discovered characteristics of the standard measures in order to 
explore the relational process embedded in income, doing this through certain properties 
such as decomposability, either by population subgroup or by income source. The 
‘subgroup consistency’ is more a relational property, which says how much inequality 
affects each group of people; this is clearly a relational implication. The decomposition 
by income source also tells which of the reasons behind inequality are, and how assets, 
savings, and other sources affect directly or indirectly the ‘motion’ of inequality across 
households. These properties allow the researcher to explore some of the reasons which 
are beyond the scope of the superficially observed income inequality, and allow her/him 
to think about how those reasons contribute to the overall phenomenon. Going beyond 
technical specifications, we are going into the terrain, not very firm, of inequality 
measurement, so we discuss the space for calculations that may be seen as an extension 
of the attributes just mentioned. 
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1.5 Space for calculations.  
 
The discussion about the space where inequality shall be measured is not short. 
This question has been addressed by many, but recently in economics by Amartya Sen in 
his Equality of What? (1980).15 In that paper he rejected the ethical views of both the 
utility maximization approach and Rawls’ justice. He contrasted those two approaches 
with his own approach of capabilities and rejected them. Afterwards, the literature 
became very broad on the definition of the space where to measure deprivation. That 
literature includes discussions with regards to the appropriate space to measure welfare, 
such as non-income spaces, multidimensional capability vectors, various types of 
functioning bundles, and a mixture of those views. 16  In spite of methodological 
discussions, there are issues of a practical nature that are yet to be completely resolved, 
for instance when only income is chosen from the plethora of spaces available (Cowell, 
1995, p. 4). Therefore, it is clear that the discussion dealing with the suitable space to 
measure well-being is broad. This paper focuses on the approaches that struggle with 
issues of welfare, and particularly with inequality measurement.  
 
 I Utilitarian Space.  
 
Considering the appropriate space where inequality shall be calculated, we find 
that most modern economists reject the utilitarian aggregated space in the sense of 
Bentham, when he considered the social welfare through the aggregation of every 
                                                 
15 See also Sen (1992, 2000). 
16 See for instance the Mexican case (CTMP, 2002, pp. 24-32). 
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personal utility (Sen, 1973, p. 15; 1980; Foster and Sen, 1997, p. 112). The strong 
assumption that avoids interpersonal comparisons, assuming that all individuals obtain 
the same utility from the same basket of goods, makes things problematic (Sen, 1973, p. 
12; 2000, p. 67). In this view it is necessary to assume identical individuals, with identical 
levels of satisfaction that come from the enjoyment of a particular good. Defending this 
approach, authors like Harsanyi (1987, p. 955), saw this problem not as a serious one, 
saying that it is only difficult to do the formalization of this approach because of the 
embedded philosophical complexity of the measurement, arguing that every person has 
access only to her own mental inwardness, and not to the others. We need to keep in mind 
those controversies on the measurement of well-being, particularly when it is necessary to 
impute a numerical value to every recipient unit (e.g. person) and their utility. When we 
think that people’s income is the expression of their ‘utility’, or more than that, if we 
think that utility is a good approximation of their welfare, there are many underlying 
assumptions made, much more if we want to believe that each person enjoys the same 
level of utility with the same amount of money spent (either looking to utility as a 
‘pleasure’, in the hedonistic view, or as a satisfaction from the consumed good, in the 
modern view).17
One utilitarian challenge that was not properly solved was the incommensurability 
of human pleasure (Welch, 1987). It is important for us to know a bit about the reason for 
the limitations of interpersonal comparisons in the utilitarian framework, and because of 
that, the limitations on inequality assessment in such framework. If we assume that all 
individuals possess an identical utility function, this has the consequence of having the 
social welfare function defined over the set of individuals and their orderings, which 
                                                 
17 See Sen (1973, p. 16, n. 21). 
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makes the task of considering the income distribution very difficult from the very 
beginning: cardinality is a problem (Sen, 1973, p. 13). As early as 1879, the professor of 
jurisprudence, T. E. Cliffe Leslie, wrote:  
 
“There is an illusive semblance of simplicity in the Utilitarian formula… it 
assumes an unreal concord about the constituents of happiness and an unreal 
homogeneity of human minds in point of sensibility to different pains and pleasures 
… Nor is it possible to weigh bodily and mental pleasures and pains one against the 
other; no single man can pronounce with certainty about their relative intensity 
even for himself, far less for all his fellows”. (1879, pp. 45-6). 
 
This and other critiques undermined the hedonistic utilitarian framework. Later 
other (‘non-welfaristic’) approaches were progressively replacing it. We discuss some of 
these approaches below. 
 
 II ‘Commodities’ and the Basic Needs Approach.  
 
As a reaction against the utilitarian-hedonic view in the assessment of welfare, a 
popular school during the 70’s was the Basic Needs Approach (BNA). It was a popular 
and influential approach in development economics. It emphasized the right of every 
individual to have access to certain ‘basic’ goods. Those goods were not only very basic, 
such as food, shelter, clothing, or community services (water, public transportation, or 
health access), but also include the participation of people in the decisions in regards to 
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their own well-being (Ghai et al. 1977, p. 9). The problem with the BNA is that it went to 
the other extreme, in the sense that it was far away from subjective considerations, so it 
overemphasized commodity needs.18 The first Human Development Report, issued in 
1990, criticized the BNA in the following way: “the basic needs approach usually 
concentrates on the bundle of goods and services that deprived population groups need: 
… It focuses on the provision of these goods and services rather than on the issue of 
human choices” (UNDP, 1990, p. 11). At that time, most of the BNA welfare assessments 
used only income as the appropriate space for the calculations, given some particular 
basket of ‘basic’ goods. 
Sen tried to generalize this framework, extending the scope of the BNA to a wider 
range (Alkire, 2002, p. 19). Sen wrote that it was necessary “to take the basic needs 
approach out of the arbitrarily narrow box into which it seems to have got confined. To 
see it as just one part of the capabilities approach—to which it is motivationally linked—
would do just that” (Sen, 1984, p. 515). He criticized the lack of philosophical foundation 
of the BNA, and its usefulness only for very poor countries. He offered the idea of 
capabilities as an active concept, instead of the passive concept of ‘needs’ (Sen, 1984, pp 
512-514). In any case, what is true is that the use of income, as a suitable space to 
calculate welfare, is rooted in the BNA School. Income is still widely used because of 
one practical issue: it is usually the only data source available in many surveys. So, even 
remembering that the BNA was rejected by the subsequent approach of capabilities, BNA 
can not be ignored as a useful, and some times the only, practical approximation for the 
assessment of welfare. 
                                                 
18 Alkire (2002) refers to this as ‘commodity fetishism’ (p. 14, n. 58), bibliography and discussion of BNA 
in Alkire (2002, pp. 166-167).  
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  III Functioning bundles and the Capability Approach.  
 
Sen is usually held responsible for introducing a new space for the assessment of 
well-being: functionings and capabilities. I will quote two important paragraphs that 
describe both the root and the present understanding of capabilities and functionings 
concepts. The first one is due to Sen in 1985. At that time he formally described his 
rejection to utilitarianism that he wrote previously in his third Hennipman Lecture.19 He 
mentioned the problems of well-being definitions when interpersonal comparisons are 
taken into account. Moreover, he questioned the problems of having just income as the 
sole space for the measurement of poverty, as we can see in the following part with his 
famous bicycle example: 
 
 “In judging the well-being of the person, it would be premature to limit the 
analysis to the characteristics of goods possessed. We have to consider the 
‘functionings’ of persons. While the ownership of commodities is a personal 
matter, and thus the command over the characteristics of goods owned is also a 
personal matter, the quantification of characteristics does not vary with the personal 
features of the individual possessing the goods. A bicycle is treated as having the 
characteristic of ‘transportation’, and this is the case whether or not the particular 
person happening to possess the bike is able bodied or crippled. In getting an idea 
of the well being of the person, we clearly have to move on to ‘functionings’, to 
                                                 
19 Methodologically discussed (Sen, 1985b, Ch. 3), and previously rejected in Sen (1973, p. 15-9). 
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wit, what a person succeeds in doing with the commodities and characteristics at his 
or her command” (Sen, 1985b, pp. 9-10). 
 
He was referring to the ‘functioning’ idea contained in Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, where it was necessary to understand the human final (and best) good that drives 
people’s seeking of their own well-being (Sen, 1999, p. 73). This idea has been 
formalized and surveyed by various authors.20 I think the next paragraph resumes the 
abstract idea of the capability approach because of the new developed terminology of 
‘capabilities’, ‘functionings’, ‘functioning bundle’, and ‘capability set’:  
 
“The functionings approach to the notion of living standards is an important 
recent development in welfare economics. The core of the approach, initiated by 
Sen … and Nussbaum …, consists of the idea that the notion of the standard of 
living should be formulated in terms of functionings (i.e., the ‘doings’ and ‘beings’ 
that have ‘intrinsic value’ for people and capabilities rather than in terms of utility 
or commodities). Several related approaches stem from this central idea. First, we 
have the approach where a person’s standard of living is assumed to be determined 
exclusively by his achieved functioning bundle. An alternative approach is based on 
the assumption that a person’s standard of living depends exclusively on his 
capability set (i.e., the set of all mutually exclusive functioning bundles available to 
him), which reflects the opportunities available to the person. Lastly, we have a 
more general conceptual framework where a person’s standard of living is 
determined by his capability set and / or the functioning bundle belonging to his 
                                                 
20 A good survey might be found in Robeyns (2005).  
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capability set, which he actually achieves. It is clear that the first two frameworks 
are special cases of the third” (Pattanaik and Xu, 2007, introduction). 
 
The proposed space is broad for the calculations of inequality and for any 
standard of living, because of the inclusion of both relational and monadic attributes. This 
approach tries to explore the implications of any possible space where destitution might 
take place. But it is not the purpose of this chapter to discuss the validity of this approach, 
even though has been proven very useful.21 The purpose in this section is just to mention 
that the capability approach offers an alternative space where well-being can be 
measured. 22  The challenge that faces the capability approach is related with the 
formalization of its multidimensional setting, problem that is not shared by the utilitarian 
framework. Sen itself proposed some ways to formalize the welfare dimensions, for 
instance, using the fuzzy approach, but this issue is still under research.23
 
1.6 Ethics: Inequality as a value judgment. 
 
Suppose I live in a simple house in the side of a hill overlooking a lake, in the 
town of Medina, Washington; just besides the mansion of Bill Gates (if that would be 
possible). If I observed that he is very rich compared to me, without thinking that that is 
unfair, I am just acknowledging inequality. On the other hand, if I think his wealth is 
‘providential’ because of his charity organizations, or if my perception of his money 
                                                 
21 See Robeyns (2005, p. 93) and the references therein.  
22 A discussion will be tackled in chapter 7. Some basic references can be found in Basu and Lopez-Calva 
(2002), Alkire (2002) and Robeyns (2005), among others.  
23 See Foster and Sen (1997, p. 121, n. 17) and Sen (2000) among many others. 
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makes me feel ‘sick’, it is clear that I am making some kind of value judgment. People 
often make value judgments in regards to their own beliefs, but for our purpose it is 
necessary to formalize this exercise. So if we want to say that inequality is rather normal 
or bad, we need to use some kind of evaluation. Our evaluations might be related with 
traditional social justice theories.24 Looking more carefully at those theories and their 
philosophical foundations, it might help us to understand better and to analyze the income 
distribution in the community (Sen, 2000, p. 60). The ethical judgment is explored, not 
only because it is needed to know ‘how much’ inequality exists, but also because we 
want to know if that inequality is ‘bad’ and to what extent it might be harmful to society.  
The comment in this section is that fairness judgment, when perceived in a 
pejorative sense, is external to the scientific model. The fairness judgment is based on the 
pure belief, or the conviction that a person (or his society) has in some philosophical 
theory. The perception of ‘unfairness’ can be enhanced by social convention and 
institutionalized by law, involving ideas “of what is good and proper, and what is 
shameful, inexcusable or intolerable” (Sen, 2000, p. 60). Because of the different ideas 
about what is good, some kind of theory survey is needed in regards to justice. For 
instance, there are some people who think that some ‘unequal’ distribution is necessary if 
the society wants cheaper and vast quantity of goods that are produced by firms 
benefiting from economies of scale. These people think that some of the individuals in 
the society must have the right to possess more than others, because this generates 
efficiency. On the opposite side, others might think that all goods and money ‘must’ be 
distributed ‘equally’, if we want to consider the distribution ‘fair’, with the aim of living 
                                                 
24 The term justice, in regards to economics, is usually related with ‘distributive justice’, different from the 
concept of justice ‘as a virtue’. In this paper both meanings are used, and that can be clear in regards to the 
context. 
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in an ‘egalitarian’ society. The previous examples enter inescapably into the territory of 
ethics and value judgments. 
 
 I Utilitarianism. 
 
Even though utilitarian philosophy considers the well-being of each individual, 
and the right of each to be treated fairly, having the same value under the law, the 
consideration of the whole community poses some problems. The famous principle “The 
greatest happiness for the greatest number”, spelled out for the first time by Bentham in 
his Fragment on Government in 1776, is well known in the utilitarian literature. The goal 
was to maximize the whole, but it was not clear if the distribution within the whole was 
important. There was a clear value judgment that treats a whole group as privileged rather 
than some part of it, rather than the individual. Bentham and his hedonistic view of 
humans in economics as pleasure-seekers or pain-avoiders, was very pervasive during the 
19th century, due particularly to the spreading of his ideas by James Mill and his son, 
John Stuart Mill. In those principles, Bentham stated that, a) the individual well being 
should be the end of moral actions, b) that each individual has the same value under the 
eyes of the law, and, the most important, that c) the aim of society should be the pursuit 
of the greatest possible happiness for the greatest number. It took almost a hundred years 
before his critics really undermined the posture proposed in his An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). 
There were several reasons to criticize this approach. One of them was related 
with the conceptualization of the human being and their desires. This particular view, 
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which is clearly beyond traditional science, affected the way utilitarians conceived 
society and its goals. Bentham with his felicific calculus was following the British branch 
of the Enlightenment period, which stated a dual composition of humans by passions and 
reason, but putting greater emphasis on the emotional side (Welch, 1987, p. 771). 
Bentham was most probably influenced by the empiricism embedded in the tabula rasa 
of Locke and/or by David Hume’s words: “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of 
the passions” (THN, 2.III.3).25 That the individual was conceived as a ‘sentimental’ 
subject controlling her own reason is clear, therefore, the hedonistic view of a pleasure-
seeker fitted perfectly with the utilitarian view of Bentham. It was argued that the 
composition of human nature is not something believed to be a scientific truth, but 
beyond the scope of science.26 Therefore, it might be reasonable to understand why other 
philosophical theories questioned deeply the pure hedonic nature of humans. In the case 
of the Continental side of the Enlightenment, that followed Descartes and Kant, the 
rational side of human nature was seen more as the driving force in the search for truth 
(Descartes, 1637). This Continental school was influenced by the Aristotelian conception 
in the pursuit of the best good,27 and not just looking to fulfill pleasurable desires.  
Criticizing also the utilitarian principle, some authors focused on its foundations. 
Robbins (1932, 1938) mentioned that in order to make a statement about human 
homogeneity, the applied value judgment could not come from scientific truth, but from 
                                                 
25 David Hume, the Scottish philosopher, said about the self and its conception (in spite of the Jewish 
tradition which includes the concept of ‘soul’ as a separate entity of reason and sentiments) that the self was 
partitioned in two, the first one as sentiments, like sensations, passions or emotions, and the second as ideas 
(THN, 1.I.1), such as memory and imagination (THN, 1.I.3).  Both sentiments and ideas are acquired in a 
complex way through experience (THN, 1.III.14) and because of the pure effect of social convention (THN, 
1.II.13). 
26 Hume saw a close connection of sciences and human nature (THN, Introduction), but the terminology I 
am using here is the one of Descartes and his scientific method. 
27 See section 1.6 IV a).  
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some ethical basis outside of economics. Then he raised his famous question: “Would it 
not be better, I asked myself, quite frankly to acknowledge that the postulate of equal 
capacity for satisfaction came from outside, that it rested upon ethical principle rather 
than upon scientific demonstration, that it was not a judgment of fact in the scientific 
sense, but rather a judgment of value…?” (1938, p. 637, emphasis in the original). From 
outside scientific scope, the utilitarian approach might also be considered non-ethical for 
the following reason: as long as the amount of suffering by some is compensated by the 
enjoyment of others, it is possible that overall welfare of the community might increase.28 
It is very likely that people who suffer are usually the poorest in the community. That 
raises the question again of the necessity of some sort of interpersonal comparison among 
members (see section 1.5 I), in order to decide whether one state is better or worse than 
the other, as it was expressed again by Sen (1973, p. 15-18; 1980), and not only assuming 
that everyone should be the same. Finally, another critique was based on the absence of 
desert-based principles. 29  Desert-based principles are founded in the account of 
exceptional contributions of individuals to their society, taking into account the effort 
expended in those activities. The critique of utilitarianism by the desert-based principles 
was such that there is no account of individual actions and some kind of reward for 
contributions of individuals, nor a compensation due to their work activity, as was 
discussed by authors like Miller, Sadurski or Dick, based on the writings of Locke (in 
Lamont and Favor, 2007). Then the utilitarian view offer a contestable value judgment in 
                                                 
28 They defended the point arguing that those cases were very unlikely to happen, and arguing that such 
cases provide ‘rules of thumb’, providing only moral information, but not theoretical arguments (Lamont 
and Favor, 2007). 
29 Those are also known as merit-based principles. 
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regards to distributive justice and mostly claims an egalitarian view only as a normative 
value in their principles. 
  
 II Rawlsian Justice.  
 
Inequality and the idea of ‘Justice as fairness’, developed by Rawls (1958, 1971), 
is one of the most frequently used frameworks in recent discussions. His figure of the 
‘original position’ using a theory of social contract is based on the writings of Locke, 
Rousseau and Kant (Rawls, 1971, p. 11).30 He justifies the idea of the original position 
with the aim to produce a fair procedure, where “any principles agreed to will be just” 
(Idem., p. 136),31 resembling the well known Kantian ‘categorical imperative’.32 This 
original position “is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to 
lead to a certain conception of justice” (Idem., p. 12), where the individual is engaged in 
                                                 
30 He acknowledged the similarity of Harsanyi’s (1953) work, but he said that Harsanyi’s was used to 
develop a utilitarian theory (Rawls, 1971, p. 137, n. 11). 
31 The original position of Rawls has been contested in a variety of ways. For instance, the supposed 
original position, using the idea of the ‘veil of ignorance’, it assumes that no individual in the society 
knows his own position or status, but in order to make decisions, those individuals are assumed that they 
should be not only ‘rational’, but also ‘self-interested’ rational (Wolff, 1990, p. 114). In that sense, the ‘veil 
of ignorance’ is only a partial veil, because the starting point is the individual rationality; a truly original 
position should be such that the individual did not know neither if he/she is rational in the self-interested 
sense. Other criticism for the original position is the assumption that all individuals think that all judgment 
resides in the brain, as a mental inwardness, as does the preconception of Descartes axiom ‘cogito ergo 
sum’ (1637, part. IV), but that mental preconception is only one of the particular systems of thought, it is 
not clear what should be revealed to the individual that particular framework of thought and not others. 
32 The saying of Rawls “For by a categorical imperative Kant understands a principle of conduct that 
applies to a person in virtue of his nature as a free and equal rational being” (1971, p. 253), added up the 
idea of ‘freedom’, which is not in the original quotation of Kant. What Kant literally said was that “There is 
therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the 
same time will that it should become a universal law.” (1785, Section II). Kant supposedly upgraded the so 
called Golden Rule, so he wrote “Let it not be thought that the common "quod tibi non vis fieri, etc." could 
serve here as the rule or principle. For it is only a deduction from the former, though with several 
limitations; it cannot be a universal law.”(1785, Sec. II). He was referring to the one saying “Do not do to 
others what you do not want done to yourself”, but this is not the Golden Rule. The Golden rule of Jesus 
says “et prout vultis ut faciant vobis homines et vos facite illis similiter” (“Do to others as you would have 
them do to you”. (Holy Bible (NIV):Luke. 6:31). This is rather different because this do not entail the 
‘limitations’ that Kant argues, only implies actions and responsibility. The Golden rule in ‘negative’ sense 
is attributed to Confucius (6 BC, Analects, 15:23 http://www.confucius.org/lunyu/ed1523.htm). 
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a process of self reflection on who she is in the society, which characteristics she has, the 
things that she possesses, and so on.  
For our consideration of inequality, in regards to justice and institutions, Rawls 
offered two important principles that shall be taken into account: “First Principle[,] Each 
person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. Second Principle[,] Social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit 
of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle,33 and (b) attached to 
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity”. (1971, 
p. 302). As a matter of clarification, some rules follow these predicates, which enhanced 
the priority of the first principle in regards to liberty, ‘allowing liberty to be restricted 
only for the sake of liberty’, while the second stressed justice over efficiency and welfare 
(Kukathas and Pettit, 1992, p. 44).34
The Rawlsian ideal of the perfect state of justice is based on the Marxian concept 
of equality in the utopian egalitarian communism: “Rather a society in which all can 
achieve their complete good, or in which there are no conflicting demands and the wants 
of all fit together without coercion into a harmonious plan of activity, is a society in a 
certain sense beyond justice” (Rawls, 1971, p. 281). 35  He explains that when this 
                                                 
33 This is the intergenerational care that the present generation should offer to the subsequent (Rawls, 1971, 
p. 284-298). 
34 See also Sen (2000, pp. 70-71). 
35 There are several ancient roots of the concept of inequality justified in regards to people’s needs. A very 
old one is found in the Jewish tradition, where in the Torah (1200 B.D), is told the story about the Israelites 
during the exodus from Egypt, they were miraculously fed with ‘manna’, a kind of bread that came from 
heaven, and how it was established the ‘unequal’ but fair distribution of necessities depending on people’s 
needs. It is written in the manuscripts that they were ordered to take just as much as they need, nothing 
more, nothing less: “The Israelites did as they were told; some gathered much, some little. And when they 
measured it by the omer, he who gathered much did not have too much, and he who gathered little did not 
have too little. Each one gathered as much as he needed.”  (Holy Bible (NIV): Ex. 16:17-18) 
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communist idealistic state is reached, the principles of justice are no longer necessary 
(Tucker, 1969, ch. I &, II). In this sense, inequality is justified solely on the basis that 
each member of society obtains exactly the equivalent to his/her needs: “It is even 
possible to elevate one of these precepts, or some combination of them, to the level of a 
first principle, as when it is said: from each according to his ability, to each according to 
his needs” (Rawls, 1971, p. 305). Rawls was quoting one of the fundamental Marxian 
ideas in the Critique to the Gotha Program (1875).  
Now that we have been mentioning Marxist thought several times, we can explain 
that the Marxian ‘equality’ is the ‘fair’ distribution of all kind of necessities among the 
‘unequal’ natural human needs. In this framework, the inequality will disappear as long 
as the private ownership of the means of production is completely abolished, then 
[surplus] value and exchange value must also disappear, so production should become 
only for the use and satisfaction of the communal society (Mandel, 1987, p. 382). The 
Marxian tradition is clear about its belief in the idea of a supreme [enforced] equality in 
society, noted in The Communist Manifesto, when it demands “[a]bolition of property in 
land and application of all rents of land to public purposes”, and  also demands “[e]qual 
liability of all to labour” (1848, Part II). They thought that inequality was maintained by 
the possession of the social surplus by the ruling class, which maintained the 
‘superstructural’ activities that unfairly entailed them with the means of production 
(Mendel, 1987, p. 369). Therefore, if classes were abolished, at least in theory, unfair 
inequality must disappear due to a full satisfaction of needs in this idealistic progressive 
system. It is clear that the Rawlsian definition of justice based on the Marxian tradition 
sees inequality as a ‘bad’ itself, as a disease that should be prevented. 
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Coming back to Rawls’ proposition, the hypothetical exercise of the original 
position, using the powerful idea of the ‘veil of ignorance’, assumes that every person 
should be able to ignore his/her own characteristics and possessions as a starting point, as 
if they were born in the lower end of the distribution. That exercise will produce a sense 
of empathy with the most destitute. Thus, this initial consideration might be helpful to 
illuminate the persons that are privileged, gifted and rich, about their responsibility with 
their society. The problem arises as there is no mechanism to force the irresponsible 
person to follow this ideal. People ‘should’ be fair, that is the thought of Rawls. In 
regards to institutions, it is said that if people are fair, the institutions will be fair as well: 
“It follows that if the basic structure of society is just, or as just as it is reasonable to 
expect in the circumstances, everyone has a natural duty to do what is required of him” 
(Rawls, 1971, p. 334). 36 That is the case for the privileged. On the other side of the coin, 
we can not see a very clear advice from this framework when people find themselves in 
very impoverished conditions, for instance, when an individual considers herself in a 
‘position’ that is ‘revealed’ to her as a person with mental or physical disabilities, as a 
part of a discriminated group, and very poor. The Rawlsian principles can not explain to 
this person why other people are not behaving ‘properly’. She might think: ‘Why do 
others not respect the social contract?’ An unsatisfactory answer for this question might 
only emphasize her anger against society, enforcing her envy as well.37 Then, it might be 
sensible for her to rebel instead, as the Marxian beliefs invite her to do. Therefore, it is 
understandable why this exercise should be mostly considered as a ‘device for moral 
                                                 
36 The root of this idea can be traced to Plato and his conception of the just city, discussed in section 1.6 IV 
a). 
37 The idea of fairness and envy is mentioned in Sen (1987b, p. 1041), where ‘equity’ arises if no one 
wishes to have or preferred a bundle of goods that belongs to the other person instead of his own, see 
references therein. 
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reflection and political discussion’ (Sen, 2000, p. 61, n. 2), more than being considered as 
a practical solution for the problem of unfairness. 
The Rawlsian concept of equality has implications in economic theory, and that 
issue has been exposed (and rejected) in this framework.38 If we talk about the space of 
‘social preferences’, where in both axes are represented the well-being of two individuals 
 and , such that one of them should be the most deprived in the society, in the 
‘difference principle approach’ of Rawls, there will be no gain for the society unless both 
of them gain together, jumping to the next upper level of welfare, as is noted in part b) of 
Figure 1-1. As a comparison, on the left hand side in part a) we have the utilitarian view, 
which will reach higher levels of social utility when the total utility is maximized subject 
to the (social) budget constraints, regardless of the welfare of the utility of each 
individual that is considered separately. In that view, the form of the preferences is more 
important than the achieved levels of utility of each individual. In that sense “[a] classical 
utilitarian … is indifferent as to how a constant sum of benefits is distributed” (Rawls, 
1971, p. 76-7). 
1x 2x
 
                                                 
38 But there are other criticisms, see Lamont and Favor (2007). 
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a) Utilitarian b) The Difference Principle  
Figure 1-1. The Utilitarian view vs. the Difference Principle. 
 
As we just saw above, Rawls rejected the Utilitarian principle because of the 
unethical aggregation of utility. But both the Rawlsian and the Utilitarian arguments just 
presented here were criticized by Sen (1973, pp. 17-18, 22-23), even though when he 
allowed those approaches to include interpersonal comparisons.39 Using a very simple 
graphical argument, it was shown how difficult it is to use the utilitarian framework, 
precisely for being non egalitarian: “As a framework of judging inequality, utilitarianism 
is indeed a non-starter, despite the spell that this approach seems to have cast on this 
branch of normative economics.” (Idem. p. 18). More formally, in order to show the 
inconsistencies of the utilitarian approaches and the deficiencies of the Rawlsian 
framework, he constructed the Weak Equity Axiom (WEA), which with very mild 
conditions,40 it rejected the utilitarian principle and pointed out the inconvenience to 
assume a very strict Rawls’s ‘maximin’ rule. 
                                                 
39 This approach was widely used by Marshall, Pigou, and Dalton, among others (Sen, 1973, p. 16, and note 
21). 
40 Taking a Social Welfare framework, it was assumed a two persons unequal world and strict concavity. 
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In the light of the previous arguments, there are reasons to believe that Rawlsian 
theory can not be considered as a unmovable basis for fairness or justice nor as a 
universal rule in distributive justice concerns; this approach has problems in order to be 
theoretically consistent with weaker approaches. On the other hand, other critiques of 
Rawls complain that the difference principle is not sufficiently strong in regards to the 
initial distribution of the endowments, and leaves this issue of unequal endowments as an 
open question. This was pointed out by authors that support resource-base theories, which 
attach a stronger sensitivity to inequality at the beginning of the distribution, even to the 
distribution of natural inequalities (Dworkin in Lamont and Favor, 2007). 
 
 III Sen’s Concept of Justice in his Capability Approach.  
 
Sen is interested not only in inequality as such, but about the repercussions of 
high inequality in society. There are, according to him, economic, social and political 
problems that might be related to inequality. Those problems are, for instance, 
unavailability of food, lack of democracy,41 people’s discontent, or disapproval given 
poor economic conditions.42 He also considers the negative effects because of inequality 
which causes the erosion of relationships among the members of a society,43 so that might 
be an important factor that boosts unstable movements such as rebellion.44 His approach 
is very different from the Rawlsian sense of justice (though Sen build up some of his 
                                                 
41 “Inequality has an important role in the development of famines and other severe crises. Indeed, the 
absence of democracy is in itself an inequality…” (Sen, 1999, p. 187). 
42 “In assessing the likelihood of discontent or protest or disapproval, or the political feasibility of particular 
policies, … it can be useful—indeed crucial—to have some understanding of the ideas of justice that 
command respect in the society in question.” (Sen, 2000, p. 60). 
43 “Furthermore, the sense of inequality may also erode social cohesion” (Sen, 1999, p. 93) 
44 “The relation between inequality and rebellion is indeed a close one, and it runs both ways” (Sen, 1973, 
pp. 1 & 6). 
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thought in Rawls contribution) because Sen is trying to encompass a practical view of 
social phenomena, not only tries to explain a mental exercise.  
Sen considers inequality as to some sort of poverty, always related to some sort of 
destitution. That can be proved by the fact that his poverty measure definition (1976) 
includes the Gini coefficient on it. He has been emphasizing the role of capabilities and 
functionings as the suitable space for calculation of welfare, so it can be credible that, in 
his account, inequality might be considered also as a type of destitution, though he uses 
the value of equality as a universal value judgment (Sen, 1992, 1980). Sen’s value 
judgment has the same Marxian basis than Rawls’ justice. The only difference is that 
Sen’s justice does not use categorical imperatives, as Rawls does, but  formal arguments 
and mathematical rhetoric to convince the reader that inequality is bad itself. Sen 
emphasizes the Marxian approach of distribution, with the subtle difference of using 
‘need’ rather than ‘desert’ in the terminology (Sen, 1973, pp. 80-81, 105). Sen refers to 
Marx in detail, using Marx’s famous quote: “From each according to his ability, to each 
according to his needs!” (Marx, 1875, p. 23, in Sen, 1973, p. 88-89) 
In his view of capabilities and functionings he tried to establish a definition of 
‘justice’, or what he thought should be the focus for the assessment of the standard of 
living. He mentioned this concept in 1983: “neither commodities, nor characteristics (in 
the sense of Gorman and Lancaster), nor utility, but something that may be called a 
person’s capability” (Sen, 1983, p. 160). He was referring again to the idea, based on 
Aristotelian philosophy,45 of capability to freely choose among some functioning bundles 
(Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2000, p. 49). The idea of capabilities is mostly related to the 
                                                 
45 From Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (335 BC [1980], book I, Section 7), Sen discusses man’s ability to 
function as a premise to assess what is good for him (Sen, 1999, p. 73). 
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methodological rejection of the income space as the only way to measure overall 
deprivation in following a broader space for the consideration of distributive justice, 
because income is only an instrument to achieve ‘something else’ (Sen, 2000, p. 81). He 
claims that other necessities of life are crucial for the well being of any individual. Those 
goods, such as education, or health, or goods that provide the individual the right to 
appear without shame in society, are not expressed correctly in the income space. When 
only income is considered, not all those goods are well captured in measures of inequality 
or poverty. This is the reason he came up, along with other issues, with his idea of 
capabilities and functionings.46
Amartya Sen (2000) discusses the issue of distributional justice in a chapter 
included in the Handbook of Income Distribution. Before Sen introduce his definition of 
distributive justice, which is his capability approach, he tried first to ‘generalize’ the 
problem with the definition of social justice. He considered as given that inequality is 
undesirable. He discussed justice first, with a descriptive theory that defined justice’s 
‘informational basis’, giving a “systematic understanding of different concepts of justice” 
(2000, p. 61). He later applied this categorization to his own approach, because he 
thought that those different concepts of justice were the relevant theories in regards to the 
assessment of fairness. He acknowledged the plurality of ideas about justice, because of 
the intrinsic linguistic nature of the concept (Idem., p. 62). He leveled the ground of the 
discussion in order to explain which inequality judgments should be used according with 
his criteria. The different factors of theories of justice are, according to his typology: a) 
the basal space, b) the focal combination and c) the reference group. He explained that 
the basal space is composed of the variables that are considered to be important, the focal 
                                                 
46 For detail see part 1.5 III and 7.3 I. 
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combination is the way to ‘discriminate’ among the many value judgments available, and 
the third factor, that is the reference group, is appropriate if some consideration of sub-
groups within the society is needed in order to explain overall social injustice. This is 
clearly a very mathematical approach to a very non-mathematical concept that is justice. 
Using these tools, he reclassified the utilitarian view of justice, libertarian theories, 
Rawlsian justice, and finally his own view about functionings and capabilities.  
When Sen is trying to generalize the ‘informational basis’ of social justice, he 
does that with a clear and subtle objective: he is trying to persuade the reader that all 
definitions of justice have the same structure, but his own, of capabilities, is better. He 
considered his approach better because of its focus on the destitution of the most deprived 
in several dimensions. His intention is truly honest: he cares about the poor as it can be 
clear in his entire contribution to economics, but the premise that all justice systems have 
the same structure can not be sustained. It is shown in this chapter that different 
definitions of distributive justice come from a variety of philosophical ideas. Not all 
definitions of justice have the same structure: On the one hand, Rawls’ approach is a 
mental exercise that takes as a basis a Kantian premise as a Universal law of judgment, 
this premise is applied to economic justice focusing at some extent in primary goods and 
liberties; on the other hand, utilitarianism is a mental metric of pain and pleasure that 
assumes every person in the society with a standardized utility function in order to 
maximize the utility of all the inhabitants. Therefore, Sen’s approach seems to be very 
narrow because he focuses on the space where this approaches pointed out, and not in the 
philosophical background of the justice concept.  
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There are not sufficient grounds to justify encompassing all justice matters in one 
monolithic structure. Philosophers usually try to generalize systems of justice, as Marx or 
Rawls tried, but this is hard to do, so we will prefer a pluralistic view of this matter, as 
Sen himself argues in other part of the same paper (2000, pp. 60-61). The mathematical 
and simplistic framework of Sen is also biased, because it offers a pure ‘rationalistic’ 
view of justice, which is a clear Aristotelian conception of the Western world applied to 
the concept of fairness (Sen, 2000, pp. 73 & 77).47 On the other hand, most of the efforts 
of Sen about the concept of justice lie in the discussion about the ‘space’ where inequality 
and poverty are assessed. We know that Sen is mainly concerned, in traditional economic 
theory, with pointing out the limitation that the space of income has in order to express all 
people’s necessities. In this light, his approach of social justice became only an 
instrumental device to support, in a ‘philosophical’ way, his capability approach, but we 
believe this exercise is incomplete.  
The consideration of Sen referring to justice is still useful for understanding some 
insights into the relationship among justice, inequality and the space of measurement 
from the point of view of welfare economics. The modern economics literature discusses 
normative, descriptive and prescriptive issues related to income distribution. So the 
assessments of inequality, and because of that, of justice, can be helpful for 
understanding their value judgments. 
 
                                                 
47 See the Greek influence on justice in section 1.6 IV a). 
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 IV Other approaches. 
 
In spite of the view of inequality as a social problem, where the society has a 
belief that ‘inequalities’ are ‘bad’, and in some cases ‘wrong’, there might be some 
considered as ‘natural’, neither bad nor good, just a normal thing. For instance, wage 
income across time, which at the beginning of every individual’s career is low, rises later 
with age and experience. The determination of available resources related to the 
individual’s country of origin might be another example. Yet another example might be 
the consideration of sex or gender. There are some physical differences that naturally 
drive people’s behavior, because of the role of nature (if sex type is not artificially 
changed, of course). In this case, the epistemological focus to inequality might have other 
philosophical views, which can see inequality in a different way, maybe as an 
opportunity, as will be explained below. These philosophical views have a different 
conception of power relations, and they might link the explanation of inequality with a 
preconceived [exogenous] order, that is attained due to the exercise of authority. 
Therefore, the variety of philosophical traditions have as a result some value judgments, 
that either might be a root of a present concept of inequality, or might be a different view, 
as can be the consideration of inequality as an opportunity for altruism. Some of the well 
known philosophical traditions will be commented briefly. 
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 a) Justice and the Greeks. 
 
The inheritance of the Greek tradition is vast. Rawls (1971, p. 3) takes his belief 
that justice is “the first virtue of social institutions” from Plato. In The Republic, Plato 
(360 BC [1892]) conceives a dual understanding of justice, first on the individual that is 
just, and second, in the creation of a ‘just’ city, which is organized according to the law 
made by the ‘just’ individual. His cosmopolitan approach of justice was probably 
influenced by Protagoras and the sophist school (Nussbaum, 1986, p. 102). According to 
Plato, the individual is just as long as he/she is guided by a vision of the ‘Good’, a vision 
that is achieved through the acquisition of knowledge (Slote, 2006). Plato thought that 
philosophers are the most likely to attain that vision. Plato also claimed that philosophers, 
rather than the guardians or workers, were better prepared to find the ‘Good’, because of 
their constant looking for knowledge. In this case, the virtuous person, that had not only 
justice as a virtue, but also temperance, wisdom and courage, became a ‘harmonious’ 
soul, then the city, if it is ruled by this virtuous person’s laws, it would enjoy the best 
possible status, a just status. The critique of Plato’s approach is very similar to that of 
Rawls, that it is deficient to explain how this harmony would be reached, and leaves this 
approach as an intellectual exercise. This approach also poses problem to the perhaps 
discriminatory treatment of the person that is not ‘looking for knowledge’, there are in 
fact very wise persons (e.g. guardians or workers) that do not talk very much and are 
more virtuous that the so call philosophers. 
Aristotle in his Politics takes a different strand in regards to justice. Deeply 
influenced by Protagoras’ anthropocentric view, he might be one of the first credited for 
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taking away the matters of justice from divine hands (Nussbaum, 1986, pp. 246, 304, and 
102, n.33). So he supported the issues of justice according to every person’s merits, in 
order to increase his/her own happiness (eudaimonia). This might be the oldest account 
of desert-based justice (Slote, 2006). One of the important influences in regards to justice 
is that he supported each person’s development in order to construct a just city (polis). 48 
He attached value to the process of development itself, not looking at this only as an 
instrumental exercise: “But we must now add that Aristotle believes the political 
participation of the citizen to be itself an intrinsic good or end, without which a human 
life, though flourishing with respect to other excellences, will be incomplete” (Nussbaum, 
1986, p. 349). The participation method, which is rooted also in the idea that humans are 
essentially social ‘animals’ and part of a whole,49 has recently been influencing welfare 
literature, as is the capability approach of Sen (2000, p. 73). It is clear that for Aristotle, 
the nature of justice was very important indeed. He took another step in his Nicomachean 
Ethics, saying that the virtue of justice could in such a way be related with other virtues 
such that without justice, none of the others virtues would make sense (Nussbaum, 1986, 
p. 353). 
 
 b) The Jewish Tradition. 
 
An older account of Justice can be found in the Jewish Tradition. Different from 
the Greek tradition, more than a philosophical or psychological treatment, it has a 
                                                 
48 As long as they were neither females nor slaves (Aristotle, 335 BC [1999], Book I, Part XIII). Discussed 
in Nussbaum and bibliography therein (1986, p. 499, n. 51). 
49 “…the human being is by nature a political animal,…” in his Politics (Aristotle, 335 BC [1999], Book I, 
Part II).  
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practical value. It is rooted in the continued behavior of individuals according to the 
following of the God-given Law (Torah): “What stands out in the entire development of 
Jewish ethical formulations is the constant interpenetration of communal and individual 
obligations and concerns” (EB: ‘Judaism’, p. 419).50 Justice is not an end but a result. In 
this tradition, inequality is not viewed as a ‘social disease’, but as an opportunity. Each 
person can be entitled to receive more or less, according to their needs and as a sign of 
reward for good behavior. This ideal includes both resource-based and desert-based 
entitlements.51 It is very important to clarify that ‘good behavior’ was never related with 
‘abstinence from bad things’ only, as the Catholic tradition emphasizes, but to the pursuit 
of justice through the constant following of good works, in the spirit of God’s 
commandments.52 In the Jewish tradition, justice is based on faith in the unique and 
supreme God,53 and that should be both a necessary and a sufficient condition to inspire 
good behavior, this being a non-Kantian ‘categorical imperative’. ‘Justice’, which is a 
term that in the Jewish literature is also translated as ‘righteousness’, is also the product 
of all the actions and attitudes of humans, which, if those are good, will produce ‘God’s 
Justice’,54 otherwise just ‘human justice’.55  
To explain inequality in this tradition, if an individual receives more than others, 
that would simply imply the responsibility of that individual to share with his/her 
                                                 
50 See also Abrahams (1921), p. 14;  
51 See Holy Bible (NIV): Desert based examples in 2 Sam. 12:7-8 and 1 Kings 3:3-15; general cases in 2 
Cron. 7:14, healing as a result of people’s loyalty to God, also in Deut. 28:1-3; for desert-based 
entitlements see note 35. 
52 Holy Bible (NIV): Is 56:1-2. 
53 Holy Bible (NIV): Gen. 15:6; Prov. 2:1-9. 
54 “The LORD commanded us to obey all these decrees and to fear the LORD our God, so that we might 
always prosper and be kept alive, as is the case today. And if we are careful to obey all this law before the 
LORD our God, as he has commanded us, that will be our righteousness." (Holy Bible (NIV), Deut 6:24-5), 
righteousness also means justice. 
55 Holy Bible (NIV): Deut 9:4-6; also Deut. 6:25. 
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proximate fellows. Starting with the immediate family, followed by the neighbors and the 
foreigners,56 and always paying special attention to the poor.57 The pragmatic Justice of 
the Jew is then a “series of virtuous acts—honoring parents, deeds of steadfast love, 
attendance twice daily at worship, hospitality to wayfarers, visiting the sick, dowering 
brides, accompanying the dead to the grave, devotion in prayer, peacemaking in the 
community and in family-life—and concludes by setting study of Torah as the premier 
virtue” (EB: ‘Judaism’, p. 419). The Jewish law was enhanced also by following the oral 
tradition. This set of commandments were first ‘orally’ transmitted, as the name suggests, 
but later one those were written, from the 5th to the 7th century (AD), in the book that is 
known as the Talmud. This oral tradition gave a more detailed expression to the 
established canon in the Torah, and it made more explicit the commands that normal 
people should follow, particularly in regards with their fellows. 
The Christian tradition of the first century, having a clear Jewish inheritance, it 
narrowed (or extended) this view of justice to a simple command. The so called Golden 
Rule of Jesus stated to behave with good attitudes with their fellows as a reflection of 
loving God with all the self. 58  This view neither lost the sense of exogenous 
commandment, nor lost its expression through positive actions to the other fellows: 
“Christian writers … were downplaying another central element in Christian thought and 
morality, the emphasis on agapic love [, such] love seems to be a matter of motivationally 
active feeling rather than of being rational.” (Slote, 2006). The sense of evident inequality 
in the earlier Christian tradition was also viewed as an opportunity to share with their 
fellows. For instance, Paul (57 AD) wrote in his letter to the Corinthian people the 
                                                 
56 Holy Bible (NIV): Deut 10:18; 
57 EB: ‘Judaism’, p. 382; Holy Bible (NIV): Psal. 41:1; Prov 14:21, 
58 Holy Bible (NIV): Matthew 22:36-40; 
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following: “Our desire is not that others might be relieved while you are hard pressed, but 
that there might be equality. At the present time your plenty will supply what they need, 
so that in turn their plenty will supply what you need. Then there will be equality” (Holy 
Bible (NIV): 2 Cor. 8:14, emphasis added). He was quoting the same history of the manna 
in the Torah (see note 35). On other issues, the responsibility for the head of the 
household always existed, the same as in the tradition of the Torah, both to provide for 
his own people and also for his extended family,59 with particular emphasis on his 
parents.60 It was normally viewed that some individuals would receive less and some 
others more, but the rich have more responsibility to share than the poor.61 With the 
following of these commands, the existent inequality could be alleviated through the 
following of good justice. 
In the Jewish tradition, the role of the government was not supposed to be the 
enforcement of law, as is common for Western culture to assume that the government has 
that duty, which such enforcement is usually a burden for the common citizen. In theory, 
the Jewish law was not supposed to be an undesired load for the inhabitants: “[Law and 
commandments] were their very love and their very life” (Schechter, 1909, p. 148). The 
concept of government arose in the Jewish tradition because of the people’s need to be 
rescued from the harsh treatment of their neighbors (EB: ‘Judaism’, p. 383), and that 
popular demand was viewed as the rejection of the ‘kingship of God’. So the government, 
in the Jewish tradition, was not responsible for alleviating poverty or reducing inequality. 
That was something that should be resolved by all the inhabitants through the 
                                                 
59  “If anyone does not provide for his relatives, and especially for his immediate family, he has denied the 
faith and is worse than an unbeliever.” (Holy Bible (NIV): 1 Tim. 5:8) 
60 Holy Bible (NIV): Mark 7:9-13. 
61 Holy Bible (NIV): 1 Ti 6:17-8. 
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accomplishment of the commandments within the given law. The government had the 
role to judge people’s behavior, obviously to punish the bad person through human 
judgment in order to obstruct evil works.62 However, the existence of common problems 
of avarice was acknowledged, the same as love of money and the selfishness of rich 
people, but that was criticized as a sign of people’s reluctance to follow God’s law,63 and 
not as a failure of the government. In that sense, ‘equality’ was not a ‘communal’ 
responsibility, nor the government’s responsibility, but it was everyone’s task.  
 
1.7 The view of traditional economic theory. 
 
Traditional economics deals more with the issue of efficiency, rather than of the 
issue of inequality. Taking one of the most recurrent frameworks in this tradition, which 
is the perfect competitive market, individual preferences and initial endowments are 
taken as given. Achieved efficiency is good as long as the distribution is Pareto-efficient, 
where it is not possible to shift somebody’s welfare to a better condition without 
decreasing the welfare position of somebody else. If there is some intervention for 
redistribution, it should be done following the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, where the welfare 
of the society is raised if it is possible to change conditions such that the winners can 
compensate fully the loss of the losers, and still gain. Following the utilitarian 
framework, the things that determine equilibrium are the individual rationality and the 
form of their utility preferences. Traditional economics steps aside from the definition of 
social or distributive justice. A very standard quote in this sense claims: “Nothing we 
                                                 
62 Holy Bible (NIV): Rom. 13:1-4, 1 Pet. 2:17 
63 Holy Bible (NIV): Luke. 21:1; Stg. 2:6; 5:1. 
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have argued so far should lead us to believe that [Walrasian Equilibrium Allocations 
(WEA)] are necessarily “socially optimal” if we include in our notion of social optimality 
any consideration for matters of “equity” or “justice” in distribution.” (Jehle and Reny, 
1998, p. 300). The coverage of this framework is bounded by ruling out the allocations 
that are not Pareto-efficient, which are not even likely to be candidates for being socially 
optimal. Given some set of additional restrictions, a candidate for a socially just 
distribution must be the set of the (existent) WEA.  
One of the links provided as a mechanism to enhance a more equal social welfare, 
is the Second Welfare Theorem, which states that every Pareto-efficient allocation can be 
supported by a Competitive Equilibrium Allocation (Figure 1-2), but this framework has 
some limitations. The redistribution of initial endowments from e to e*, should lead this 
economy to achieve a socially superior competitive equilibrium allocation, which is  
rather than . Assuming zero transaction costs, if the society previously defined that  
was a better result, the new redistribution allocation gives a chance for government 
intervention. This framework does not need a central planner in order to guarantee a 
competitive equilibrium, but a third-party is still needed to reallocate the initial 
endowment.
_
x
'x
_
x
 64 Social Choice and Welfare theory faces other challenges (due mainly to 
the puzzle represented by Arrow’s impossibility theorem), but definitely gives up the 
choice of the best social state, and reassigns that responsibility to ethical grounds: “your 
choice of social welfare functions is a choice of distributional values and, therefore, a 
choice of ethical system” (Jehle and Reny, 1998, p. 356).  
                                                 
64 It is also possible to change this equilibrium with post-equilibrium transfers of income, or through some 
artificial change on prices (pre or post equilibrium) through subsidies or taxes (Adelman and Robinson, 
1989, p. 970). 
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Figure 1-2. Efficiency and social optimality in a two-person economy. 
 
By the same token, it is said by Coleman that “The concept of ‘equality’ has no 
place in positive economic theory” (1987, p. 170). He explains that the very essence of 
what he called ‘equality of result’ would imply a distribution process that would be the 
antithesis of the market. On the other side, normative economics tries to compensate for 
the absence of the equality concept within the utilitarian welfaristic framework. Pigou 
(1938) came up with the, perhaps contestable, idea that because of the decreasing 
marginal utility of money, the maximization of social welfare was inevitable, and indeed, 
that would lead to equality of incomes. That did not happen. This approach was rejected 
by Robbins (1938) with the critique of interpersonal comparisons of Jevons. As early as 
in 1897, Edgeworth pointed out before Robbins that equality of means would lead 
forcefully to an unequal distribution. Again, traditional economic theory does not fully 
contain the important issue of inequality, so the theory still remains incomplete: “…, the 
very programme of welfare economics –not to speak of the foundations for a policy 
designed to bring equality – is emasculated” (Coleman, 1987, p. 170). 
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In economic theory as well, both Rawls and Sen followed the justice value 
judgment of Marx, who is credited to be the first classical economist to introduce ethical 
value judgments into the theory of distribution (Adelman and Robinson, 1989, p. 968). It 
is argued in this paper that the Marxian criticism of classes is inconvenient, in the sense 
that the Marxian setting assumes a predetermined perennial negative social framework, 
which is the inheritance of the theory of historical materialism (Mandel, 1987, p. 369). 
For the follower of this tradition, it will never be possible to conceive of a clear advance 
in regards to inequality; the very existence of inequality will be a proof that something is 
wrong. Using that value judgment it is easy to lose the valid search for real unfairness, 
legitimizing and exacerbating only people’s envy (Simmel, 1922; in Coleman, 1987, p. 
170). Not surprisingly, traditional economic theory only looks at (income) differences, 
assuming them to be undesirable, following with precise calculations that ignore the 
processes that cause them. It is always assumed that the cause of all inequality is 
“exploitation of labor” (Adelman and Robinson, 1989, p. 968). Unfortunately, traditional 
economic theory gives the same treatment to the poor person who has been sick for years 
as it does to the poor whose poverty is due to some vice or because of irresponsible 
spending. The researcher in both cases will recommend to the policy maker some transfer 
from the rich to the poor, regardless of the reasons behind the status of poverty. In this 
case, the consideration that some inequalities might come from natural processes or from 
merit-based reward issues is lost. Then the pure consideration of inequality as unfairness 
shall be rejected. 
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1.8 Concluding remarks. 
 
For most theoretical frameworks, the definite and indubitable relationship of 
inequality as unfairness goes beyond the scope of scientific discourse. The discussion of 
morals and ethics enters. For this reason, it should not be surprising to know that 
inequality, even though it might be measured with ‘objective’ mathematical precision, 
will always be subjectively perceived in regards to the value judgment used.  
The typology of the inequality concept helps us to discuss with an organized 
methodology, centering our attention on the important issues. On the one hand, the 
attributes of inequality make clearer the thing that is measured in reality, so studying the 
attributes is a good premise for looking into the definition of the suitable space for 
measurement. On the other hand, the processes driving inequality recognize the causal 
relationship between inequality and its historic composition. It can be comprehensible 
why inequality measurement goes beyond the simple analysis of dispersion of income, 
asset or wealth distribution. For instance, some of the properties of inequality 
measurement identify the sub-group composition of inequality, looking not only at the 
big picture, but at the underlying composition of inequality measurement, which is a 
relational attribute. 
The space of inequality has been a matter of debate in welfare economics, because 
of the problematic narrow view of having just income as the expression of well-being. It 
was shown that the utilitarian framework inherited a one-dimensional space, which was 
approximated by income. The Basic Needs Approach discussed the possibility of a 
multidimensional space, but because of practical issues, it measured welfare again on the 
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income space that was needed to buy a basic basket of goods. It will be taken from this 
school of thought the pragmatic value of the income space, such that many of the 
computations of inequality measurement will be done in data that come from income 
surveys. The space of capabilities and functionings tries to capture the multifaceted 
nature of human welfare, including not only food or material things, but also issues like 
freedom, opportunities, education and health. The capability approach explains the 
serious limitations in welfare measurement, making clear that it would be best to have a 
more expanded space. But many times the researcher will still need to use the available 
(income) data, while the government institutions developed other mechanisms of data 
collection. For this research, some functionings will be available in the form of data sets, 
so those will be used in the computations in order to know the degree of deprivation that 
is related with high values of inequality. 
A good part of the discussion of inequality is around value judgments; this paper 
clearly shows that these judgments are not ‘neutral’ or value free. Some of the previous 
frameworks in regards to inequality and justice have penetrated into our present concept 
of economic theory. The Rawlsian principles, the Utilitarian maximizing rule, or Sen’s 
Capability approach are clear and well known examples, but these examples are not the 
only ones. The philosophical foundations of the traditions mentioned above clearly go 
beyond ‘scientific truths’, because they deal with individual and social motivations, and 
these traditions enter into the blurred non-falsifiable scenario of morals and ethics. Our 
reason to show other schools that are clearly known as ‘non scientific’, such as the Greek 
or the Jewish tradition, is twofold. First, to show the influence of those schools on 
modern economic theory, and second, to make the reader aware that the discussion of 
87 
justice and inequality could not be reached with full certainty in old frameworks, but 
neither is it possible with modern exercises. Even the self-evident reasonability of the 
equality concept, as discussed by Isaiah Berlin in his Equality (1961), could not do that. It 
only brought to science another mental exercise that was tautologically based on fairness 
and aesthetics.65  
In regards to value judgments, we do not need to assume a perennial Marxian set-
up in order to study inequality. The pejorative view of inequality, regardless its nature, 
which is seen on the Rawlsian inheritance or the Capability approach, takes as given the 
Marxist view of inequality as unfairness. In that sense, there is no separation between 
natural inequalities from inequality as a component of deprivation. The existence of 
classes is not a problem by itself, but rather the artificial conditions that are unfairly 
changed. This has some implications. We can still try to measure inequality, as a social 
disease, mostly as a lack of people’s responsibility for their fellows, rather than as the 
existence of classes itself. It is necessary to include all people, and not only the 
government in discussing the matter of inequality alleviation. The government, 
addressing the problem, might explore the artificial rise of inequality, issue that is usually 
responsible for unhelpful situations. Those situations are also responsible for persistent 
effects of unfairness. The government can also focus not only in transfers of money from 
the rich to the poor, but also on the understanding of the causes that enlarge and enforce 
this process. 
                                                 
65 “… an equal distribution of benefits for that is ‘natural’, self evidently right and just, and needs no 
justification, since it is in some sense conceived as being self justified … The assumption is that equality 
needs no reasons, only inequality does so; that uniformity, regularity, similarity, symmetry,… need not be 
specially accounted for, whereas differences, unsystematic behavior, changes in conduct, need explanation 
and, as a rule, justification.” (Berlin, 1961, p. 131). 
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Some useful and practical advices can be taken from old traditions. The Jewish 
tradition suggests both a resource-based and a merit-based approach to inequality, and it 
provides the government some practical advice, as it is to make the whole population 
aware that everyone is entitled to justice matters, not just to the rich or to the 
bureaucracy. If someone criticizes this suggestion as ‘non scientific’, it can be said that it 
is much more practical than the mental exercise suggested by Rawlsian Platonism. The 
Jewish tradition explains that there are natural (or at least exogenous to humans) causes 
of inequality, therefore it is a duty of each person to try to balance that situation because 
they care for their fellow human being. Following also the old traditions, it might also be 
helpful to take some of the Aristotelian suggestions, as in the case of social participation. 
As long as the community is aware of other communities around them, they can make 
good decisions that take into account a more global environment by giving voice to all 
groups. It is clear that participation shall address in the first place the rights of the poor by 
not allowing for any kind of discrimination, which might be the source of real inequality 
and injustice.  
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22   Inequality Measures: Traditional Indices and Their Properties. 
 
2.1 Abstract. 
 
Going further on the question of Sen about “Equality of What?” we can also ask the 
question: ‘Which Equality of What?’ In order to answer that question we need to make a 
review of the variety of methods available to measure inequality in economics. The focus 
of the research about measurement of inequality has been mostly concerned with the 
analysis of the money-income distribution, using mathematical formulations and 
statistical tools. The variety of methods and measures contains a series of assumptions 
and properties that has been explored extensively in the past decades. The purpose of this 
chapter is to mention the most popular inequality measures in order to support the use of 
Gini coefficient, Theil Index and Lorenz ranking in the next chapters. The context will 
explain how those measures are constructed and which are the benefits and limitations 
that certain inequality measures provide. Besides the traditional inequality measurement, 
it is unavoidable to put in context the debate of the calculation of relative vs. absolute 
poverty, because of the embedded inequality consideration in the calculation of relative 
poverty, so it will be argued that it is better to compute separately inequality and poverty 
measurement. Finally, some inequality and dispersion measures that come from labor 
tools and econometrical theory will be mentioned as well. 
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2.2 Introduction. 
  
Using the definitions described on chapter 1, the traditional research usually 
focuses on the monadic attributes of the income space, neither in the relational attributes, 
nor in the processes. There is some sense of pragmatism in this decision, money-income 
data are available in several surveys, so that fact makes it easier to focus on the monadic 
attributes of inequality. Some of the processes on the measurement of inequality would 
be possible to include, dealing with the causes that produce inequality. The historical 
shifts that could make inequality increase or decrease might be explored as well, but there 
is usually a data constraint. The decomposition by income source of the inequality 
measurement will not be the focus of this research, because this property is attached 
mostly to the relational and monadic processes. Thus, the exercise later on will be mostly 
descriptive because of the focus on the attributes of the inequality measurement. With the 
inequality measures discussed, it can be said where the inequality is, or how big is that 
inequality and at which extent its measurement is consistent across the different methods 
of calculations. The interpretations of those indicators will be left to the researcher or to 
the policy maker. The income space will be used even though that the theoretical gap 
between the meaning and the representation of income as a representation of individual 
welfare is acknowledged.  
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2.3 Indices and tools to measure inequality.  
 
As early as in 1920, Dalton noted that the reduction of inequality in society was 
desirable, but “it is not generally agreed how this inequality should be measured” (1920, 
p. 48). Things have not changed very much almost a hundred years later. Now that we are 
comparing incomes of individuals in the society, we want to know what kinds of 
measures to use to make those comparisons. Atkinson divided the classification of 
inequality measures between ‘conventional’ measures and indices based upon ‘social 
welfare functions’ (1970, pp. 252-7). Sen also stated a classification of two kinds: 
‘objective’ or ‘positive’ vs. ‘normative’ measures (1973, pp. 2 & 24).67 While the former 
is applied without any use of social welfare concerns using statistical methods of income 
variation, the normative measure does consider social welfare and ethical judgments. The 
‘normative’ term of Sen will be used in this chapter, because of the predefined social 
consideration that is needed in the utilitarian setting, but the ‘pragmatic’ terminology of 
Kuklys  (2005, p. 61) will be used  for the ‘objective’ or the ‘conventional’ measures. The 
pragmatic definition is statistically intuitive, and it does not run into problems to explain 
what is ‘objective’ or what ‘conventional’ is. Following with the classification of Kuklys 
(2005),68 the entropy measures will be considered separately because of their own unique 
properties; the most remarkable property being the decomposability by population sub-
                                                 
67 Recently Cowell (2000, p. 110) made a non-mutually exclusive categorization among measurement 
approaches, as is (1) ‘ad hoc’ procedures (i.e. Gini), (2) measures base on axiomatic user’s demands, and 
(3) measures based on SWF. 
68 Kuklys (2005, p. 61) defined a classification that accounts with a) pragmatic measures (decile ratios, 
variance, Gini coefficient), b) Social Welfare Functions (Atkinson measure) and c) measures derived from 
a set of desirable properties(Theil index or the mean log deviation). On the other hand, Authors like Dutta 
(2002) have a unique classification of inequality measurement, classifying all of them as ‘normative’, 
explaining the foundation of each of it, but Sen’s interpretation might see to disagree with this general 
approach, claiming that the motivations underlying the pragmatic measures are quite different (Sen, 1973, 
p. 43). 
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group. After the consideration of the normative and pragmatic measures, where the list of 
measures can be huge, there is a more general way to consider inequality if it is relaxed 
the assumption of ‘completeness’. Assuming very mild conditions, the ranking of two 
distributions through the tool of stochastic dominance will be mentioned as well.  
 
 I Criteria 
 
In order to show the criteria that divide our inequality measures, let’s mention a 
simple example. If we assume a given distribution, which is a set of numerical values 
(e.g. income) of n persons arranged in a vector form representing individual’s earnings, 
we can have the following distribution: 
1,1,3x =< >  
such that x denotes the income of a population of three individuals, because n=3, 
where each of them 1x , 2x  and 3x earn or possess 1, 1 and 3 unit values respectively. On 
the other hand, let’s define the distribution y in a similar way: 
1, 2, 2y =< >  
With a simple eye inspection, it is easy to see that the distribution y is more 
egalitarian than distribution x, so we say that y is preferred to x. We might be applying 
directly a measurement of inequality like the variance or the Gini coefficient; these kind 
of direct measures are, roughly speaking, a) ‘pragmatic’ inequality measures. On the 
other hand, if we want to consider the numerical values of the distribution as the seeds of 
a social welfare utility function, we will be doing a b) ‘normative’ measurement, like the 
Atkinson family of indices. Using a set of assumptions and properties, inequality 
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measurement can be done using c) ‘entropy’ measures, but that makes more sense to do 
when sub-groups within the distribution are considered. 
In order to make a difference among different indices, we need to think on the d) 
properties of the inequality measures. Some people might argue that we are implicitly 
considering some properties in the ranking of distributions x and y, as it is the non-
transformation to the numerical values of income. If we use measures that apply 
logarithmic transformations to these incomes, it is conventionally agreed that we are still 
talking about pragmatic measures, like the standard deviation of logarithms, but it is true 
that the ranking might be different using a transformation. On the other hand, in regards 
of inequality measure properties, we might see a problem if we consider the following 
distribution: 
1, 2,"."w =< >  
Where “.” represents a missing value in the survey data. We can think that either 
the person, that was the subject of the interview, was not present at the moment of the 
survey, or his/her questionnaire was mishandled by the institution that makes the surveys. 
The ranking will be done depending on how the researcher treats that missing value. 
can be considered sometimes asw ' 1, 2w =< > , such as the distribution has different 
number of people than x or y, or it might be considered as '' 1, 2,0w =< >
                                                
, with different 
mean income and with the same number of people as distribution x or y. Using the Gini 
coefficient as an example, the ranking of x with w’ is different from the ranking of x with 
w’’. So both the technical decisions and the properties used in the inequality 
measurement do matter. 69
 
69 Technical decisions for the calculation of inequality are available in the following chapter. 
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In the previous cases, both pragmatic and normative measures rely on the 
assumption of ‘completeness’ of the ranking distribution (Sen, 1973, pp. 5-9 & 47). To 
consider a counter example, let’s consider the following distribution 
1, 2, 2,1, 2, 2z =< >  
For an inexpert reader, it might be sensible to compare distribution y with 
distribution z. Indeed, a pragmatic measure like the Gini coefficient will give the same 
value to either distribution y or z, so it is possible to say that we remain indifferent 
between each distribution, but this is not formally correct, unless we make some 
important assumptions, as it is to consider that the inequality measure has to be able to 
compare distributions with different number of people. In the same venue, if we consider 
the distribution , we might be tempted to rank the distribution of y and y’ as 
equal, but we might need another assumption, such as the independence of the measure 
from the mean income. The mean independence of the measure or the population 
consideration, along with other characteristics, can be expressed formally in order to 
generalize the ranking distribution: this is known as 
' 2, 4, 4y =< >
e) stochastic dominance. The most 
known dominance method that relaxes the assumption of a total ranking is the Lorenz 
dominance condition, but this is only a particular case of stochastic dominance. 
It is necessary to say that not all the times the criteria expressed above allow us to 
make a definitive classification of measures. 70  For instance, Sen includes entropy 
measures into the pragmatic inequality measures. On the other hand, there are some 
inequality measures that touch more than one classification. For instance, Gini coefficient 
is a pragmatic measure, but it is also related with stochastic dominance because of its 
                                                 
70 An elegant and rigorous classification of measures, based on their properties, might be found on Dutta 
(2002). 
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intrinsic graphical representation with the Lorenz curve. Other case is the entropy family 
of indices, which might be considered as a pragmatic way to measure inequality, but in a 
particular case those indices became a special form of indices that resemble Atkinson’s 
measure (Shorrocks, 1980), but Atkinson’s is considered a normative type of measure, 
and so on. Thus, having a general panorama of the inequality measurement, and before to 
start the formal definition, let’s define some notations. 
 
 II Notations 
 
Let I be any general inequality measure. Let n be the number of persons, where 
every person is indicated by i=1,…n. Let y be the income vector, so yi is the income of 
person i. The number of groups within population are k=1,…K., such that . The 
average overall level of income is
∑
=
=
K
k
knn
1
µ , such that , and the relative share of 
income of person i is x
∑
=
=
n
i
i ny
1
µ
i, such that ii xny µ= . Average and share group income are defined 
analogously for every group k. When x and y are given income distribution vectors, then 
 and will be the correspondent degrees of inequality measures for those income 
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 III Pragmatic measures 
 
The most basic pragmatic measures are the variance ( ∑
=
−=
n
i
iyn
V
1
2)(1 µ ), the 
coefficient of variation ( µ
2
1VC = ), and the relative mean deviation ( ∑
=
⋅−=
n
i
i nyM
1
µµ ), 
which are well known and used in modern studies on economic development.71 Some of 
their properties, as the transfer principle, were studied and later on included in more 
complex measures, (Sen 1973, p. 27), but it is known that there are some limitations for 
these measures.  
The pragmatic measure that is most widely used is the Gini coefficient. The 
discussion was motivated by French and Italian concerns about achieving better income 
distribution (Dagum, 1987, p. 529-32). Corrado Gini (1910, 1912) developed this method 
in order to refute Pareto’s research (1896, 1897). He used as a basis the work of Lorenz 
(1905).72 The Gini coefficient satisfies the intuitive criteria that if all the people have the 
same income, we should have a “perfect” distribution. There are several ways to calculate 
this ratio, and different formulae give us a different intuition or different ‘welfare 
interpretation’ (Sen 1973, p. 31). A well known way to measure the Gini coefficient is the 
following: 
 
(1) [ ]nG nyyynnGI +++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+== ...2211 212µ  
                                                 
71 The continuous version of these measures are found in Cowell, (1995, p. 142). 
72 For an account of the Gini coefficient literature see Xu (2004). 
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where . (Sen 1973, p. 31) nyyy ≥≥≥ ...21
 
The formula used in Jenkins’ software (1999, p. 9) that considers weights for the 
sample data is the following: 
(1’) ( )∑
=
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This formula assumes also a ranking in ascending order. On the other hand, Stuart 
(1954, 1955) firstly noted that Gini’s mean difference could be expressed as a function of 
the covariance between variate-values and ranks (Xu, 2004, p. 17). Based on that 
stochastic property, Anand (1983, p. 315) wrote down a nowadays used formula of the 
Gini index, which is the following: 
 
(1’’) ),cov(2 iyin
G µ=  
 
This formula can be used conveniently with statistical software packages, because 
of the expression that is a function of the covariance of the related variables.73  
As it was mentioned before, the Gini Coefficient and the Lorenz curve are closely 
related. In 1914, Gini proved the important theorem that his inequality measure could be 
expressed as the ratio of two of the areas in the Lorenz diagram. This will be explained in 
Figure 2-1.  
 
                                                 
73 This measure is explored in detail in Dutta (2002), and references therein. 
98 
100%
Perfect Equality
Lorenz Curve
Cumulative Percentage of Population
C
um
u l
at
iv
e 
 P
e r
ce
nt
ag
e  
 o
f  
In
co
m
e 
 R
ec
ei
ve
d
A
B
a
c
Perfect Inequality
100%
G
YX b
W
Z
H
0
 
Figure 2-1. The Lorenz Curve and the Gini coefficient 
 
The vertical axis measures income (in percentage) of the recipients, while on the 
horizontal axis we measure the cumulative percentage of population. The population is 
ordered from the poorest to the richest, from the left to the right respectively, and the line 
traced by OX is the percentage of total population in the poorest groups, which receives 
an “a” percent of the income, and so on. The Lorenz Curve is shown with the letter B. 
Complete equality occurs only if “a” percent of the population receives “a” percent of the 
income, as is shown by the line named with the letter A. Complete inequality is given by 
the “curve” OGH, where only the richest person in the community receives all the 
income. The area above the Lorenz curve (B) and below the line of complete equality (A) 
is known as the concentration area, or area of inequality. The sum of all the trapezoids, 
like the one formed by the area WXYZ, composes the area below the Lorenz Curve; 
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therefore this quantity subtracted from the unit is the area of inequality (Loehr & 
Powelson, 1981).74 Gini proved an important theorem, that his Gini coefficient can be 
expressed as two times the concentration area; this is the relationship with the Lorenz 
curve (Dagum, 1987, p. 530). 
 
 IV Normative measures 
 
The concept of Pareto optimality,75  which was presented as the basis of the 
traditional economic theory, refrains from judgments in regards to the distribution of 
income. It was considered later that the ranking of possible ‘social’ states could be a 
better option in order to measure social welfare, assuming additive individualistic 
utilities. Accounting to that restriction, a social welfare function that ranked different 
states of the distribution was proposed later; even when all kind of functions are 
considered Pareto optimal. This social consideration gave one of the first attempts in 
modern economic literature in order to consider distributional judgments within the 
society.76 There are issues associated with the normative ranking that are still to be 
solved. In the first instance, this ranking depends on the property of the social welfare 
function chosen, so this measurement had some degree of arbitrariness in that regards; 
second, it has exercised the efforts of many people to solve the problem posed by 
Arrow’s (1951) impossibility theorem, in that case the mentioned ranking is virtually 
                                                 
74The Gini coefficient method has some problems capturing some degrees of inequality within the 
population, as can be shown in the Appendix 2.7 I. It has tried sometimes to be formally rejected by authors 
like Blackorby and Donaldson (1980, p. 122) or Atkinson (1970, p.262). 
75 Discussed in the previous chapter. 
76 A discussion in Sen (1973, p. 5-9). 
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impossible. Regardless of the previous criticisms, the most common normative measures 
will be mentioned: Dalton’s measure and Atkinson’s measure. These indices have their 
own characteristics and problems.77
On the practical side, normative measures started with the classical contribution 
of Dalton (1920). He chose a homogenous representative agent with a strictly concave 
utility function that is with diminishing marginal utility of income (Sen, 1973, p. 37). His 
measure of inequality assumed this form: 
 
(2) ∑
=
⋅=
n
i
i UyUn
D
1
)()]([1 µ  
 
Dalton assumed that all utility levels should be positive. It is clear that the value 
of this measure depends on the functional form of the utility function, and various 
criticisms related to the cardinality associated to this measure have been spelled out in 
welfare literature (Sen 1973, p. 37). For instance, Atkinson considers this measure ‘not 
very useful’ (Atkinson, 1970, p. 250).  
As we know, Atkinson criticized pragmatic measures saying things such that  
measures like the Gini coefficient, “serve to obscure the fact that a complete ranking of 
distributions cannot be reached without fully specifying the form of the social welfare 
function” (1970, p. 262). He argued in favor of the use of normative measures, so he 
proposed a measure that solved Dalton’s problem of cardinality. Atkinson’s measure 
claim to be not invariant with respect to positive linear transformations of the utility 
function, so the formula became 
                                                 
77 More normative measures in Cowell (1995) or Dutta (2002).  
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)]()([ , so could be considered the “equally 
distributed equivalent level of income” (1970, p. 250).
ey
78  
Atkinson said that his measure has, among other convenient properties, to lie in 
the range between 0 and 1, this range make him claim that his measure has an ‘intuitive’ 
appeal. Shorrocks pointed out that the Atkinson measure could be seen as part of his 
generalization of entropy measures (1980, p. 622, n. 6), and we can see criticisms of this 
measure in Sen (1992, p. 95-101). In general, these kinds of measures have been subject 
of scrutiny because of the degree of arbitrariness attached to the form of the utility 
function chosen. The selected form might introduce more subjective judgments to the 
measurement that are difficult to interpret to the average researcher, much more difficult 
to understand for the policy maker. 
 
 V Entropy measures 
 
Assuming the satisfaction of the Pigou-Dalton condition, the same as other basic 
assumptions, entropy measures have been defined as ‘characterized theorems’ (Dutta, 
2002, p. 612), such that adding up additional restrictions to inequality measures, as the 
decomposability by population sub-group, a particular set of indices can be developed. 
Drawing on the notion of entropy in information theory, Theil (1967) developed an 
                                                 
78 The function used in this measure was based on the risk bearing theory of Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) 
(in Sen, 1997, p. 70). 
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interesting type of measure,79 later on, Theil measure was generalized by Shorrocks 
(1980). 80  The resultant family of measures for positive incomes (satisfying mean 
independence and population replication) given a particular value of c is such that: 
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where T is better known as the Theil measure, while L is the mean logarithmic 
deviation, also known as a Theil’s ‘second’ measure (Shorrocks, 1980, p. 622; Sen, 1973, 
pp. 34; Foster and Sen, 1997, pp. 140 & 156). The definition of this family of indices 
makes it possible to include even Atkinson’s normative family of indices, as was pointed 
out by Shorrocks (1980, p. 622, n. 6). The re-expression of these measures considering 
carefully the property of sub-group decomposability is explored in Appendix 2.7 II. 
Two comments in regards of this measure: a convenient property of measures that 
uses logarithmic transformations is that they attach greater importance to the distribution 
at the lower end of the scale (Sen, 1973, p. 28). This happens with measures L and T, 
                                                 
79 For the intuitive explanation of the entropy approach, see Theil (1996, Appendix A). 
80 Shorrocks credited Cowell for having a ‘similar’ contribution (1980, p. 615, n. 5). Cowell credited 
himself as the source of this generalization in 1977, not to Shorrocks (Cowell, 2000, p. 110). 
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which are increasingly used in modern development studies. On the other hand and also 
because of the logarithmic transformation, entropy measures are difficult to see as ‘purely 
pragmatic’. Even Sen mentions that “This is a rather peculiar welfare function, and the 
other measures could be justified in normative terms rather special representations of 
social welfare” (1973, p. 43).  
 
 VI Properties of inequality measures. 
 
One can ask why there is not a uniform way to measure inequality, or why some 
authors prefer one type versus another. The answer lies in the properties of the measures, 
because not all measures have the same properties. It will be convenient to enumerate the 
most common properties. 81  According to Anand (1983, p. 306), the most desirable 
properties of any inequality index are a) The Pigou-Dalton condition known as the 
principle of transfers (Dalton, 1920, p. 351; Pigou, 1912, p.24), b) mean or scale 
independence and c) independence of population.82 For Sen, d) an ‘ordinal’ scale is 
desirable because that makes the measure free of the numerical representation, idea that is 
very close to the concept of a ranking (1973, p. 3-4). Sen also adds a property that comes 
from an ethical judgment, which it is called in this chapter e) ‘poor sensitiveness’, which 
consist in to attach importance to transfers at the ‘lower end of the scale’ of the 
                                                 
81 For a long review see Cowell (1995, pp. 54, 66 &139), Sen (1973, Chapter 2), Anand (1983, 
Appendixes), and Dutta (2002).  
82 The detail of the Symmetry Axiom for Population is in Sen (1973, pp. 59-60), and the theorem of the 
Population Principle in Dutta (2002, p. 610). A similar property is named ‘Replication invariance’ in the 
normative framework, such that if we have ( , , )x y y= … , it will imply  ( ) ( )W x W y=  (Foster and 
Sen, 1997, p. 133, n.31). 
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population, as it happens when logarithmic transformations are used (1973, pp. 29).83 
Finally, f) symmetry is another desirable property (Foster and Sen, 1997, p. 139).84  
There are other characteristics that come from ethical judgments, for instance, g) 
non-positive sensitiveness, which is to include the very destitute such as people with no 
income. The Gini coefficient satisfies not only this condition, but also considers negative 
income (Dutta, 2002, p. 615); however this is not the case for measures like T and L. 
There is a contested property h) that judges if it is good or not to have a SWF within the 
inequality measure, which to some authors is a desirable property but not to others. For 
Sen, it is a good characteristic if a measure does not need any consideration of a SWF, 
(1973, p. 33-4),85 property that authors like Atkinson (1970) or Newbery (1970) disagree 
with. Another demanded property of inequality measures is i) Decomposability by 
population sub-group; it requires consistency between the size of population sub-group 
and the meaning of the index within population (Cowell, 1995, pp. 55 & 57). Other 
property is another kind of decomposability, and is called j) decomposability by income 
source, where in the same fashion overall inequality can be expressed as the relationship 
among the impacts of the source components.86 For some people is important if k) the 
interpretation of the measure is intuitive, for instance, if the range of the measure lies 
between the range of 0 and 1, as Atkinson does with his family of indices (1970). As we 
know, Gini coefficient also satisfies this condition, and we can not deny that most 
popular inequality measures have this intuitive property. Not only being in the range of 0 
                                                 
83 It is known the flaw of the logarithmic transformations that are unable to handle zero values, also this 
property can be inconvenient when violates the transfer principle in some cases (Sen, 1973, pp. 32). 
84 Symmetry is also known as ‘anonymity’, where for any permutation of income vector y, named y’, 
 (Litchfield , 1999, p. 2; Foster and Sen, 1997, p. 133, n. 31). )'()( yIyI =
85 He slightly change his argument when in 1997 comment on ‘Transfer sensitivity’ (Sen and Foster, 1997, 
p. 144), giving room to discuss Atkinson measures. 
86 A classical theoretical paper is Theil (1979), but the literature has largely increased recently. 
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and 1 makes the type of measure intuitive, another way to be intuitive is to consider 
ranking comparisons, like using quantiles or decile ratios, but again, because of the 
ethical and practical judgments, there is no agreement in which of these rankings should 
be used, therefore, there is no consensus about way to express the importance of the 
property of being intuitive in this sense (Cowell, 1995, p. 67). 
After mentioning all these properties, the literature usually agrees on the first 
three, so it is common to see inequality measures satisfying a), b), and c) properties. If 
we include property f), those measures are called relative measures (Foster and Sen, 
1997, p. 140; Anand, 1983, pp. 339-40). It can be noticed that after considering those four 
characteristics, the ethical judgment shape the discussion about the rest of the properties. 
Looking at the variety of properties described above, it is not difficult to see that usually 
those properties can be in conflict, and then the associated ranking of the measures of 
inequality might not always be always the same. 
 
 VII Incomplete Rankings. 
 
For the use of the pragmatic and the normative measures, in the same way as the 
use of entropy indices, it is assumed that every pair of income distributions can be totally 
compared under any of the mentioned methods. A total ‘complete’ ranking imply that a 
set of distributions x, y, z, etc., with a given inequality measure I, which is a function of 
any of the given distributions, it will map into the set of real numbers ( )I x , ( )I y  or ( )I z  
that are representing the true degree of inequality. Then any pair of inequality measures 
of the mentioned distributions can produce a comparable ranking in the form 
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of ( ) ( )I x I y> , ( ) ( )I x I y<  or ( ) ( )I x I y= , because these are just real numbers (Sen, 
1973, p. 47). Once the assumption of ‘completeness’ is relaxed, then it becomes another 
set of inequality comparisons, which Sen has described as ‘quasi-orderings’ in his 
literature (Sen, 1973, p. 63), but it is more common to use the notion of dominance, or 
stochastic dominance (Dutta, 2002, p. 607). Following the standard notation, the 
α degree of stochastic dominance is known as Dα , where the first degree is 0α = . The 
idea of dominance starts with very basic conditions. It is assumed that all rankings and all 
measures of inequality should satisfy certain properties, and the ranking of the dominance 
condition is given by the properties that are satisfied. On the following three paragraphs 
the dominance relationship will be touched on, finalizing with other ways to rank 
distributions through the intuitive tool of quantile comparisons and graphical tools. 
 
 a) First Degree Stochastic dominance. 
 
The first degree stochastic dominance relation ( ) implies unanimity for all 
symmetric, population-invariant, and monotonically increasing welfare functions (Foster 
and Sen, 1997, p. 137-138), it is also called quantile comparison (Cowell, 2000, p. 102), 
or ‘Anonymous Pareto Dominance’ (Zheng, 2000, p. 435). This is equivalent to say that 
our first ranking should satisfy our properties c) independence of population, and f) 
symmetry. We can not see very often the application of this ranking method, because it 
does not take account of the transfer principle, which is central to almost all inequality 
measures.  
0D
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 b) Second Degree Stochastic dominance. 
 
As it is expected, the second degree stochastic dominance ( ) includes also, 
besides c) independence of population and f) symmetry, the a) Pigou-Dalton condition or 
the transfer principle. The comparison is equivalent to the Lorenz dominance,
1D
87 assuming 
that the mean income is the same for both distributions. 88 Graphically, in Figure 2-2 it is 
clear that x Lorenz-dominate y (x L y), the same as z Lorenz-dominate y (z L y), because 
for both distributions x and z lie above y. Using this dominance condition, it is not very 
much clear which distribution should be chosen if we just consider only x and z, we do 
not know if x L z or if z L x. So, Lorenz domination is helpful for the comparison of two 
income distributions, but it does not always have a definitive ranking, as we can see in 
this case when two income distributions intersect.  
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Figure 2-2. Lorenz dominance diagram. 
 
87 See Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.1 of Dutta (2002, p. 608-609). 
88 It can also be assumed that the income levels are normalized by the mean (Foster and Sen, 1997, p. 146). 
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 The second degree stochastic dominance has a restrictive framework, because it 
assumes that the mean income of the two distributions should be the same. In practical 
terms, it is difficult to find this condition, but we can get rid of this restriction with a 
generalized assumption. For this, there is an extension of this theorem: Shorrocks (1983) 
generalized this theorem as the Generalized Lorenz dominance (GL) which is the same 
Lorenz curve but scaled up by the mean income (Dutta, 2002, p. 610). In graphical terms 
(Figure 2-3), we can see that the vertical axis goes from 0 to µ  instead of from 0 to 1 
(Cowell, 1995, p. 42). The generalization is helpful, because Lorenz dominance only 
applies to comparisons between two income distributions with the same mean income, as 
it was mentioned before (Dutta, 2002, p. 609). Therefore, the extended definition of this 
theorem is exactly analogous to Lorenz dominance criteria. Saying that one distribution x 
Lorenz dominate other distribution y in the generalized sense ( xGLy ), it will imply 
higher welfare associated with distribution x. In the normative setting, this will be 
equivalent to say that if we have two welfare functions such that , is exactly 
equivalent to say that Generalized Lorenz curves do not intersect ( ), because 
lies above of (Foster and Sen, 1997, p. 135), as is shown below. 
)()( yWxW >
xGLy
xGL yGL
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Figure 2-3. Generalized Lorenz dominance diagram. 
 
The explanatory power of the theorem about Lorenz dominance and its 
generalization is limited as it does not always solve our concerns: the curves representing 
the distribution sometimes intersect. If we are rigorous, we can neither say that we prefer 
some distribution over another, nor that we are indifferent between the two, simply we 
cannot rank them (being x and y suitable distribution vectors, happens that yx ⊥ ) 
(Cowell, 2000, p. 107). In empirical analysis, is true also that the Lorenz curves intersect, 
it is possible to apply the Generalization of the Lorenz criteria in this case, and sometimes 
the problem disappears (Cowell, 1995, p. 43). But if that is not the case, it will be 
necessary to apply methods that consider some form of the Social Welfare Function, as it 
is done by the Atkinson family of indices, or we can apply a higher definition (e.g. third 
degree) of dominance. 
The link of the Lorenz dominance with the normative measurement was 
developed by Atkinson (1970). He proved an important theorem based on the Lorenz 
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ranking using the normative approach. He said that if we compare two income 
distributions, x and y, and if we assume the existence of some social welfare function W 
composed by the sum of all individual U’s, where , and U is a concave 
function of income (
∑
=
=
n
i
iyUyW
1
)()(
0'',0' ≤> UU ), then those two distributions compared in the sense of 
, is exactly equivalent to say that the Lorenz curves do not intersect ( ), 
because the Lorenz curve of one of the distributions (x) lies above of the other (y) , 
so lies above of . The implication of the theorem is such that the comparison can be 
done without necessarily knowing the particular form of U at all (Atkinson, 1970, pp. 
246-7; Sen, 1973, pp. 48-49; Cowell, 1995, pp. 41-3 & 55). In other words, if there is 
Lorenz dominance, that is a guarantee that the ranking is free of the particular form 
attached to the (utility) function U. 
)()( yWxW > xLy
xL yL
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 c) Third Degree Stochastic dominance. 
 
Finally the third degree stochastic dominance relation ( ) includes ‘transfer 
sensitivity’, which attaches greater importance to the transfers at the lower level of the 
distribution. In other words, it is ‘poor sensitive’ (Foster and Shorrocks, 1988, p. 176; 
Foster and Sen, 1997, p. 138; Cowell, 2000, pp. 102-103; Dutta 2002, p. 608-612). 
Therefore, our third degree stochastic dominance relation includes not only conditions a), 
b), c) and f), but also condition e). This will mean that a third degree stochastic 
dominance will consider a transfer from a middle-class person to a poor person more 
valuable, than the same transfer from a rich person to a middle class person. The rationale 
is that transfers done at the lower end of the scale are more likely to reduce poverty. 
2D
 
 d) Quantiles and Share Ratios. 
 
Another way to assess a ranking between a pair of income distributions is using a 
type of ‘intuitive’ measures that considers cutoff points on the frequency distributions. 
We can consider the population dividing the amount of income over a fixed population 
share in equal proportions. A quantile division takes intervals from the cumulative 
distribution, such that is measured an income value given a fraction or percentage of the 
distribution. The division of the distribution in certain proportions is arbitrary, but the 
most common are the quintiles (5 shares of 20% each, or 5 quantiles), quartiles (4 
quantiles) or deciles (10 quantiles) (Cowell, 1995, p. 28). The purpose of this 
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simplification is usually seen in regards to the simplicity of the results. For some people, 
it might be intuitive to follow the relationship of how much the lower 10 percent ( ) of 
the population has in relation to the whole distribution, or as another example, it can be 
questioned how much this amount can be related with the richest 10 percent of the 
population ( ). The relationship of these proportions is the starting point for the share 
ratios. For instance, a common measure of inequality is how much the lowest 20 percent 
of the population has in contrast with the richest 10 percent, this ratio is known as the R 
10/20 ( ). Some people consider the ratio of the first quintile (the poorest 20 
percent of the population) over the richest quintile, which is the usual  ratio, and 
some others like to compare each quintile in relationship to the median income of the 
distribution ( …). These last set of ratios are considered measures of 
poverty, because there is a notion of a ‘poverty’ gap on the deviation of certain quantile 
over the median of the population, but this poverty measure is indeed a measure of 
‘relative’ poverty, and that approach will be rejected in a following section for the sake of 
clarity. What is true is that the possible combinations of these ratios can grow 
exponentially (Cowell, 1995, p. 29). On the one hand, it is very simple to understand 
these proportions, but, on the other hand, there is no convention in order to use one ratio 
over the other. Then, the comparison of results across papers is difficult, unless a big 
tradition on the use of one of these ratios has been already established beforehand. 
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2.4 Other ways to assess inequality. 
 
Besides the above-mentioned methods, inequality might be measured in other 
ways. One is through graphical methods and the other is through the construction of 
statistical models. On the statistical side, we might assume the existence of a density 
function that represents the income distribution, so this function might be subject to 
exploration, because the income vector contains a characteristic shape, the vector is 
sufficiently regular and more information is usually available about it (Shorrocks, 1987, 
p. 822). The study of this branch of research has been traced to Pareto (1897) and his 
universal law of the (log-normal) income distribution (Shorrocks, 1987, p. 823; Cowell, 
1995, p. 71). The result was that income distribution was seen as a process that was 
governed by the stochastic laws, so the link with the statistical theory, and the assessment 
of income distribution in that particular framework was imminent. In the stochastic 
framework, it is possible to observe income inequality through the approximation of 
income differentials. The basic equation that describes this relationship is the following: 
 
(7) 1 2ln w P J Rα α= + +  
 
Where w represents wage income; because of Pareto’s research, w is usually 
presented in the logarithmic form. P are personal characteristics, J are job characteristics, 
and R is a random term. Parameters 1α  and 2α  are estimated ‘market prices’ in the 
equation. In this setting, it is assumed that income differentials can be explained by the 
differences in personal characteristics, job characteristics/opportunities and a random 
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term. In the general case, the true inequality can be observed after controlling for the 
mentioned characteristics (Shorrocks, 1987, p. 824). It will be vain to comment on the 
vast possibilities that the assessment of income distribution provides in this framework, 
particularly when we consider the intertemporal dimension or the panel data analysis. The 
statistical modeling is mentioned here in order to acknowledge the existence of the 
variety of density functions and ad-hoc methods with simultaneous equations. On the 
measurement of the variability of income, a set of robustness checks are available, and 
the changes on inequality are subject to measurement through the decomposition of the 
variables that are part of the model. For a glance of this methodology see Cowell (1995, 
chapter 4), but any econometric analysis textbook might be of help as well.  
Finally, on the graphical side, the possibility to analyze inequality through the plot 
of income distributions is also known. It can be done through a plotting of the related 
density functions that comes from statistical methods. A glance of that kind of 
measurement can be seen as in Cowell (1995, p. Chapter 5). 
 
2.5 Inequality and the Relationship with Absolute and Relative Poverty 
 
Knowing that in development economics the issues of poverty, inequality and 
welfare altogether are matters of primary concern, it is necessary to make some 
clarifications, much more when some authors consider the measurement of relative 
poverty as a good approximation of human deprivation. This issue needs to be considered 
with care. The mathematical definition of relative poverty is simple. Rather than 
assuming a fixed poverty line (z), which is exogenously required by the measurement of 
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absolute poverty, a relative poverty measurement uses a z that is endogenously defined by 
the income distribution. In the relative definition, z is usually a fraction of the mean or of 
the median of the population’s income (Ravallion, 1996, p. 1330; Foster, 1998a, p. 336). 
The relative measurement of poverty challenges the basic assumption of measurement of 
absolute welfare, where “[t]he starting point is the canonical consumption problem in 
which a household chooses the consumption of individual goods to maximize utility 
within a given budget and at given prices” (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002, p. 6). The 
consideration of relative poverty clashes against the absolute definition of the basic 
basket of goods and services, where the discussion about the definition of the basket is 
vastly covered by development literature.  
The concept of relative poverty might elevate the issue of inequality to the highest 
ranking in the assessment of deprivation; however it is not the intention of this research to 
support that approach. Unfair inequality, as different from natural inequality, is a shape of 
deprivation, with different causes and consequences than poverty itself. On the one hand, 
inequality considerations urge normal individuals to make transfers to a worse off 
persons, because they can be easily targeted. On the other hand, a normal altruistic citizen 
would require much more effort to know where the poorest person is, because sometimes 
the answer is not obvious. Thus, it is assumed that targeting the poor through alleviation 
programs should be a task of the government. The intrinsic relationship of these two 
destitutions can not be denied; both in the theoretical and in the practical side (Foster, 
1998a, p. 337). On the practical side, the common sense says that if the government has 
only one dollar available for either a program for alleviating poverty or one for inequality 
reduction, poverty reduction should be chosen. In fact, in theoretical terms, the 
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dichotomy of alleviating poverty rather than reducing inequality should not exist; it will 
be supposed to be the same issue (Anand, 1983, p. 344-345); recalling the third degree 
stochastic dominance criterion, the most valuable transfer is the one done to the poorest 
person. 89 The problem with relative poverty is the resultant mixture of concepts that have 
different practical implications, so it is difficult to recognize which problems belong to 
inequality, and which problems belong to poverty. In practical terms, a relative notion of 
poverty might lose track of the poorest people “by anyone’s reckoning” (Ravallion, 1996, 
p. 1330).90  
 
••
                                                
  Debate between Sen and Townsend. 
 
In fact, the discussion about the relative and the absolute notion of poverty can be 
first understood outside of the formal framework. Almost three decades ago, Amartya 
Sen argued in favor of an absolute definition of poverty: “ultimately poverty must be seen 
to be primarily an absolute notion” (Sen, 1983, p. 153). He was challenging the 
sociological literature of his time, which maintained that poverty issues should be 
discussed from a sociological perspective rather than using the science of economics. He 
was clear in saying that focusing on relative poverty had some meaningful implications, 
because around the end of the 19th century, some studies based on absolute measures 
were suggesting an unfounded optimism in poverty alleviation (Sen, 1983, p. 154). In the 
same line of thought, he said that the relativist notion of poverty started to point out 
 
89 Foster (1998a, p. 337) recognizes that using a relative definition of the poverty line is not to measure 
inequality, but under certain circumstances, the connection is very strong, there are almost the same (See 
theorem 6 in Foster and Shorrocks, 1988a).  
90 Foster (1998a) commented on a hybrid (relative-absolute) poverty line based on empirical applications. 
His results are inconclusive. This hybrid possibility was previously rejected by Zheng (1994). 
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problems with wrong absolute assumptions, as it was pointed out by the empirical 
research of Townsend (1962) in the UK. 
On the other hand, Sen (1983) criticized the problems with measurement of 
poverty in relative terms, as he did criticize the main thesis of Townsend (1954, 1962) in 
terms, first, of the fixity of necessities over time that were confused with ‘absoluteness of 
needs’; and second, the confusion of inequality deprivation with the concept of absolute 
destitution because of inequality: “there is a difference between achieving relatively less 
than others, and achieving absolutely less because of falling behind others” (1983, p. 
155, emphasis in the original). One of the implications of the relative view was that this 
view was so rigid, such that poverty could not be seen as a target for elimination, as it 
was argued by the work of Fiegehen et al. (1971, in Sen, 1983, p. 156).91 Sen also 
criticizes the extreme focus of the egalitarian point of view of sociologists like Miller and 
Roby (1971, in Sen, 1983, p. 157), where they claimed that inequality should indeed be 
the measurement of poverty, a position that was contested not only by Sen (1983) but by 
Townsend (1979a) as well. Another implication of the relative view is about the policy to 
locate the changing poverty line that might have a perverse effect. For instance, Sen 
criticized the practice in the UK of using Supplementary Benefit scale as the poverty line, 
similar to the method that used to be used by the US government in 1969. The perversity 
of the results came from the possible manipulation of the definition of what should be 
considered a need (Sen, 1983, p. 158).  
Townsend’s reply to Sen was focused on the sociological aspects of poverty, 
saying that Sen misunderstood behavior with motivation (Townsend, 1985, p. 660). He 
                                                 
91 Atkinson (1975) argued in favor of a relative notion, saying that ‘the adoption of a relative poverty 
standard does not mean that the poor are always necessarily always with us’ (p. 189), but the reasons 
explained there are not convincing for this author. 
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questioned the ability of persons to see their own poverty: “People may be in poverty 
when they believe they are not and vice versa” (Idem, p. 661), and ‘other’ actors might be 
‘conveniently’ interested in changing these points of view. Townsend said that sometimes 
hunger is a signal and not a cause, for instance, hunger might be a signal of coercion, then 
looking only at hunger, as it was the argument of Sen, the important link of a cause of 
destitution could be missed. In regards to the identification of the needs, he mentioned 
that not all needs can be perceived by the government side: “certain kinds or degrees of 
human need may not be perceived by any powerful group in a society—either because 
their own self-interest precludes it or because fashion or customs are such that it does not 
seriously obtrude upon their attention” (Idem, p. 665). And finally, he questioned the 
framework that Sen was using: “His [conceptualization] is a sophisticated adaptation of 
the individualism which is rooted in neo-classical economics” (Idem, p. 668). He went 
further: “[t]hat theoretical approach will never provide a coherent explanation of the 
social construction of need, and hence of the real potentialities which do exist of planning 
to meet need” (Idem.). 
In order to finalize this debate, Sen was clear that his 1985 paper was not devoted 
to Townsend’s work but mostly to others, as Townsend seems to understand in his 
‘rejoinder’ (Sen, 1985, p. 669). He clarified that, when people were going below some 
basic absolute level of fulfilling of capabilities, is to be ‘absolutely’ poor, regardless the 
fact that others within the same society might also be destitute. Sen recognize that need 
might vary from society to society, or from time to time, but that was not an issue in 
order to claim that need is ‘relative’: “The characteristic feature of “absoluteness” is 
neither constancy over time, nor invariance between different societies, nor concentration 
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merely on food and nutrition. It is an approach of judging a person’s deprivation in 
absolute terms…, rather than in pure relative terms vis-à-vis the levels enjoyed by others 
in the society” (Sen, 1985, p. 673, emphasis on the original). Among other criticisms, Sen 
primarily pointed out Townsend’s misunderstanding of the capability approach (Idem, p. 
674-675), something that can be understood because Townsend might not be familiar 
with Sen’s economic literature. Summing up, the ‘relative’ notion of poverty did not 
come up with better defendants, and the debate produced an ‘externality’. It seems to be 
that after this discussion, the focus of the human development studies was definitively 
shifted to economic science; a trend which some people found to be disturbing.  
 
2.6 Concluding Remarks. 
 
As it can be clear with this measurement survey, there are several ways that 
inequality measurement can be done. The variety of indices depends on the 
characteristics attached to their properties. There are also practical reasons to decide to 
use certain inequality measures, mostly related with the data constraint. For our purpose, 
the use of the Gini coefficient is supported in this work, since it is a standard inequality 
measure, because it is necessary to provide understandable measures to other policy 
makers and researchers in developing countries. The interpretation of the Gini coefficient 
is intuitive as well. Besides the standard measurement, the Gini coefficient has properties 
associated with a second degree stochastic dominance condition that ensures the link with 
the ranking that considers the transfer principle, symmetry, and the population principle. 
The consideration of the mean income provides a generalized Lorenz ranking that is 
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useful in the ranking of different distributions. The graphical representation of the Lorenz 
curve also helps us to focus on the stochastic dominance of the distributions, so the 
ranking of these distributions would be more meaningful. The challenges of the Gini 
coefficient and the Lorenz dominance ranking are not ignored, but the options available 
are both complicated and sometimes not very intuitive. 
There are other properties that are important for the measurement of inequality. 
The Theil Index was chosen because it is ‘poor sensitive’ and it is also decomposable by 
population sub-group. The first is an ethical judgment that cares more about the poor in 
the distributional setting, and the second is a practical implication that provides a tool in 
order to target inequality better. The property of decomposition by population sub-group 
is not entertained by the Gini coefficient, and that compelled us to focus on a measure 
from the family of entropy measures. On the other hand, though the consideration of 
normative inequality measurement seems to be important, the conflict that poses the 
arbitrariness on the form of the social utility function makes the results difficult for 
interpretation. The use of ‘incomplete’ rankings is important itself, not only because of 
the link with other inequality measures, but also because some of the tools available are 
intuitive, so it is better the communication between the researcher and the policy maker. 
As the last way to assess inequality considered in this chapter, we have, on the one hand, 
that the use of stochastic models have been proven fruitful in modern research, but some 
times the data constrains the empirical analysis. On the other hand, the use of graphical 
representations of inequality is useful, and its use is considered in the following chapters. 
Even though it is acknowledged the sense of deprivation that comes from an 
unfair unequal distribution, it is better to separate inequality measurement from other 
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kind of measures of destitution, as the latter is a measure of income relative poverty. So 
the inequality embedded in the measurement of relative poverty should not be considered 
together, because it might not be clear which destitution comes from an unfair 
distribution and which deprivation comes from the absence of basic goods. The 
theoretical similitude of poverty and inequality definitions was discussed, but the 
practical implications embedded in both topics are different, so it is better to maintain 
them separated. There are still technical decisions that need to be taken in regards to 
inequality measurement once a particular measure of inequality is chosen, and those 
decisions, which are mostly related with limitations of the data sets, will be explained in 
the next chapter. 
 
2.7 Appendix. 
 
 I Problems of Gini coefficient 
There are some problems regarding the calculation of the Gini Coefficient (Loehr 
and Powelson, 1981) as follows: 
a) There is no algebraic formula for the calculation of the Lorenz curve, and then, 
a simple integration for the exact area under the curve is very difficult. 
b) Some computations understate the real value of the trapezoids under the Lorenz 
curve. 
c) It is possible in some income distribution, that the Gini ratio can be insensitive 
to some changes (i.e. due to growth). It is also possible to have an increase of number of 
people under the poverty level without the respective increase for the Gini coefficient 
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(used as a proxy of income distribution). Suppose we have a traditional Lorenz curve, in 
order to calculate the Gini ratio we use the area below labeled as B in the formula of the 
Gini ratio= A/(A+B). Where A is the area below the line of perfect equality (Figure 2-4) 
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Figure 2-4. The Lorenz Curve 
 
Now, assuming an increase in income (due to growth), is possible to face a 
hypothetical case, where everybody gets in the same proportion the share of income, then 
the area below the Lorenz Curve remains unchanged, in this case, is logical to assume 
that even though the income of everybody changes, the inequality does not, because all 
the changes were proportional. But if this change occurs in some strange way such that 
the increase in income for some of the highest income earners became proportionally the 
same (in the opposite direction) for some of the lowest income earners, is possible that 
the area below the Lorenz Curve remains the same, obtaining the same Gini coefficient, 
but with the wrong conclusion that the inequality remain the same, because the shape of 
123 
the Lorenz Curve (as shown in Figure 2-5) changes, resulting in a highest proportion of 
poor population (the poor are more poor). 
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Figure 2-5. Change in the shape of the Lorenz Curve, not in the area below. 
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 II Decomposability by population sub-group. 
 
Using the convenient property of decomposability of entropy measures 
(Shorrocks, 1984; among others), we can see the contribution to inequality of each region 
to the whole inequality in the country. The intuition of decomposability, that is said to be 
traced to the ‘analysis of variance’, can be found in Foster and Sen (1997, pp. 149-53). 
Using suitable shares of income and population overall inequality can be calculated, as is 
expressed by Dutta: “an inequality measure is decomposable if it is possible to express 
overall inequality in a population as a function of the inequalities within major 
subgroups” (2002, p. 612). Tables and graphics are consistently used to show levels of 
inequality among countries, the same as its composition by within-group and between-
group, depending on how groups are defined.92 Other kinds of graphic tools help us to 
show the contribution of inequality per region, the same as other intuitive interpretations 
for indices of inequality (Conceição and Ferreira, 2000).  
To make understandable our measures considering weights and groups, let’s 
rewrite our original formulas in this sense: 
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92 Review in Theil (1996, Chapter 2). 
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 Now, additive decomposability is written as follows: 
 
(4’’) ),(),(),( ycGEycGEycGE Bw += . 
 
From this equation, we have two terms, within-group and between-group 
inequality. Within-group inequality is written 
 
(8) ,   ∑
=
−=
K
k
k
c
k
c
kw ycGESVycGE
1
1 ),(),(
where 
N
N
V kk = , also known as the subgroup population share. Analogously  is 
the subgroup income share.  is the same inequality measure as (4’), with the 
difference that  the subgroup is considered a separate population (i.e.  rather than 
).  
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The second term, between-group inequality ( ), is obtained 
substituting in (4’), meaning that every person in the population receive the 
same income as its own sub-group. (Shorrocks, 1983; Jenkins, 1999, p. 8). 
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33   Practical Issues in Measuring Inequality: Operational Decisions with Survey 
Data Sets. 
 
3.1 Abstract. 
 
In order to compute indices of inequality, there are operational decisions that are to be 
made beforehand. The literature supports the fact that inequality measurement, the same 
as poverty measurement, is sensitive to some of the decisions. The information provided 
by consumption-expenditure surveys is different from the information that comes from 
employment income surveys. In both cases it is possible to compute measures of welfare, 
but the results are to be considered with specific reference to the recipient unit chosen, 
different measurement errors from underreported and misreported income, and the use of 
equivalence scales. Going further, the consideration of non positive incomes needs to be 
tackled, much more if there is a possibility that those values represent the poorest people. 
There are other issues that also affect the measurement of inequality, for instance, the 
issue of regional prices, regional classification of groups, or the representativeness of the 
sample in the survey; such discussions are mentioned in this chapter as well. 
 
3.2 Introduction. 
 
After doing the methodological analysis and the review of inequality measures, 
there are some insights that shall be discussed before going to the calculations of income 
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inequality. The information available in survey data provides the means for deprivation 
measurement. When we are ready to do the measurement using statistical packages and 
suitable software, it is noticed that some operational decisions are needed to be taken. 
The researcher needs to make sure that the measurement of inequality is independent of 
these operational decisions taken, or he/she need to be aware of how much those 
decisions will change the level of inequality measured. The process of a correct 
description of inequality is important, not only because the result of the measurement is 
more accurate, but also because the expression of the technical decisions can make the 
research comparable with the present and future literature. Therefore, this chapter is 
mostly concerned with the operational decisions in regards to empirical calculations of 
inequality, focusing on the descriptive part of the measurement. Even though the purpose 
of this research is a descriptive exercise, an understanding of the property of population 
sub-groups can give a hint of where the inequality comes from, or where it is more 
concentrated; this property might be giving rise to not only the descriptive measurement, 
but also to its underlying causation. In general, after a proper descriptive exercise, using 
different tools that acknowledge the complexity of the phenomena, the extent of 
inequality within the country or among the regions will be known. Knowing this, 
inequality measurement will serve as a proxy of social inequality, which to some extent is 
the measure of individual deprivation in the social context.94 The intention of this chapter 
is to introduce the reader into the operational decisions dealing with survey data, in order 
to build up proper indicators in regards to the decisions taken. 
 
                                                 
94 It is recognized that inequality is one of the possible human destitutions, but that functioning might be 
related with deprivation in other dimensions. That relationship is assessed for the case of Mexico in chapter 
8. 
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3.3 Survey considerations.  
 
There has been a recent improvement in availability of data in developing 
countries, but not all data are collected using the same methodologies (Atkinson and 
Bourguignon, 2000, p. 27). If we know a little bit more about the basis of the data 
collection, it will also be easier to understand and fully exploit the information contained 
in the data and hence, these can be used more properly. In the literature about income 
inequality, most of the discussion lies in the type of measure that shall be used (e.g. Gini 
coefficient, Atkinson measure, etc.), or in the properties of these measures, but it happens 
often that other kind of practical problems are not addressed when the computations are 
done. It is common that “it is omitted in the analyses to make reference to operational 
procedures that are behind the comparative indicators and it is taken for granted as if all 
estimations were generated with the same statistical quality, and all inequality calculation 
methods are provided from a standard algorithm…” (Medina, 2001, p. 29). It is common 
to see in developing countries literature that there is no formal definition of the 
operational decisions for the measurement of inequality. However, this is not the case for 
poverty measurement, which is explored in more detail (World Bank, 2004, p. 8). 
Because of the lack of explanation of operational procedures in development literature, it 
is difficult to compare the inequality measurement ‘across papers’, so it is not easy to 
know with certainty ‘what’ among ‘whom’ is calculated , as Atkinson and Bourguignon 
(2000, p. 41) observed. 
The following paragraphs are intended to provide some light on the technical 
decisions, showing the operational considerations of different inequality measures, the 
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different epistemological positions taken, and also the computational problems that arise 
when the analysis is done.  
 
 I Quality of survey data. 
 
One of the immediate questions arises about the concern of the reliability of 
survey data; this issue used to be a big problem some decades ago. The role of income-
money coming from expenditure or consumption surveys was questioned as the 
representation of the household’s welfare. Given that developing economies are by 
definition subject to more chaotic environments, the question about the data reliability is 
more important. The accuracy of sample estimates as representative of the population 
used to be a big concern in development literature, for instance it was said that “[m]any 
available estimates of income distribution are derived from samples that are statistically 
inadequate in these respects with the result that sample estimates are both biased and 
have a large variance” (Chenery, in Chenery et al., 1974, p. 5). These authors were 
pointing out more problems of the survey data, mostly in regards to improper design, lack 
of an adequate sampling frame, or the failure to consider inaccessible regions. Now, 
things have improved since those early days, so that almost 30 years later, authors such as 
Atkinson and Bourguignon concluded something different: “One of the conclusions 
which the reader will rightly draw from the Handbook is that there has been a very 
considerable improvement in the availability of data about the distribution of income.” 
(2000, p. 27). They mentioned advances made in the representativeness of the surveys, 
because of countries from developed and developing economies have increased the 
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budget for this purpose. Besides that, progressive improvements in the methods used to 
perform the data analysis have been made. 
Approximating social inequality with income inequality can be sometimes 
problematic. While considering social inequality and measurement of poverty, some 
institutions are concerned with the reality of the assumptions made in the calculations. It 
has been argued that it is difficult to assume a simplistic framework in developing 
economies, because of their higher level of complexity (Chenery, 1974, in Chenery et al., 
1974, p. xvi). The limitations of survey data can point towards other limitations as well, 
like to focus research only to income-money-wage in the case of income surveys, or to 
focus only on the money value of consumption, as is the case of expenditure surveys. It is 
assumed that each of the types of surveys mentioned would work well to measure social 
deprivation. There are opinions about the mainstream measurement of welfare, criticizing 
its unavoidable reliance on household surveys, such that those measurements are built up 
in ‘soft’ grounds (Ghai, 1977, in Ghai et al., 1977, p. 49); such that these critiques 
mention some sort of pre-existing inter-related patterns of prices that are expressed in the 
household income. These perhaps endogenous patterns might be biasing the patterns of 
distribution. It is obvious that some critiques focus also on the problem of non-measured 
demonstration effects, and the non inclusion of services or benefits such as public goods 
is also pointed out. Another sort of limitation of the survey data is the periodical stability 
in their collection. It was argued that in developing economies, information cannot 
always be collected on a regular basis, such that political or social events might disturb 
the institutions that produce data. Summing up, it is necessary to be aware of the probable 
limitations of the use of survey data, though that should not be a constraint to measure 
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this important aspect of welfare. Income data is most commonly used because these are 
readily available, and might be complemented with other information as soon as newer 
one, such as other functionings rather than income or subjective information, is ready. 
The fact is that, in order to approach the problem of measurement of inequality and 
poverty, there are not many substitutes for income or consumption surveys. 
 
 II Recipient Unit and Welfare Source for Inequality. 
 
There are two discussions that are usually connected, one is the issue about 
income vs. expenditure surveys and the other is the argument that comes from household 
vs. the individual focus. Both issues are closely related and it is difficult to disentangle 
them. On the one hand, usually expenditure surveys try to capture consumption that is 
approximated from household expenditure and it has the household as the recipient unit. 
The household might be composed of one or more families, and each of the families 
might be composed of one or more individuals. On the other hand, income surveys (e.g. 
employment surveys), even though they collect the information by household, they focus 
more on individuals. It is difficult to assess individual well being in a household survey, 
since for that it is necessary to assume a theoretical framework, for instance, a framework 
which attach some weights to individuals within the household (e.g. equivalence scales), 
among other considerations. With regard to income surveys it is difficult to ‘isolate’ the 
individual from his/her surroundings, assuming that s/he is answering just with reference 
to his or her own wages and earnings when s/he is interviewed. This view might 
introduce a measurement error that is not easy to detect. The issue of income vs. 
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expenditure survey discussion will be tackled first, followed by the consideration of 
household vs. individual focus. In order to address certain questions, the understanding of 
both issues at the same time will be necessary. 
 
 a) Income vs. Consumption-Expenditure Surveys. 
 
In order to construct indicators of welfare, such as poverty or inequality, the use 
of (wage) income or consumption data might imply a decision, which can be both a 
practical issue and a conceptual challenge (CTMP, 2002, p. 34).  Both expenditure and 
labor incomes are usually available in many surveys, but there are some basic limitations 
when we want to use them to make indicators of welfare. On the consumption side, there 
are some practical issues in regards to its measurement: the first problem is the difficulty 
to obtain a reliable quantification of consumption, which is approximated in theory by the 
recorded expenditure in household surveys. If we are interested in the individual 
approach on a consumption-expenditure survey, the kind of weights attached to every 
individual within the household is important, because the household is used regularly as a 
recipient unit: this is the link with the household vs. individual approach. In consumption-
expenditure surveys there are other problems, such as the role of public goods, which are 
difficult to include in the household expenditure. On the other hand, we also have 
different things to consider in regards to income data, like the different kinds of income 
sources. Income surveys usually contain information only about money-wage income. 
Other sources, such as capital or asset income, are not included very often neither are the 
non-money-wage incomes.  
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An advantage of an income survey is such that usually it has a bigger number of 
observations in the survey data; more households are surveyed because this information 
is not as expensive to collect as on the expenditure surveys. Focusing on the problems of 
income surveys, we can not ignore the problem of underreported and misreported 
income, limitations that are usually criticized in development literature. Now, in both 
consumption and income survey data, different kinds of fluctuations of income or 
consumption should be considered. That consumption-expenditure income has a 
smoother behavior through time is assumed. The use of monetary representations to both 
approaches might also be considered for criticism, issue that has been considered very 
narrow with reference to the capability approach of Sen. All the previous issues have 
different and ambiguous impacts on the measurement of real inequality and real poverty, 
but this should not be a definitive obstacle to make an assessment on the size of the 
biases. 
 i) Traditions. 
There are different traditions of collecting data, and those traditions can lead us to 
different assessments of poverty or inequality. In the present literature, a strong tradition 
of collecting consumption data in Asian countries from expenditure surveys is mentioned, 
while it is generally known that Latin American countries collect information mostly 
from income surveys (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002, p. 13; De Ferranti et al. 2004, p. 36). 
Poverty measures show a different level of welfare using consumption-expenditure data 
rather than information from income surveys, so the number of poor people might change 
in regards to the methodological practices of collecting data sets from different countries 
(Székely et al. 2000, p. 12). These differences are important for Latin America: the 
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percentage of poor people changes by up to 7 percent, depending on the country. The 
referred literature can make us think that the number of poor people will be reported 
differently depending on the source of the data sets, so we would expect different 
reported levels of inequality as well. 
 ii) Approximating Welfare: Different Sources. 
In the literature is assumed the validity of using proxy variables that characterize 
the satisfaction of individual preferences. The sources might be either labor income or 
consumption. The particular standard of living of the individual is supposed to be 
approximated with these sources. On the one hand, when only labor income is taken into 
account, it is assumed that labor income is equivalent to consumption. This assumption is 
theoretically feasible in a model with a single period of time, if the entire income is 
consumed at once within the period. In such a way the mentioned income represents the 
entire earning sources of individuals within the household (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002, p. 
13). We know that such simplistic assumption might be rather narrow, because in reality, 
labor income is neither consumed in one period of time, nor does represent the only 
earning source for the necessities of the household. On the other hand, consumption data 
have also the problem that it does not always account for all kinds of expenditures, 
because some kinds of expenditure are not always recorded or is not possible to know 
them easily. For instance, the measurement of consumption leaves behind the 
considerations of public goods. The problem with public goods and their measurement on 
deprivation indices is that those goods are usually consumed by the poor in a relatively 
higher proportion, and the exclusion of those goods might bias the measurement of 
deprivation downward. 
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Income does not come only from labor, but from other sources as well. Capital 
income might not be very common, but rent that comes from ownership of property in 
many cases is.95 In this case, the proportional rent represented by the owned asset might 
be considered a particular kind of capital income as well. In a similar way that happens to 
the treatment of capital income, rent is difficult to evaluate as well. Capital income is 
difficult to evaluate even in developed economies: “capital income is generally paid on a 
less regular basis than earnings and therefore more difficult to observe in data sources 
other than income tax returns” (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2000, p. 37). We see that, in 
practice, capital income is not always considered in developing economies, and it might 
be an important component of well-being for the people in the household; this important 
information might be inappropriately considered. Estimating the proper amount of value 
associated to the ‘rent’ of such asset as a house, would give a better measure of well-
being, so the poverty or inequality indices would have a better foundation in their 
accuracy. 
 iii) Valuation. 
The valuation of consumption is both a theoretical and a practical challenge. The 
practical difficulty relies on the complete inclusion of basic goods in the basket, with a 
process that is a continuous search for the particular items that satisfy people’s needs 
according to their changing tastes. The challenge might come from the correct 
consideration of prices (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002, p. 13). Regional prices have another 
                                                 
95 An explicit form of capital income is available in some expenditure surveys or in some questionnaires of 
census data, but it is not very common to find on income surveys. Despite of this fact, sometimes the 
information of capital income might be partially approximated indirectly from income surveys, as long as 
some information of the house ownership is available. The value imputed to this asset might be 
approximated with the quality of the construction, if that information is available. 
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problem, which is the de facto assumption that all sectors in the economy are fully 
monetized, so all the goods consumed within the household are accurately measured in 
terms of money, but this issue is not always the case (Ghosh, 1986); for example, when 
wages are paid in kind, as often the case in a not fully monetized economy, goods 
consumed do not reflect the market price, making the assumption of measuring 
consumption by its money value of limited use in the context of say, poor rural areas. 
When only wage income is considered, the price definition has certain constraints that are 
usually related with data availability (discussed in section V of this chapter). But when a 
basket of consumption goods is needed to be valued, the problem is much more 
complicated, because of the consideration of the variety of goods rather than considering 
income from wages alone (Deaton, 1997, Section 5.2). In this case, it is more difficult to 
know the right set of prices in the consumption-expenditure surveys, rather than in the 
consideration of wage income that is available in income surveys. 
 iv) Seasonal Variation. 
There is an argument that claims that welfare is better measured with 
consumption-expenditure surveys. The argument is that consumption is subject to less 
variation than income over periods of time (Deaton, 1997, p. 148). It is explained that in 
developing countries, which are subject to a more unstable macroeconomic situation, 
consumption is less variable than income itself, so the former might be a better 
approximation for evaluation of well being. Deaton and Zaidi (2002, p. 14) commented 
about this process, which is known as ‘smoothing’, saying that “consumption is not 
closely tied to short-term fluctuations in income, and that consumption is smoother and 
less-variable than income”. They also said that “there is a good evidence that consumers 
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can smooth out income fluctuations in the short term, certainly over seasons, and in most 
cases, over a few years” (Idem). In spite of this argument, it can be said that consumption 
might be seasonal. If we consider that the community enjoys periodic festivals or 
holidays, that consideration might introduce a bias if the time of the survey coincides 
with such period of time that does not represent the normal pattern of consumption. This 
information is difficult to know with certainty. In general, however, it is agreed that the 
size of this last bias introduces less noise than the advantage of the smoother variability 
of consumption that is captured in consumption-expenditure surveys. 
 v) Measurement error. 
A problem that is always present in survey data collection is the accuracy of the 
information. The bias in the information can come from a variety of sources, such as 
misreported and underreported information. In the case of consumption-expenditure 
surveys, we have the case of misreported non-monetary income, such as self-
consumption or payments in kind, etc. (Székely et al., 2000, p. 13). When gains from 
consumption from payments in kind are considered, we have the immediate issue of how 
to distribute those gains, which are usually imputed to the head of the household. Anand 
noted that “There is a problem with imputing income from jointly owned assets such as 
land or a family house. In practice, such income is likely to have been attributed wholly 
to the household head, and unpaid family workers, for example, would not count as 
income recipients unless they were in receipt of income from other sources. This should 
be borne in mind in the interpretation of some of the findings…” (1983, p. 187, note 2).96 
                                                 
96 There also a discussion of including non-monetary items, as assets, into the income or wealth aggregate, 
in Cowell (1995, p. 100). 
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So the evaluation of different sources of income is a bias that introduces a measurement 
error in the evaluation of consumption.  
In the case of income surveys, it is known that income data is usually 
underreported for the lower deciles, and misreported for the higher deciles. The story 
behind the underreported income is that people hope to get some help from the 
government as long as they report a poorer condition. People usually think that surveys 
are connected in some way with government alleviation programs. The underreported 
income in poor regions might also exists because of the natural tendency of the people to 
declare just the income flow, and might also be related with the naive ignorance of the 
surveyed individuals, who can be giving false information unintentionally about what 
really happen in the household (CTMP, 2002, p. 45). 97 The underreported income might 
also come from the difficulty of evaluating income from self-employment and the 
production for own consumption as well. It is argued that it is very difficult to gather 
accurate data for income from self-employment, either from small business or from 
agricultural environments. But this information is hard to get not only for developing 
economies, but in developed ones as well (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002, p. 14). The problem 
of misreported and underreported income in higher levels might be both a matter of 
personal safety and the fear to incur in higher tax liability (CTMP, 2002, p. 35, Chenery 
et al. 1974, pp. 4-5). The problem of misreported income in higher deciles it is not a 
problem for poverty measures, but definitely it might be for inequality assessment. 
                                                 
97 Others argue that people in lower end of the distribution report higher levels of income, because those 
represent their aspiration preferences or because there are ashamed to say to the interviewer his/her real 
situation. In any case, only an empirical application can give an idea of the direction and the size of the bias 
in the measurement error. 
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Once that we saw the possible measurement errors in both consumption-
expenditure surveys and also in income surveys is important to see what the literature say 
about this issue, and what would be the possible effect of this bias on the calculations of 
poverty or inequality. We understand that the discussion in the literature about the 
possible misrepresentation of inequality and poverty measures is not conclusive, and 
sometimes contradictory. For instance, De Ferranti et al. (2004) opine the following: “Is 
“real” inequality lower or higher than the estimates derived from household surveys? 
Unfortunately, the answer is not clear. Some factors lead to an underestimation of 
inequality (for example, misreporting of capital incomes or the absence of very rich 
people in the surveys), while others result in an overestimation (for example, using 
monthly income instead of permanent income or consumption).” (p. 53). From a different 
point of view, Deaton (1997) points out the problem of getting information from the 
household as a recipient unit, a practice that is very common in consumption-expenditure 
surveys, so when the consumption of each individual need to be considered, there is a 
propensity to understate poverty and inequality: “… the assumed equal distribution 
within the household could be reached from the unknown but true one by a system of 
equalizing transfers, so that any welfare measure that respects the principle of transfers 
will be overstated (or understated if a poverty measure) using household [consumption] 
data” (p. 150, [comment added]). So, using consumption based surveys, the measurement 
error in poverty and inequality indices could be bigger than using income surveys.  
 vi) Family Interactions. 
One of the limitations of the consumption-expenditure surveys is such that 
because of the household approach, the focus of the survey remains on the head of the 
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household. In this case, consideration of the aggregated income raises the question 
whether all individuals make decisions over the pooled income. If the decision within a 
household is usually made by the head of the household only then it becomes difficult to 
know the satisfaction of preferences by persons who are not making the decisions, so the 
reported levels of deprivation might not be representative of the whole population. On the 
other hand, an income survey focuses on individuals rather than centering the attention on 
aggregates. It is true that the information is more limited, but the isolation of the 
individual is more appropriate for income surveys. If the consumption survey provides 
information about the characteristics of the family individuals, then it is possible to attach 
some ‘weight’ to each individual, because of the clear heterogeneity within the 
household, this is discussed in the next section as the issue of equivalence scales (3.3 II 
b) i)). 
 vii) Spatial aggregation 
Income surveys are more useful for considerations of measurement of inequality 
when we consider the issue of the levels of spatial aggregation. This feature of income 
data, which generates data with greater level of detail, can be a source of crucial 
advantage for the researcher and the policy developer in the construction of regional 
analysis. It is known that information from expenditure surveys is more expensive to 
collect by household units, if we compare the cost with that of income surveys. Besides 
that, the information on expenditure surveys usually takes more time in order to be 
collected (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002, p. 15). In order to collect a reliable expenditure 
survey, it can take more than two weeks per household, because of the necessity to record 
detailed information on consumption spending. On the other side of the coin, asking 
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about labor income and employment information usually takes a few hours in a single 
visit. In this regards, for a given budget, income surveys provide relatively more 
observations. The higher sample size is a useful tool for the researcher. For instance, a 
higher sample size is more useful when we try to measure levels of poverty per region 
using the related statistics. Labor income is also preferred when it is used in the 
representation of welfare levels with spatial analysis tools. 98  However, when the 
assessment is done at the country level, expenditure data is preferred. In that case, it is 
obvious that what usually matters is the country as a whole and not the individual 
regions, so the precision of the sources of income rather than the variety of the 
disaggregated data seems to be more important.  
 viii) Measurement of Welfare Using Income Surveys. 
The previous discussions of income vs. consumption-expenditure surveys tell us 
that the measurement of welfare is possible and the results are meaningful, even though 
imperfect with the use of income surveys. On the one hand, the higher sample size 
provides information for interregional comparisons, with the possible use of inequality 
and poverty maps. Atkinson (2006) mentioned that income might be related with 
potential capabilities and minimum rights, rather than just consumption of food that 
reflects the standard of living (2006). It is argued by several authors that if we want to 
measure poverty or destitution, it is better served by an expenditure survey, where the 
amount of goods with the proper prices will be giving us some minimal basket of goods 
consumed (De Ferranti et al., 2004, p. 36), however, in this case availability of data is a 
problem. When data availability is a constraint, we can support the use of income as the 
                                                 
98 The spatial aggregation of census data is the most detailed, but its main constraint is the long period of 
time that takes to collect one survey in regards of the other. 
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measure of welfare (Székely et al., 2000, p. 12). It has been traditionally supported for 
Latin American countries that income is used as an approximation of welfare, so “the 
implicit assumption is that current household income, as measured in household surveys, 
is highly correlated to individual opportunities and intertemporal living standards” (De 
Ferranti et al., 2004, p. 36). 
 ix) Differences on inequality and poverty measurement 
The effect on the measurement of inequality might be ambiguous in regards to the 
source of the survey data. We can explore the direction of the effect of using survey data 
on the inequality measure. For instance, if the measurement error has zero mean but 
introduces a higher dispersion to the values on the income distribution, the measurement 
of inequality that satisfies the principle of transfers will be artificially higher (Deaton, 
1997, p. 151). On the other hand, if the measurement error is equally distributed on the 
population, such that the same proportion of income source is regularly unreported across 
the whole population, the measure of inequality would be unaffected because of the 
property of scale invariance. The Gini coefficient and the Theil Index are both scale 
invariant, so the measurement error might not seriously affect the reported levels of 
inequality in this case (see section 3.3 V), but in the case of a higher dispersion of the 
distribution, the inequality measure that satisfies the principle of transfers will be 
affected. If the change of misreported income has some bias, for instance, that the poor 
people consistently fail to report self-employment income, the lower end of the scale will 
suffer from underestimation, therefore the levels of inequality would be overestimated. 
The opposite effect on inequality levels comes from underreported income by the richer 
people; the effect will be such that the distribution will be softened at the higher end of 
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the scale, so the reported inequality will be lower than real inequality. Other effect that 
might be ambiguous is when the inequality indices have the property of ‘poor 
sensitiveness’,99 the reported level of inequality would be higher if the income at the 
lower end of the scale is underestimated, but the reported inequality will be lower if the 
problem arises from the misreported or underreported income in higher deciles. Finally, 
when income surveys are used such that only wage income is used as a source of welfare, 
the lower reported income will produce an overestimation of poverty if the definition of 
the poverty line z remains fixed; another effect of inequality calculated from income 
surveys is such that the effect on inequality measurement changes if the lack of income is 
more accentuated at the lower end of the scale, producing a more unequal distribution and 
therefore, showing a higher level of inequality in the community.  
 
 b) Household vs. Individual Inequality. 
 
There are several reasons why inequality has been calculated mostly on a 
household basis. We might think that, historically, it was easier to deal with household 
inequality, because of the fewer observations on households than on individuals. In the 
past, the computational capacity used to be a big constraint. However, today the 
availability of computing resources makes it easy to calculate inequality at both the 
individual and the household level in a variety of ways. The decision between using 
income or household data is important; the results of inequality measures that use one or 
the other approaches are different. Medina (2001) says that “[t]here exists in empirical 
                                                 
99 Property that was discussed in chapter 2. 
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work a debate about which should be the appropriate variable to evaluate concentration of 
income. In fact, the principal controversy arises at the moment to choose household 
income or per capita income.” (p. 22, emphasis in the original). According to him, both 
recipient units can be used, depending on the objective of the research. It can be argued 
that taking the individual as the recipient unit makes assigning the individual ‘weights’ in 
the family with the use of equivalence scales unnecessary, because all individuals would 
be considered the same in society. At the end, it will be a decision of the policy maker if 
h/she attaches more importance to one of the recipient units, either the individual or the 
household.  
 i) Equivalence scales and survey data. 
The problem of adjusting income for family size is known in economics jargon as 
‘equivalizing’ incomes (Cowell, 1995, p. 98). These equivalence considerations take into 
account not only the family size, but also the number of children and their representative 
‘cost’ within the household. Economies of scale in households with more than one adult 
and the proportion of income devoted to food are also issues for consideration with 
equivalence scales. The use of equivalence scales might be directly linked with a 
household vs. individual discussion, but it is also indirectly related to the approach of 
expenditure vs. income surveys.100 The issue is that the information needed in order to 
calculate equivalence scales are only available in consumption-expenditure surveys. For 
some equivalizing methods (e.g. Engel method) it is necessary to know the relationship 
between the proportion of the budget that is devoted mainly to the consumption of food 
with the proportion that is spent in other kinds of goods. This comparison can only be 
                                                 
100 A brief survey of equivalence scales are mentioned in section 7.3 II. 
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checked in consumption-expenditure surveys. If the family composition is to be taken 
rigorously, a consumption-expenditure survey becomes necessary in order to know the 
proper weights of each kind of individual within the household; income surveys can not 
tackle this issue directly. But once the relative weights of individuals are computed using 
consumption-expenditure surveys, it is possible to take those values and impute them into 
the calculations of welfare where the data source is an income survey. 
There are assumptions that affect the modeling which involve equivalizing 
income and the variety of methods to calculate the scales are numerous. 101  
Understandably, the econometric analyses methodology is different from one approach to 
the other. Some of the methods that are used to compute equivalence scales might claim 
superiority over other methods, but there is no consensus about the use of one of these 
methods as a general rule. This academic debate affects also governmental institutions, 
such that some governments remain skeptical about the use of equivalences in their 
calculations of income poverty or inequality, using only per capita income.  
 
 III Income with zero values (Non-response and Misreported Data). 
 
There are concerns in the literature about the treatment of non-positive income in 
survey data. The concerns come from methodological and computational problems. 
(Cowell, 1995, p. 155). I will concentrate on the case of zero income, which is usually 
seen as a non-response bias. A ‘zero’ value in the data does not mean that the person 
represented in that observation shall not be considered. The problem arises if those zero 
observations are ignored, as it usually happens in practical computations when those 
                                                 
101 The issue of equivalence scales and a discussion of a variety of methods are mentioned in chapter 7. 
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values are dropped. When the functional form that considers the income distribution is 
assumed in some kind of logarithmic representation (e.g. Theil Index), this 
transformation becomes a problem in the case of zero as well as negative values. The non 
positive observation might imply that the individual is totally deprived or in debt, so a 
logarithmic transformation, which is convenient because of the emphasis on the poor, it 
fails to consider these perhaps poor people. 102  Zero values might not come from 
underreported income, but from the most destitute people. But it would be desirable that 
these destitute people could be taken into account on inequality measures (Anand 1983, 
p. 308). More than a technical problem, the most important issue here is from ethical 
considerations. The ethical judgment is considered very important by some authors, for 
instance, Dutta (2002) say that Gini coefficient has been considered better in a general 
sense: “This [Gini coefficient] gives it a decided advantage [accommodate non positive 
incomes] over the Atkinson and Generalized Entropy family since these are only defined 
for positive income.” (Dutta, 2002, p. 615, [comments added]). In the available literature 
there are attempts to solve this problem. A simple solution can be to run the calculations 
in a normal way, but to impute directly some small income )(ε  to the zero observations 
(Anand, 1983). Another solution can be to identify those individuals, taking estimates 
from income of similar people according to their characteristics, and then to impute them 
with a simulated income. This estimation can be made not only with people with zero 
income, but also with people with missing observations (Székely et al., 2000). 
                                                 
102 Logarithms have convenient properties, they consider in a similar way high and very high values, but 
they have the power to explain with more detail what happen at the lower end of the distribution: “The fact 
that a logarithmic transformation staggers the income levels tends to soften the blow in reflecting inequality 
since it reduces the deviation, but on the other hand it has the property –as noted before—of highlighting 
differences at the lower end of the scale.” (Sen, 1973, p. 29). 
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In the normative vs. pragmatic measurement discussion, we have some sort of 
trade off between the convenient decomposability properties of some methods (e.g. Theil) 
versus those which are able to attach greater importance to those who are the most 
deprived in society, people with zero income (e.g. Gini). The ethical judgment, about 
which property is more desirable, might be based on the ‘practical’ value of the theory for 
policy planners. On the one hand, decomposability by the population sub-group property 
allows policy makers to focus on the region or group that is considered to be contributing 
more to inequality. It is not always the case that ‘the most unequal’ groups should be 
considered first. It might be the case that groups with lower inequality, but larger 
population, have a larger impact on overall inequality. In this case, those groups might be 
considered first. On the other hand, if the population size of groups with zero income is 
large enough and these values are dropped from the computations, inequality measures 
might be biased downwards, making the assessment of welfare not only difficult, but 
incomplete.  
There are other solutions to this problem if we assume that zero incomes refer to 
informally paid family members at the lower end of the distribution, as it happen when 
we deal with entrepreneurial activities. In this case, the measurement error in the analysis 
of welfare can be diminished. It can be assumed that the observation with missing and/or 
zero incomes should be treated equally as a ‘non-response’ bias, as is done by Székely et 
al. (2000, p. 17).103 With a two steps technique, they simulate income data for those 
observations. The first step of their procedure is a regression of personal and household 
characteristics on income, so that the resultant coefficients can be used to predict each 
individual’s income. The second step consists, after producing and ranking the estimated 
                                                 
103 See also Székely and Hilgert (1999b). 
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incomes followed by calculation of confidence intervals, in doing calculations using the 
average of the income slightly above and slightly below of the missing and zero 
observations (Székely et al., 2000, p. 18).104 The predicted value of the estimates is 
regrouped for each household, and the estimated values are used as if those come from 
the original data. In Latin American countries, the bias that is due to missing or zero 
income might not be apparently very significant, because the solution proposed does not 
lead to a very large change to the original results on inequality or poverty measurement. 
In the case of Latin American countries, this exercise in regards of headcount poverty 
measures can lead to a change between nothing and less than 5 percentage points change. 
The changes can be more important in economies with lower level of development, such 
as Nicaragua, where the change appears to be more than 10 points of difference using this 
technique of simulation. It should be borne in mind that a change of 3 or 5 percentage 
points on inequality or poverty measurement in a particular period of time, even though is 
a small change, it may mean an important change on the distribution of the very poor. In 
that sense, this ‘small’ change can have ‘big’ economic implications for the most 
destitute.  
The technique mentioned in the last paragraph can help us to have an idea about 
the size of the bias that is caused by the presence of zero values in the survey data, which 
might come from misrepresented or undervalued income reported in survey data. It is 
also known that certain groups of the population are misrepresented in every survey, for 
instance, young people that already have a job, which are difficult to be interviewed or 
considered in any survey. These kind of biases might produce undesirable results, then 
                                                 
104 The application of this technique has been discussed by Brick and Kalton (1996), Kalton and Kasprzyk 
(1986), and Rubin (1987), among others. 
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the measurement error in income surveys might lead to an underestimation of poverty in 
countries of Latin America, and also might lead to an ambiguous biased estimation of 
inequality (see section 3.3 II a) ix).). The bias might come from the missing poor people 
in the survey, or from the misreported incomes in higher deciles of the population, among 
other things, so this simulation of the incomes and the imputation of those values in the 
calculations might help us to evaluate if the effect of the non-response values are 
affecting importantly the measurement of well-being.105
 
 IV Survey coverage. 
 
The principle of population replication of inequality measures (or independence 
of population) provides an extension of the basic theorem of Lorenz dominance, because 
it allows the comparability of inequality measures when the size of the population is not 
the same, a phenomenon that is very common in reality (Dutta, 2002, p. 610). This 
principle also allows the comparability of our inequality measures from different regions 
or from different time periods. We just need to assume some sort of equivalence of 
certain population group over different periods of time. Formally, the principle of 
population replication says, I being a suitable inequality measure, the 
following: { }IntegersrrnyInryInryyyI ∈>∀=⋅=⋅ ¦0),();();,...,,( ,106 where r is the 
number of groups, each one containing n individuals having identical income distribution 
                                                 
105 Another way to correct for these biases might be using adjustments for national accounts, which is a 
method to simulate a ‘proper’ income, the Mexican case discussed this issue (CTMP, 2002, p. 44-47), but 
the results are inconclusive. A general discussion is found in Ravallion (2000). 
106 Generally { }IntegersrrYyyIyyyIyRI r ∈>∀∈∀=≡ |0,)(),...,,()( 1  where is a 
replicator matrix of dimension
rR
)()( yrnyn × with the form ],...,,[ EEERr =  for some identity 
matrix E . (Shorrocks 1984, p. 1369). 
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y, so those can be aggregated into a single population of nr ⋅  individuals (Shorrocks, 
1980, p. 619). The replicator r works as an arbitrary multiplier of the size of the 
population, and this convenient assumption makes it possible to compare inequality 
measures across regions, or to do the comparison between population groups across time. 
The above axiomatic generalization is one relevant issue, but another issue, perhaps 
equally relevant, is the confidence that the policy makers can have on the results, 
considering that the information might come from different populations with different 
size and different sample distribution. Not all the time the survey coverage is the same 
across different periods of time or across different regions within a country. These 
practical limitations are faced by the institutions that collect the survey data. The survey 
institutions have to make a variety of decisions in regards to the use of the statistical 
methods that define samples that are representing the population, and that also affects the 
homogeneity of the survey coverage. There are more practical issues to decide, for 
instance, a budget limitation that affect the sample size, a natural disaster, or a negative 
social conditions that might block the free flow of information during the time of data 
collection. It shall be convenient to explain in the research the assumptions made when 
we calculate inequality, so that our results can be taken with the caveats made clear, and 
our research might be considered reliable.107
Going further into the consideration of population size, the way to operationalise 
this condition has been discussed elsewhere (Foster and Sen, 1997, p. 122), and it is 
claimed that in order to get accurate estimates of human welfare it is necessary to take 
note of size variations on population. Sometimes the use of graphical tools has been 
proven useful, making clearer to the researchers and the policy makers how the survey 
                                                 
107 An example of a sampling procedure might be find in INEGI (2000, part 3) for the case of Mexico. 
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coverage keeps changing. In this framework, the survey limitations can be clearly 
presented, and issues like budget constraints or changing sample sizes can be presented 
along with the supporting documentation, because it is known that these limitations affect 
the quality of the survey and the results that comes from this information as well. Again, 
this approach will make the results of the calculations more reliable. 
 
 V Consideration of Regional Prices. 
 
It is difficult to see often an application of regional price adjustment in 
development inequality literature, even though the problem has been highlighted by some 
authors. The usual reason behind this apparent lack of consideration is the unavailability 
of regional price data. There are some operational problems that are better explained in a 
formal framework. Letting I being an inequality measure, it will be scale invariant (or 
income homogenous, or mean independent) if I remains the same for proportional 
changes of income. Intuitively, this condition might be violated if the changes on income 
are not the same for the whole population, as happens when diverse regions are affected 
differently due to those changes. Formally,  is homogenous of degree zero in the 
income vector y  if and only if 
),( nyI
0),();( >∀= knyInkyI  (Shorrocks, 1980, p. 621; 1984, 
p. 1372; Foster and Sen 1997, p. 139). The change in income is denoted by the letter k, 
which is supposed to be constant for the entire population. If the term k is not constant for 
the whole population, then the change in distribution y will not be the same for all yyi ∈ , 
so the scale invariance property will not hold. The change of prices might be due to a 
factor like inflation. These differences on prices are also common in developing 
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economies because of the heterogeneity of the communities within the country. In this 
sense, De Ferranti et al. (2004) commented that “If prices faced by all households were 
the same, the distinction would be irrelevant. However, prices usually differ by location.” 
(p. 52). So, prices do not change automatically in every region of the country, and that 
should be considered on the calculations.  
Going further in the price adjustment, Anand (1983) mentioned a violation of this 
property (p. 317), where even a homogenous change that is not proportional, but additive, 
I will not satisfy the property of homogeneity of income, such that 
, and it is clear that this change will neither satisfy the 
homogenous condition if the change of k is not the same for the whole population. In this 
case, the same as mentioned in the previous paragraph, there is no consistency in the 
calculations if the k is not the same for the entire population. What is true is that the 
possibility of making this adjustment lies in the availability of regional prices. That is the 
reason why price adjustment is seldom performed; Latin American economies are no 
exception in this respect. Even if regional price data were available, that does not 
completely solve the problem, since price dispersion may vary widely from one region to 
the other. Moreover, the price difference within a single region might be not the same for 
the whole sample, for instance, between urban and rural areas (De Ferranti et al. 2004, p. 
52). In the available inequality literature, the results are a little bit different when income 
is adjusted considering a regional price, so the changes in the indicators of welfare with  
price change are relatively small (Idem, pp. 52-3). 
( ; ) ( , )I y k n I y n k+ ≠ ∀ > 0
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 VI Population Sub-groups. 
 
When we need to make the decision about how inequality statistics are presented, 
there are many possibilities in regards to population sub-groups. The many combinations 
might be, for instance, inequality among specific social groups (i.e. traditional caste 
systems in some countries, or groups divided by income level such as deciles), inequality 
that considers gender or sexual orientation groups, inequality among different 
geographical areas (e.g. urban and rural), or indices by state or some pre-classified 
regional distribution within the country. Some people can have strong opinions in favor 
of one of the regional classification, but practically, it is not possible to show all 
combinations of regional disparities. There can be several reasons to believe that one 
classification is better than the other, and it might also be believed in the convenience to 
show those results in a particular way. The fact is that people, affected by their beliefs or 
the audience concerns, they can argue in favor of a certain way in order to express the 
results. This is why the decision about showing the results will depend on the audience, 
or the interest of the policy makers.  
Nowadays it is very common to compare inequality between sub-groups of 
communities, such that we measure inequality in regards to geographical location, 
gender, or considering ethnicity. When we do these exercises, that there might be a limit 
in the groups considered should be borne in mind. Not all sub-groups are communities 
(Sen, 2000, p. 80), hence, this procedure should not be abused by the use of 
decomposition by population sub-group of deprivation measures, which is easy to 
calculate in practice, but difficult to explain if the group is artificially chosen. For 
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instance, the inequality of income among the group of households with more than 3 
children might be compared with the income of the rest of the population, but the 
meaning of this comparison will be difficult to explain. Thus, this type of exercise shall 
be taken with care, because the definition of a ‘sub-group’ might not be very clear. The 
point is that the assessment of inequality among groups should have a solid foundation 
that should come from a documented position. Otherwise, there is the risk of implying 
that some classifications of groups of people are more important than others (e.g. gender 
inequality vs. urban-rural inequality), so the results might be considered incomplete. 
 
3.4 Conclusions. 
 
The considerations of operational procedures support the use of income surveys as 
a reliable data source, though imperfect, in the measurement of inequality. On the basis of 
the literature documented in this chapter, we can see that the variety of operational 
procedures and the decisions taken on those regards do indeed affect the reporting of 
inequality and poverty measurement. One of the important issues is that the researcher 
needs to provide a documented account of the inequality measurement and not only being 
focused on the estimates provided by the statistical measures. The research should 
provide an account of the operational decisions, so that policy makers and other 
researchers can make comparison of the results presented such as any bias might be 
discounted, or at least considered.  
The quality of survey data and the institutions that undertake these surveys have 
been improving over the last decades. The different sources of information that are used 
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to calculate human welfare provide an opportunity to measure deprivation on 
intertemporal and interregional contexts. There is a strong tradition in the Latin American 
countries that prefers the use of income surveys. Consumption surveys, which are 
approximated with expenditure, are being progressively used as well. One issue related to 
consumption surveys is the focus on the household as the recipient unit; in this case, 
individual welfare is approached with the use of equivalence scales that are subject to a 
variety of theoretical assumptions on different methodologies. There are other operational 
decisions that might be important. There are issues that might pose ethical questions, for 
instance, the consideration of observations with zero value in the data sets, which are 
usually discarded on the computations, but those observations can be a representation of 
the poorest people. Another issue is the variability of the population size that has been 
solved with a theoretical assumption of a perennial homogenous population, which might 
be different from the reality. The existence of heterogeneous prices for different 
population groups makes inequality measures to be separated from the true picture, 
because of the violation of the property of scale independence. Summing up, the size of 
the biases and the measurement error can not be known with certainty by theoretical 
means, because even though the direction of the bias might be clear for a particular 
measurement error, the total effect on the measurement of inequality or poverty can only 
be computed using empirical data sets with a variety of sensitive analysis.  Taking the 
case of Mexico as an example, a sensitive analysis will be performed in the next chapter. 
Finally, the higher sample size of income surveys has been useful for the 
interregional comparison of human welfare. The higher sample size provides meaningful 
data for the measures that are sub-group decomposable, which can then be used to 
156 
estimate the contribution of deprivation by region, an approach that is highly appreciated 
in policy discussion. The spatial aggregation of income surveys also provides the 
researcher with the opportunity to show results using with geospatial maps; because of 
their intuitive graphical nature and richness in information, geospatial maps are better 
means for communication for such audiences that are not specialized in human welfare 
measurement.  
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4 Measurement of Inequality in Mexico: Operational Decisions and Empirical 
Issues.
4 
  
 
4.1 Abstract. 
 
Measuring inequality in Mexico, as an indicator of relative deprivation, has been 
calculated with technical alternatives that usually are not fully specified in development 
literature. Following the trend in Mexico that tries to formalize different measures of the 
standard of living, it is explored, for instance, the household or the individual as the 
recipient unit in the computations of inequality. Besides this, the use of the (wage) 
income information is compared with the inequality obtained from consumption-
expenditure surveys. The technical issue of the people with zero or negative income is 
touched, and also the consideration of the different regional coverage of the survey 
instruments across time. In regards of the regional heterogeneity of Mexico, it is included 
in the calculations of inequality, the consideration of a regional Consumer Price Index 
(CPI). Not only the traditional Gini coefficient, but also other types of measures are also 
considered, as are those that belong to the Entropy family of indices, in order to present 
results in regards of different groups of the population. Finally, Geographical Information 
Systems’ tools (GIS) in order to construct some inequality maps are used. After all of 
this, when the technical issues are explained, ‘what’ among ‘whom’ is calculated can be 
clearer. 
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4.2 Introduction. 
 
A number of scholars have studied the issue of income inequality in Mexico. 
While their contributions have shed much light on many aspects of the Mexican income 
distribution, they share certain limitations. Insofar as they might ignore some important 
issues (to some extent, that might be due to the fact that most of the earlier contributions 
focused on the relationship between inequality and other variables, such as growth, 
education or poverty, rather than the study of different aspects of income inequality as 
such), 109 some of them have considered a number of those issues for the case of Latin 
America,110 but in general, the research agenda is still open (CTMP, 2002; Székely, 2005, 
Székely, Lopez-Calva and Székely, 2006).  
The aspects of inequality that are usually considered in the literature are based in 
the traditions that said that in order to estimate the amount of social inequality, the 
measurement must be done almost exclusively by the calculation of the Gini coefficient, 
using data from expenditure surveys and having the household as a recipient unit. Despite 
the fact of these assumptions, there are more technical issues that are sometimes unclear 
or neglected in the literature (Medina, 2001). Therefore, the focus of this paper is to 
tackle some of those operational issues. The methodological discussion was presented in 
the previous chapter, so is necessary to do some empirical applications. In that way we 
will have a better understanding of income inequality. The following aspects are some of 
these issues that have not received much attention in the literature about Mexican 
inequality so far: 
                                                 
109 Székely, 1998; Székely, 2005; Lopez-Acevedo, 2006; among others. 
110 As in De Ferranti et al. (2004). 
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1. The recipient unit, either if it is considered the household or the individual as a 
basis. The consideration of family structure is mostly narrowed to the inclusion of per-
capita (non-equivalized) income in Mexican literature (CTMP, 2002, p. 43, Székely, 
1998, p. 255), but this has been changing (De Ferranti et al., 2004, p. 39-40). In this paper 
is covered both individual and household inequality. In the case of the calculation of 
household inequality, it is also considered the equivalized income, which assigns weights 
to individuals in regards of their gender and age. 
2. The use of either expenditure surveys or (labor) income data in order to 
calculate income inequality. This issue is closely linked with the previous one, and in the 
case of Mexico, has had recently some debate. On the one hand, the discussion pointed 
out the important bias of savings in the information provided by expenditure surveys, but 
on the other hand, the debate was centered in whether the degree of underestimation on 
income surveys was more important than the inaccuracy of the recorded expenditure, 
which tries to approach real consumption (Cortés, 2005, p. 856). It has also been 
discussed the only use of expenditure surveys for calculation of inequality (CTMP, 
2002), and because of that, it might be good to explore other sources of data rather than 
only consumption. Using those other sources, we might provide alternative and 
interesting results, as it is the more regional detail because of the level of aggregation of 
the data. 
3. The inclusion of people with zero income in the computations (Székely et. al. 
2000). It can be both a technical difficulty and an ethical problem for the measures that 
are unable to handle these observations (e.g. Theil index). On the other hand and because 
of this problem, the exclusion of the measures that use some form of logarithmic 
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transformation take off the opportunity to value more the people at the lower end of the 
distribution (Sen, 1973, p. 29). In any case, it is explored the size of the change in the 
measurement of inequality when this group of people is considered. 
4. Survey coverage. The principle of population replication allows the comparison 
of different population groups in different time (Dutta, 2002). This is the assumption that 
permits the comparability of the results in regards of the different regional survey 
coverage. This coverage fluctuates across time in Mexico due to changes in budget and 
variations in methodological procedures. Our calculations show that this principle might 
be very strong for the case of Mexico. 
5. Regional considerations. In order to acknowledge Mexico and its regional 
heterogeneity in regards of inequality measurement, the following topics are considered:  
a) Different prices per region. In general, in the existent literature is used income 
data that comes from expenditure surveys, with some sort of general per-year price 
consideration through a Consumer’s Price Index (CPI). But this is done only with an 
urban/rural regional assessment of prices.111 In this paper is explored this property more 
in detail with an available regional price index that comes from the Bank of Mexico 
(2006). 
b) Population sub-groups. In regards of the type of measures, the restriction of the 
computations only to the Gini coefficient, it might mean a limitation. The recent literature 
has been including other types of measures, as are those included in the Entropy family of 
indices, but this effort has not been consistently explored, but for Székely in some of his 
publications.112 The diverse properties of the different types of measures help us to 
                                                 
111 CTMP (2002, pp. 40, 46, 58, 61), Székely (1998). 
112 Restricted to the period before 1992 (1995; 1998, Ch. 2). 
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explain the various expressions of income inequality, and for instance, it is useful in this 
paper to explore the property of decomposability by population sub-group.113 Therefore, I 
will consider in the estimations some natural divisions among geographical regions, and 
some divisions between urban and rural areas using the Theil index. 
c) Inequality maps. The geospatial tools are being used in development 
economics, mostly on the construction of poverty maps. Using that technique, it is 
convenient to show inequality maps in a more understandable graphical way, because of 
the difficulty that means to present voluminous information to policy developers. This is 
more suitable using Geographical Information Systems tools (GIS), which have become 
more available due to the modern computational software and faster equipment. 
 
The previous issues can be appreciated better if we look upon the economic 
scenario in Mexico. To understand better the results, the Mexican economic scenario will 
be explained in the following chapter, but it can be briefly mentioned that recent 
conditions are important in explaining the prevalent increases and decreases of inequality, 
and this is indeed related with the standard of living of Mexicans. It will be clear that the 
shocks experienced during the two major crises, the one in 1982 and the other during 
1994-5, affected seriously the very poor (see also Lustig, 2001 & Lustig and Székely, 
1998). 
 
                                                 
113 The decomposition by income source has been explored recently; see Lopez-Acevedo (2006), among 
others. 
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••  Overview.  
 
The organization of the chapter is as follows: after this short introduction, the data 
sets and the tools used are briefly introduced in section 4.3. The bulk of the chapter is 
section 4.4, which includes operational decisions such as several possibilities are 
calculated using available data, such as ‘household’ vs. ‘individual’ inequality, survey 
limitations, pragmatic and normative measurement, and similar things. This section 
finished with some results of individual inequality, using GIS tools. Finally, section 4.5 
has some concluding remarks. 
 
4.3 Measures and other tools. 
 
In this section, I will introduce technical details of the data sets and software used. 
The used measures, Gini coefficient and some of the measures of the Entropy family of 
indices, are briefly mentioned in this section but those were explained in detail in a 
previous chapter. 
 
 I Data and software. 
 
The data comes from an extended version of the National Survey of Employment 
(ENE –Encuesta Nacional de Empleo), which is provided by the Mexican Institute of 
Information ‘INEGI’ (Instituto Mexicano de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica). It 
records data per household at individual level from the years 1991-2003, and includes 
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data not only on urban, but also on rural communities (details about the data in Appendix 
4.6 I; for some discussion about this type of survey see section 4.4 II). 
Regarding computations and software, it is used STATA version 9.1 and routines 
based on the code developed by Stephen P. Jenkins (1999), and the graphic version of the 
Lorenz curves by Jenkins and Van Kerm (1999; 2001). For the graphic tools of 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS), it is used ARCGIS (ArcMap and ArcCatalog), 
Version 9.1. The geospatial map of Mexico was kindly provided by Glenn Graham 
Hyman (CIAT) from data developed in research of the Institute CIMMYT (Bellon et al., 
2004). 
 
 II Measures.  
 
As it was explored in chapter 2, among the pragmatic measures there is a variety 
of this kind, such as the variance, the coefficient of variation, or the relative mean 
deviation, but those are not used very much for practical reasons or due to 
methodological constraints. Instead of those measures, the Gini coefficient is traditionally 
used and is broadly mentioned in development literature. On the other hand, the Entropy 
measures, such as the Theil index or the Logarithmic deviation measure, are being used 
more. Entropy measures are useful, mainly because of their decomposability by 
population sub-group property, but they have some limitations. Besides these two kinds, 
in the chapter is also used some traditional measures, such as shares and deciles with their 
related ratios. Those do not need too much explanation, just some intuition (see section 
2.3 VII d)).  
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 4.4 Survey considerations. 
 
Now that we have the tools and the prevalent scenario in Mexico, it can be started 
the analysis of the issues that have not receiving much attention in regards of inequality 
assessment, using the available data. Mexico belongs to the group of countries that have 
been improving the quality of survey data, and it has been more clear the procedures to 
operationalise the computations. In Mexico there has being an effort in order to 
standardize the most common measure of the standard of living, which is poverty. The 
Technical Committee of Poverty Measurement, (CTMP) produced a document called 
‘Medición de la pobreza: variantes metodológicas y estimación preliminar’ 
(‘Measurement of poverty: methodological variants and preliminary estimation’). It was 
published in 2002 (CTMP, 2002). This committee, as a result of a year of work, 
institutionalized the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) poverty measure, using non-
equivalized income, having the household as the recipient unit, and the expenditure 
survey (ENIGH) as the main data source. This is the starting point for the consideration 
of human deprivation in Mexico, but only of poverty. Inequality measurement was left 
out from the agenda, and then my contribution will be the formal consideration of some 
of the different operational and technical issues in regards of the calculation of income 
inequality in Mexico, using an income data set that, among other things, it will allow a 
more detailed regional assessment. Therefore, the following topics are intended to shed 
some light into the limitations of previous literature. 
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 I Household vs. Individual Inequality. 
 
As it was discussed in the previous chapter, there might be reasons to do the 
computations of deprivation based on household. In the particular case of Mexican 
literature, it is acknowledged the problem about the recipient unit in the estimation of 
well being. For instance, it is said that is known that “per capita income over represent to 
the bigger households among the poor” (Teruel, et al. 2005, p.1). In this case, the 
consideration of individuals within the household leads to another problem, which is the 
proper weight (using equivalence scales) that would be assigned to each individual in 
regards of his/her gender and age. In this sense it was said that “unfortunately, there are 
not equivalence scales among the household members that are specific to the Mexican 
case, that is the reason why it was considered that the introduction of scales, made for 
other countries, it could introduced an unknown bias in the adjustment of the information 
for the Mexican case” (CTMP, 2002, p. 60, translated from the original). Later on, more 
research was done in regards of equivalence scales, and it was applied mostly for poverty 
measurement (Teruel et al. 2005; Teruel & Rubalcava, 2005). I will take some of the 
equivalence scales results in those papers, and apply them for inequality measurement.   
In order to make a comparison between household and individuals, it is necessary 
to do both calculations. So my chapter shows those calculations in Figure 4-1 (Gini), 
Figure 4-2 (Theil) and Figure 4-3 (Log. deviation). It can be noted that when we 
calculate Gini coefficient for households (yellow) 114, it has a higher level of inequality 
                                                 
114 Due to some limitations of the data, household identification is not available for all years. 
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than inequality for individuals (blue).115 With the exception of the immediate period after 
the 94-5 crisis, Theil index also show a higher household inequality, and again higher 
household inequality levels when is considered the measure of logarithmic deviation. It 
can be generally inferred that, ceteris paribus, household inequality is higher than 
individual inequality in Mexico, and to make clear the understanding of why inequality is 
like that, or if that is so, it will be necessary to assess it with weights that come from 
equivalence scales, which is discussed in the next paragraph. It can also be shown, that 
using bootstrap techniques, the statistical properties of the household or the individual 
inequality measures remain more or less the same, as it can be seen by the dotted lines, 
which represent the 95% confidence interval of the inequality measures (some details in 
Appendix 4.6 III, Table 4-9).  
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Figure 4-1.  Income Inequality in Mexico (Gini) 
 
                                                 
115 The pink line is the individual income without the price transformation, but the perceived change is 
minimal in the graph, so the blue and the pink lines are very close. 
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Figure 4-2.  Income Inequality in Mexico (Theil Index) 
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Figure 4-3. Income Inequality in Mexico (Log. Deviation) 
  
Now considering the important issue of equivalence scales, I am doing another set 
of calculations that are presented in Table 4-1. Taking as a sample the year 2003, the 
results about household and individual inequality are such that in general, household 
inequality remains higher than individual inequality. How much higher depends on the 
assumptions made about the family composition. In the case of the Amsterdam Scales, 
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they consider children and females with a different weight (male and female children 0-
13=.52, young male 14-17=.98, young female=.90, male adult=1, female adult=.9). In the 
parametric case, children are counted with a value of 0.7 (α ), and economies of scale 
with a value of 0.75 (θ ). Considering the Mexican literature, it was used the estimates in 
Teruel et al. (2005) according to the Engel and Rothbarth method, with and without 
economies of scales (without making a difference between males and females, because in 
their case the difference was not statistically significant).116 It is also true that while the 
lower bound is shown by individual inequality, the upper bound is the per capita not 
equivalized household inequality, and the results are sensitive. From individual to 
individualized per capita household inequality, Gini coefficient shows a difference of 8%, 
and the difference gets lower up to 1.5%, considering the Engel method of equivalence 
scales with economies of scale. In this case, the equivalization almost corrects from the 
aggregation problem on the household per capita income. This is not the case for Theil 
Index, which present a higher difference, 25% higher in individualized household 
inequality than on pure individual data, getting significantly lower, but still 8% higher 
than individualized per capita household inequality when we look at the same Engel 
method. In all cases, equivalized household inequality remained higher than individual 
inequality, and a little bit lower when are introduced economy of scales within the 
household. So, the results are sensitive from 1.5% on the best case, to 25% on the 
extreme case, and this show that the operational procedures might mean a big difference, 
therefore those procedures should be explained in detail. 
                                                 
116 Teruel et al. (2005, p. 22). Engel method with economy of scales, children 0-12=.65, young 13-18=.61, 
and adults 19 and up =.82. Engel method without economy of scales, children 0-12=.78, young 13-18=.74, 
and adults 19 and up =1. Rothbarth method with economy of scales, children 0-12=.54, young 13-18=.54, 
and adults 19 and up =.71 
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 Inequality Measurement and Equivalence scales (2003) Gini Theil
Individual Inequality 0.4733 0.4007
From Household aggregates
     Per capita inequality (No equivalence scales) 0.5132 0.5033
     Equivalized income (Amsterdam Scales) 0.4953 0.4642
     Equivalized income (Parametric method NRC (1995)). 0.4812 0.4300
     Equivalized income (Mexico, Engel, no economies of scales) 0.4782 0.5021
     Equivalized income (Mexico, Engel, with econ/scales) 0.4793 0.5026
     Equivalized income (Mexico, Rothbarth, with econ/scales) 0.4806 0.5032
Source: Author's calculations based on microdata (ENE).
 
Table 4-1. Household and individual inequality (with equivalence scales). 2003. 
 
 II Income vs. Expenditure Surveys. 
 
The discussion on chapter 3 about the use of income surveys and consumption-
expenditure surveys it highlighted some properties, advantages and disadvantages of both 
approaches. In the Mexican literature was said that in order to make indicators of welfare, 
such as poverty or inequality measures, the use of income or consumption data might 
imply a decision, which can be both a practical issue and a conceptual challenge (CTMP, 
2002, p. 34), so it is recognized the difficulty of choosing one source or another. In 
Mexico there are roughly three kinds of data sets available for the measurement of 
inequality, a) census data, b) expenditure data (ENIGH) and c) income coming from 
employment surveys (ENE/ENEU). All instruments have their own properties, 
advantages and disadvantages (CTMP, 2002, p. 27). For poverty assessment, in general, 
there are not many decisions to take: if the researcher accounts with an expenditure 
survey, this is usually preferred to others, because this is supposedly better to approach 
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consumption. With expenditure data is possible to draw a poverty line according with a 
particular basket of basic goods.  
But a survey with expenditure data is not mandatory in regards of inequality 
measurement. In order to make the policy maker aware of this discussion, it will be good 
to compare our results (income survey) with other published results (expenditure data), as 
we can see in Table 4-2. For instance, looking at the results around the year 2000 we can 
see first a comparison of our estimates with other source, which uses a similar income 
survey (ENEU-ENET). The results for the year 1990 or 1995 are quite similar. Checking 
the estimates of the inequality indices (Lopez-Acevedo, 2006), it is shown for the year 
2000 that both Gini (0.4400) and Theil index (0.3990) are consistently lower than our 
estimates of household inequality (0.4968, Gini; 0.4816, Theil), but this is because of the 
different operational assumptions made on her calculations.117 In the second place, if we 
compare the results that use consumption-expenditure data with ours, the indicators of 
household inequality (.5460, Gini; .6160, Theil) are consistently higher than our 
estimates. This is an example of how diverse are indicators of inequality in different 
papers, but that is mostly related with the different (sometimes unknown) operational and 
technical assumptions that were taken. 
 
                                                 
117 She dropped not only observations with zero income but very high incomes because those were 
considered unreliable in her criteria. 
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Recip. Unit Inc. Source Equivalized Ratio Traditional Measures
(Ind/Hou) (Wg/Exp) (Eqv/No Eq) Bot. 20% Mid. 40% M.Hg. 30%. Top 10% R 10/20 Gini Theil
1991 (Own calculations) I W - 4.3% 22.2% 35.7% 37.8% 8.79 0.4360 0.4155
1991 (Own calculations) H W NE na na na na na na na
1992 (L-A 2006) H W NE 6.5% 23.4% 33.5% 36.6% 6.74 0.4340 0.3960
1992 (DeF 2004) H Ex NE 3.1% 18.3% 33.9% 44.8% 14.45 0.5590 0.6670
1992 (DeF 2004) H Ex Eq 3.4% 19.3% 34.1% 43.2% 12.71 0.5390 0.6120
1997 (Own calculations) I W - 2.2% 19.7% 34.5% 43.6% 19.72 0.4917 0.4795
1997 (Own calculations) H W NE 1.7% 16.2% 38.8% 43.3% 25.82 0.5044 0.4726
1996 (L-A 2006) H W NE 5.7% 22.1% 33.6% 38.6% 6.74 0.4640 0.4740
1996 (DeF 2004) H Ex NE 3.2% 18.9% 34.6% 43.3% 13.53 0.5440 0.6160
1996 (DeF 2004) H Ex Eq 3.6% 19.8% 34.7% 41.8% 11.61 0.5250 0.5710
1999 (Own calculations) I W - 3.7% 22.5% 36.0% 37.8% 10.14 0.4804 0.4916
1999 (Own calculations) H W NE 2.9% 21.2% 39.9% 36.0% 12.28 0.4968 0.4816
2000 (L-A 2006) H W NE 5.9% 23.3% 34.5% 36.2% 6.11 0.4400 0.3990
2000 (DeF 2004) H Ex NE 3.1% 18.9% 34.9% 43.1% 13.90 0.5460 0.6160
2000 (DeF 2004) H Ex Eq 3.4% 19.7% 35.3% 41.5% 12.21 0.5270 0.5580
2002 (Own calculations) I W - 2.8% 21.3% 38.1% 37.8% 13.56 0.4638 0.4169
2002 (Own calculations) H W NE 3.7% 21.3% 38.3% 36.7% 9.89 0.4834 0.4242
2002 (L-A 2006) H W NE 6.7% 25.5% 35.5% 32.3% 4.81 0.3960 0.3020
Notes: Ind= Individual, Hou = Household, Wg= Wage Income survey, Ex= Expenditure surveys.
Sources: L-A 2006 (Lopez-Acevedo, 2006), DeF 2004 (De Ferranti et al., 2004), and Own calculations (ENE survey)
Inequality Indices for the Distribution of Earnings, comparison of different sources and years.
Deciles
 
Table 4-2. Comparisons between surveys, inequality indices and deciles. 
 
Some indicators of inequality that use expenditure survey data take into account 
weights to individuals within a family. The inequality indicators (Gini and Theil) that use 
equivalence scales here (marked with ‘Eq’ on the third column of the table) show to be 
lower compared with the values that use just per capita income (‘NE’). This is also 
consistent with our findings, albeit the functional form and the values assigned to the 
parameters are slightly different than those in our calculations (recall Table 4-1).118 We 
shall bear in mind that the indicators that come from (expenditure) equivalized income 
might be more comparable with our estimates of (income) individual inequality. To finish 
this section, it is also shown other kind of measures, such as deciles and shares in the 
same table. The finding is that shares, which come from expenditure data calculations, 
are lower than the household income shares, particularly at the lower end of the 
distribution. 
                                                 
118 The equivalized income is calculated by the formula where θαα )( 2211 KKA ⋅+⋅+ A  is the 
number of adults,  the number of children under 5 years, and  the number of children between 6 and 
14 (De Ferranti et al. 2004, p. 40). Following Deaton and Zaidi (2002), they assigned values to the 
parameters in the following way:
1K 2K
5.01 =α , 75.02 =α and 9.0=θ . 
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  III Income with zero values. 
 
There were discussed in chapter 3 a variety of methods in order to solve the issue 
of zero income. For our purpose, I will focus in the simple solution that is mentioned by 
Anand (1983), assigning some small positive value )(ε  to those individuals who are 
willing to work, assuming that they have no income because they are unemployed 
(Anand 1983, p. 308). If we consider individuals who are willing to work, but have no 
job (and because of that, no income), the Gini coefficient, as expected, increased between 
0 to 2%. This can be shown in the column of ‘differences’, located at the right hand side 
of Table 4-3. In the other columns we can see the different effect of the change on 
indices with logarithmic transformations (Theil and Log. deviation). If the values of zero 
income are set up equal to 1, the Theil index increases by 1% up to 5%. We can argue 
that the higher increase of inequality expressed by the Theil index is not surprising, 
because of the number of observations with zero income also increased, and that might be 
related with the higher proportion of the unemployed after the 94-5 crisis.  
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Simulation (ε=1) Differences
Year Calculations with original
Log Dev Theil Gini Log Dev Theil Gini
1991 0.32884 0.41812 0.43652 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1993 0.32371 0.37999 0.43386 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1995 0.63829 0.70583 0.51917 29.12% 3.22% 2.11%
1996 0.57133 0.50924 0.49696 28.84% 4.06% 2.08%
1997 0.55198 0.49413 0.49907 20.45% 3.04% 1.50%
1998 0.52156 0.48688 0.49293 13.82% 2.05% 1.02%
1999 0.49072 0.49866 0.48409 10.38% 1.44% 0.77%
2000 0.5033 0.48697 0.49087 10.40% 1.49% 0.75%
2001 0.49983 0.46536 0.48347 9.46% 1.41% 0.70%
2002 0.47883 0.42346 0.46729 10.06% 1.57% 0.75%
2003 0.46844 0.39946 0.45869 13.11% 2.06% 0.97%
Simulation (ε=1 E-10) Differences
Year Calculations with original
Log Dev Theil Gini Log Dev Theil Gini
1991 0.32884 0.41812 0.43652 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1993 0.32371 0.37999 0.43386 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1995 1.1419 0.7059 0.51918 130.99% 3.23% 2.12%
1996 1.0264 0.50931 0.49697 131.46% 4.08% 2.08%
1997 0.88658 0.49418 0.49908 93.46% 3.05% 1.50%
1998 0.74605 0.48691 0.49294 62.81% 2.05% 1.02%
1999 0.65396 0.49868 0.48409 47.09% 1.45% 0.77%
2000 0.66816 0.487 0.49087 46.56% 1.50% 0.75%
2001 0.64921 0.46537 0.48347 42.17% 1.42% 0.70%
2002 0.62934 0.42348 0.46729 44.66% 1.57% 0.75%
2003 0.65423 0.39948 0.45869 57.97% 2.07% 0.97%
Source: Own calcuations (ENE), Various years
Sensitive analysis. People with zero income.
  
Table 4-3. Effect of zero income in levels of inequality. 
 
At the difference of Theil index and Gini coefficient, the Logarithmic deviation 
shows a higher impact when 1=ε , and much more when income is equalized to an 
smaller value )10.0.1( −= Eε . This last finding is difficult to interpret. It was also found 
that after taking this into consideration, the standard ranking tools (e.g. deciles) suffered 
some changes, but those results are not shown because of space constraints. The ad-hoc 
assignation of a small positive value )(ε  proved to be useful to shed some light on 
inequality measurement in the sense that any given measure will be sensitive with the 
inclusion of people with zero income. Therefore, it can be said that the extent of this gap, 
which can go from 1 to 5 percent, means that the normal lack of consideration of this 
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very poor people, dropping those observations from the sample, certainly would show 
that in reality the levels of inequality are higher in that proportion.  
 
 IV Survey coverage. 
 
In the case of Mexico, it is stated in the government institution’s procedures that 
all survey projects should consider, among many things, sample size and geographical 
coverage according to the budget (INEGI 2005, p. 16). Usually, in almost all surveys, we 
can find a detailed specification of the sample, its size, and the methodology used, in 
order to ensure that the sample is representative of the population.119 But one of the issues 
that is not very common, is to find in those explanations the detail of the budget 
constraints, or some technical issues that limited either the size of the sample, or the data 
collection in certain areas. When our inequality measures take into account the principle 
of population replication, it is making a convenient, but a strong assumption. In the first 
two boxes of Figure 4-4, we can see that survey coverage was very limited. That is 
shown by the empty spaces that correspond to the non-surveyed municipalities. Later on, 
we can see that little by little, most of the country was more represented by the sample.  
 
                                                 
119 Some technical details are found similar in INEGI (2000 and 2003). 
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Figure 4-4. Geographical coverage of ENE survey, selected years. 
 
In order to know how these possible new samples have been changing across 
time, and if that has been affecting the size or the dynamics of real inequality, I calculated 
individual inequality measures for all the years, but considering only the 215 
municipalities included in the first survey (1991).120 The Figure 4-5 shows the similar, 
but lower inequality of the new computations when it is used only the small sample. In 
that sense, it can be clear that the larger regional coverage of the survey, allows a 
different (and supposedly better) understanding of the dynamics of inequality.121 The 
small sample of 215 municipalities has also a higher variance (using the bootstrap 
                                                 
120 The results for the household inequality are similar, and are omitted for obvious reasons. 
121 It might be inferred that there is a (small) positive relationship between the size of the area covered, and 
the levels of inequality, but this finding might be explored. A similar exercise that shows also regional 
differences in a similar survey can be found in Freije et al. (2006, p. 282).  
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technique) across time, presented with the dotted line. By the previous reasons, it can be 
seen that the axiom of independence of population does not hold perfectly for the case of 
Mexico, because inequality levels are not equal in the different samples, neither their 
statistical properties. 
 
0.43
0.44
0.45
0.46
0.47
0.48
0.49
0.5
0.51
1991 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
INDIVIDUAL Ineq. different samples. Whole (yel.), small (Blue), GINI
Source: Author's calculations based on microdata (ENE).
Gini (Inc.Def, Nat) small Gini (Inc.Def, Nat)
Gi i I D f (C ) Gi i I D f (C )
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
1991 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
INDIVIDUAL Ineq. different samples. Whole (yel.), small (Blue), THEIL
Source: Author's calculations based on microdata (ENE).
Theil (Inc.Def, Nat) small Theil (Inc.Def, Nat)
Th il I D f (C ) Th il I D f (C )  
Figure 4-5. Comparison of different samples, Gini and Theil. 
 
 V Regions. 
 
Mexico is a country that because of its geographical size and because of its 
different ecosystems within, it presents a particular heterogeneity in regards of its 
climate, culture, and economy. In the case of the assessment of social inequality, which 
can be seen as economic phenomena, those regional differences must be considered as 
much as possible. The topics in this section try to capture some of this regional 
heterogeneity, so income inequality might be explored better. 
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 a) Regional Prices 
 
It is the contribution of my paper to consider inequality with these regional prices 
in a detailed way. Recent literature made an effort to include some sort of this 
regionalization in Latin American countries (De Ferranti et al., 2004), but for the case of 
Mexico, the literature is practically inexistent. Considering the particular characteristics 
of Mexico, if we consider the country as a whole without regional differences, our results 
can be misinterpreted, because the poor and the rich are not ‘homogenously’ distributed 
within the country. “We must recognize that changes in consumer goods’ prices will 
affect the purchasing power of the poor and of the rich in different ways”. (Cowell, 1995, 
p. 100). For Mexico, we can solve this issue, because it is the case that the Bank of 
Mexico publishes periodically a regional index (2006), using as a base the year 2002. The 
Bank uses its own regional distribution, which is based on such factors as the proximity 
of a municipality with respect to the U.S. border, state geographical closeness, and 
density of population (2002, p. 6), as we can see in Figure 4-6.122
 
                                                 
122 This distribution is useful for consideration of prices, but it might not be very much for other purposes. 
It has the inconvenience of mixing municipalities within states that belong to different regions, as is clearly 
noted in bordered states colored in gray in the map. 
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Figure 4-6. Regions (Bank of Mexico) 
 
The Bank of Mexico publishes the Consumer Price Index (CPI), not only at a 
national level, but also at a regional level as well. The CPI is composed by 8 categories of 
goods, according to the consumers’ expenditure (food, clothing, housing, furniture, 
health, transportation, education and others). The CPI considers more than 170,000 price 
inputs that are gathered in a monthly basis from different sources, and are stratified in 
313 generic concepts (Bank of Mexico, 2002, p. 3). In order to calculate the CPI, it is 
imposed a particular weight to each category of goods. These weights are constructed 
from data gathered in an expenditure survey (ENIGH), so the weight of each category is 
assigned in relation to the population average consumption of the good, as a proportion of 
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the total expenditure (Idem, p. 4). Moreover, in order to consider in a proper way the 
regional distribution, it is assured that at least in every state of the country one important 
city is chosen. That makes each region to be represented through the overall collection of 
price inputs. It is also the case that the cities are classified according to their population 
size, and finally, the price index considers 4 household strata according to their income 
level.123  
In Figure 4-7 we present a set of selected years of the Generalized Lorenz curves 
for the whole country, without price index consideration. It is convenient to note that 
without transforming income into 2002 prices, it is not possible to compare ‘real’ income 
distribution, neither to compare how economic conditions, during the crisis of 1994-5, 
really affected the people’s purchasing power. It can also be seen that differences across 
years are very dissimilar, so we can be tempted to believe that using the Generalized 
Lorenz Dominance criteria, the Lorenz curves do not intersect each other and can be 
accordingly ranked. It might be thought that later years were better than previous in 
regards of income distribution, but the mentioned 94-5 crisis makes us think more about 
this first graph.  
 
                                                 
123 There is a recent critique about the calculation of the CPI in some Latin American countries, including 
Mexico, and how happen that “with heterogeneous consumption baskets the overall CPI tends to mimic the 
individual price index of [just] the better off” (Goñi et al., 2006, p. 4 [comment added]), having as a result 
that “the changes in nominal inequality provide and upward-biased measure of the underlying changes in 
real inequality” (Idem, p. 10). But this just enforces our theory that it is necessary some regional assessment 
when we consider prices of goods. 
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Figure 4-7. Distribution of Income without price index consideration 
 
After the price deflation, which is a contribution of this chapter, the picture 
changes quite a bit. I can be shown in Figure 4-8 that, after applying to every income the 
regional CPI published by the Bank of Mexico, the order of the curves changed, and it is 
clear that the Mexican economy enjoyed higher real incomes before the 94-5 crisis, 
where the income distribution of 1993 was better than later years. We can also note that, 
just recently, the distribution has becoming similar to those years before the cited crisis, 
as it can be seen in the graph. It got closer the recent distributional curves (2001 and 
2003) to the distribution before 1996. It still seems to be that curves do not intersect each 
other, so it can be applied a direct Lorenz ranking. By now, using the graphical Lorenz 
curves is clear that it will be better to consider levels of inequality with regional prices, 
because that allow us to compare the status of income distribution through time, much 
better than without regional price assessment. 
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 Figure 4-8. Distribution of Income in regards of regional price index. 
 
Still considering prices, we can carry out some regional computations. We know 
that most of the inequality measures are invariant to a change in prices, because they 
focus in relative variations of income (Sen 1973, p. 69; Foster and Sen, 1997, p. 139; 
Annand, 1983, p. 339), but in this case, the assumption of ‘mean-independence’ can be 
violated, because of the prices that affect income in a different way in each state or 
region. Taking into account regional prices on inequality computations, it was carried out 
an interregional comparison, shown in Table 4-4.124 It is observed that in the columns 
with ‘differences’, some values are different than zero. The regions that show values 
different from zero, is because of the small, but perceived change between the column of 
the deflated vs. the non deflated inequality index, due to the presence of price changing. 
                                                 
124 Regional classification of states is briefly presented in Appendix  II 
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This fact can almost be ignored in state comparisons (except in states in the border with 
the U.S.; detail in Appendix 4.6 III, Table 4-8) 
 
Region
Deflated Non-def. Difference Deflated Non-def. Difference Deflated Non-def. Difference
1 0.4818 0.4817 0.013% 0.4931 0.4929 0.027% 0.4451 0.4449 0.025%
2 0.4625 0.4626 -0.006% 0.4215 0.4216 -0.017% 0.4338 0.4341 -0.026%
3 0.4338 0.4338 0.000% 0.3521 0.3521 0.000% 0.3651 0.3651 0.000%
4 0.5426 0.5425 0.014% 0.5412 0.5411 0.010% 0.6044 0.6040 0.044%
5 0.5111 0.5112 -0.006% 0.5044 0.5046 -0.019% 0.5165 0.5166 -0.018%
6 0.4214 0.4215 -0.017% 0.3542 0.3544 -0.021% 0.3403 0.3407 -0.040%
7 0.4254 0.4253 0.009% 0.3620 0.3618 0.022% 0.3140 0.3139 0.008%
8 0.4524 0.4524 -0.001% 0.3875 0.3875 -0.002% 0.3772 0.3772 -0.002%
Source: Own calculations for the year 2001 (ENE)
Gini Theil Log Dev.
  
Table 4-4. Effect of regional prices in different inequality calculations. 2001. 
 
My results are consistent with the available literature, where small, but perceived 
changes are presented in experiments in Argentina and Chile (De Ferranti et al., 2004, p. 
53). Therefore, it might be seen that results became comparable, and a little bit more 
accurate, so it might be more useful to employ income that takes into account some price 
index. This will have the advantage of making it easier the comparisons across time with 
a uniform base year, but the levels of inequality seems to be not very different.  
 
 b) Population Sub-groups. 
 
For Mexico, the tradition of the classification lies in the regional groups, either 
location or urban and rural areas (World Bank, 2004). I acknowledge that in other parts of 
the world, the interest can lie sometimes either in the gender classification (because of 
183 
possible female discrimination),125 or sometimes in social groups classified by income 
level (i.e. deciles). The gap between urban and rural areas is recognized in Latin-
American literature (World Bank, 2004, De Ferranti et al., 2004, among others). In 
Figure 4-9 (Gini), we can see that inequality is consistently higher in rural areas 
compared with the national indicator. So inequality at a national level remains in the 
middle of both urban and rural inequality. We can also observe higher dispersion (using 
the bootstrap technique) in years where happened economic or social shocks (during the 
94-5 crisis, or the year 1999, previous to a presidential election).  
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Figure 4-9. Household and Individual Inequality (Gini). Total, Urban & Rural 
areas. 
 
If we compare the graph of the Individual data (left), with the one with the 
household data (right), the numbers are similar, just the dispersions appears to be smaller 
                                                 
125 In spite of this, in Mexico, for instance, when is controlled for observable characteristics, the size of 
gender inequality is narrower than in the rest of the Latin-American region (De Ferranti et al., 2004, p. 62) 
and sometimes, with surprising reverse results in favor of females (Idem, p. 75, n. 60). Other development 
literature, in regards of poverty measurement, tests for gender differences, finding no statistical significance 
in favor of males or females (Teruel et al., 2005, p. 22), and finally, it is also known the case where 
Mexican females have different understanding of what is ‘development’, such that they challenge the 
traditional theory that supposedly make them always better of when, for instance, they get a paid job 
outside of their house, or they enroll in contraceptive method programs promoted by the state (Nazar-
Beutelspacher et al. 2005, p. 236) 
184 
in the household data. The Figure 4-10, which uses the Theil index, shows a similar 
outcome than the calculations that uses Gini coefficient, and both are consistent with the 
present literature (World Bank, 2004, p. xxii & xxiii). 
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Figure 4-10. Household and Individual Inequality (Theil). Total, Urban & Rural 
areas. 
 
 c) Individual inequality: some results. 
 
There is also a methodological challenge to display results in an appropriate 
manner. Now is more possible to show visually accessible and friendly results with the 
availability of modern equipment and software. There is a recent growing trend in 
‘poverty mapping’, because “The plotting of such information on maps – poverty 
mapping – is useful to display information on the spatial distribution of welfare and its 
determinants. It is also useful to display simultaneously different dimensions of poverty 
and/or its determinants.” (World Bank, 2007).  The so called ‘spatial analysis’ allow us to 
process in a short period of time a lot of information. Now it is important to consider 
some of the certain limitations of expenditure surveys, as is their level of aggregation and 
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the sample size. Expenditure surveys have a lot of detail in consumption, but the number 
of observations is very limited, because they have other focuses, such as the assessment 
of poverty at a country level. On the other hand, an income survey looks more suitable in 
order to do a proper spatial analysis. It will be desirable to account with data in the level 
of aggregation of census data, but usually census data do not focus in income data or 
expenditure details, and the time period between one survey and the other is very long. 
The graphics of Gini coefficient (Figure 4-11) and Theil Index (Figure 4-12) at 
municipality level are consistent with some stylized facts, as is the high inequality in 
country side regions, or some regions with higher inequality in states with big industrial 
corporations, or in tourist areas with high investment. The analysis and the interpretation 
of the inequality maps are left to the policy maker. For the case of Mexico, it will be very 
difficult to show all the 2500 municipalities in a table, but in an inequality map is 
possible to give an idea about them.  
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Figure 4-11. Gini per municipality (2003). 
 Inequality in Mexico. Own calculations based on ENE (INEGI).
David Vazquez-Guzman. University of Stirling (2007).
170 0 170 340 51085
Kilometers
4
Detail
 
2003, Theil 
T_2003
0.02680 - 0.14361
0.14362 - 0.27675
0.27676 - 0.39638
0.39639 - 0.57776
0.57777 - 1.35942
Regional Distribution
NREGION
1 Center (Centro)
2 Semi-Center (Semi-Centro)
3 West (Occidente)
4 South (Sur)
5 Gulf-Peninsula (Golfo Peninsular)
6 North (Norte)
7 Northest (Noreste)
8 Northwest (Noroeste)
Lake; Ocean
Land
Mexico: Levels of income inequality (2003).
0 75 150 225 30037.5
Kilometers
Detail, Central part of Mexico.
 
Figure 4-12. Theil index per municipality (2003). 
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4.5 Concluding Remarks. 
 
It might be clear that, in general, the levels of inequality have decreased in 
Mexico in the last decade, so those have reached similar levels to the period before the 
94-5 crisis. But there are still things to consider on the assessment and the measurement 
of inequality. The different aspects of inequality in Mexico can be explored better if it is 
used more than the Gini coefficient, household inequality and expenditure surveys. In the 
course of this paper it can also be understood why the available literature presents 
sometimes dissimilar indicators of inequality. Those differences come from the different 
technical and methodological assumptions, which have not received much attention. 
There have been recent advances in Mexico about the definition of poverty measurement 
(CTMP, 2002; Székely, 2005), but the definition of inequality as such is still a matter of 
debate (De Ferranti et al., 2004).  
This paper covers some of the issues that have been a matter of debate, and it 
finds some interesting relationships, as is the close connection between the decisions of 
the recipient unit used, and the choice of using either expenditure or income surveys. It 
was found that inequality measurement is sensitive to these decisions, such that 
household income inequality is usually higher than individual income inequality, even 
considering equivalence scales. Comparing our results with others in the available 
literature, it was exposed that inequality measures are sensitive to the use of different data 
sources, either expenditure or income surveys. In Mexico, the inequality measured with 
expenditure surveys are usually higher than inequality measured with income survey 
data. In regards of other technical considerations, it was shown that the inclusion of 
people with zero income in the computations makes a significant difference in inequality 
measurement. The same happens when regional coverage is considered, the principle of 
population replication does not hold perfectly for the case of Mexico. 
Acknowledging the country heterogeneity in Mexico, there are various issues to 
think about. The first one is the consideration of a price index in the computations, which 
prove to be useful for regional assessment. It was shown that the computations regarding 
inequality seem to be clearer when prices, if those are available, are considered. The 
second issue was the convenient use of indices that come from the Entropy family 
measures, because of their decomposability sub-group property. In this case, the rural 
area showed a higher inequality, compared with the national level. Being the last, but not 
the least topic in regional estimation, the presentation of inequality results in a visually 
accessible way, prove to be useful as well. The use of inequality maps, with GIS 
techniques, is helpful to communicate more efficiently with the policy makers. 
 
4.6  Appendix. 
 I Data 
 
The data comes from the Mexican Institute of Information ‘INEGI’ (Instituto 
Mexicano de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica) which provides information to the 
public. We focus in the National Survey of Employment (ENE –Encuesta Nacional de 
Empleo), a recent survey that had its foundation in previous attempts traced to 1971.126 
                                                 
126 In 1971 was agreed by the President and the Secretary of Commerce to start a new employment survey. 
It was between 1973 and 1984 that the Continuous Survey of Occupation (ECSO –Encuesta Contínua sobre 
Ocupación) was developed with some changes. A second major change started in 1979, when the Direction 
of General Statistics (DGE) started and inquiry regarding the assertiveness of ECSO. The new product that 
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The ENE, which started in 1991 as a biannual survey, changed its periodicity per annum 
later on, and recently added up quarterly data, as shown in Table 4-5. The methodology 
is found in INEGI (2000, 2003) or Székely (2006, p. 298). 
  
Surveys Population % of country
Year Records* per year represented population
1991 143,957 1 - -
1992 - - - -
1993 139,902 1 - -
1994 - - - -
1995 111,949 1 59,083,793 -
1996 365,525 1 62,302,968 -
1997 119,404 1 63,425,327 -
1998 375,134 1 69,537,053 72.60%
1999 164,550 1 70,818,567 72.86%
2000 436,344 3 72,137,537 73.12%
2001 450,577 4 73,577,159 73.54%
2002 443,035 4 75,352,912 74.31%
2003 414,785 4 76,863,320 74.84%
Total Records 3,165,162
* People of more than 12 years age. Source: INEGI.
National Survey of Employment (ENE )
 
Table 4-5. Main data set. 
 
We have quarterly data between the year 2000 and 2003 in a more detailed 
fashion, having even the household characteristics correspondent to the year 2003, not 
only the personal survey. That is shown in Table 4-6. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
includes some changes regarding international standards was ENEU (National Survey of Urban 
Employment), and covered the period between 1981 through 1998.  The present survey (ENE) again was an 
effort to upgrade past surveys (ENEU), and between the years of 1991 and 1998, both instruments were 
surveyed. 
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Population % of country
Year Quarter Records* represented population
2000 2 443,354 72,137,537 73.12%
3 454,232 72,528,671 73.25%
4 454,971 72,929,882 73.40%
2001 1 461,928 73,264,167 73.48%
2 460,271 73,577,159 73.54%
3 454,708 74,141,311 73.85%
4 455,390 74,496,476 73.96%
2002 1 456,645 75,026,801 74.24%
2 451,687 75,352,912 74.31%
3 442,114 75,836,489 74.55%
4 441,256 76,224,891 74.69%
2003 1 448,590 76,746,666 74.96%
2** 422,523 76,863,320 74.84%
3 366,715 77,076,798 74.81%
4 354,484 77,448,509 74.93%
Total Records 6,568,868
* People of more than 12 years age. Source: INEGI.
** Available household characteristics
National Survey of Employment (ENE )
 
Table 4-6. Quarterly data (2000-2003) 
  
The survey is divided in ‘batteries’ of questions, and it obtains information about 
employment, self-employment and unemployment conditions, status of residence (i.e. 
migrant from other region), income, traditional questions about related working sector, 
and all general characteristics of people like gender and age. 
 
 II  Regional distribution. 
 
Mexico, in the same way as many other countries in the world, presents a natural 
heterogeneity within it. It is easier to show results by regions than for every state in the 
country, but there are many ways to divide the country in regions. Even the federal 
government does not have a unique way to consider regions. It happens that several 
departments within the government make their own distribution of states in regards of 
their own objectives. The distribution considers not only geographical closeness of states, 
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but also different ‘tastes’ according to related cultural values, historical inheritance and 
native composition.  
This distribution (Figure 4-13) considers major geographical characteristics, not 
only state proximity, which guarantees that states that appear close in the map are really 
economically closer to each other. This also considers two sets of mountains that 
naturally divided the country, where it is difficult to get from states in the center to states 
in the Pacific or in the Gulf of Mexico. It also has the convenience of not mixing 
municipalities within states, so each region contains complete states (details in this 
Appendix, Table 4-7). So unless stated in the paper, the classification of regional 
distribution of Mexico will be the following: 
 
Inequality in Mexico. Own calculations based on ENE (INEGI).
David Vazquez-Guzman. University of Stirling (2007).
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Figure 4-13. Regional Distribution. 
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 III Supporting tables and graphs. 
Zone Distribution by regions Population % Pop. 
1 Centro  -Center- (Distrito Federal, México, Puebla, Tlaxcala, Morelos 
29,296,553 30.05%
2 
Semi Centro –Semi center- ( San Luis Potosí, Querétaro, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, 
Aguascalientes) 
11,546,574 11.84%
3 Occidente –West-(Jalisco, Michoacan, Colima) 10,850,296 11.13%
4 Sur –South- (Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas) 10,439,306 10.71%
5 
Golfo-Peninsular –Gulf Peninsula-(Campeche, Yucatan, Quintana Roo, Veracruz, 
Tabasco) 
12,024,666 12.34%
6 Norte –North-(Chihuahua, Durango, Zacatecas) 5,855,178 6.01%
7 
Noreste –North east- (Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, Coahuila) 
8,885,433 9.11%
8 Noroeste North west- (Baja California, Baja California Sur, Sonora, Sinaloa, Nayarit) 8,585,406 8.81%
 Source: INEGI, Census data, 2000. 97,483,412 100.00%
  
Table 4-7. Distribution of regions. 
State Gini Theil Log Dev.
Deflated Non-def. Difference Deflated Non-def. Difference Deflated Non-def. Difference
1. AGS 0.4015 0.4015 0.000% 0.3568 0.3568 0.000% 0.2942 0.2942 0.000%
2. BCN 0.3931 0.3931 0.000% 0.2882 0.2882 0.000% 0.2559 0.2559 0.000%
3. BCS 0.3793 0.3793 0.000% 0.2796 0.2796 0.000% 0.2538 0.2538 0.000%
4. CAMP 0.5113 0.5113 0.000% 0.4922 0.4922 0.000% 0.5061 0.5061 0.000%
5. COAH 0.3895 0.3894 0.012% 0.2919 0.2917 0.021% 0.2637 0.2636 0.009%
6. COL 0.4369 0.4369 0.000% 0.3621 0.3621 0.000% 0.3541 0.3541 0.000%
7. CHIS 0.5632 0.5632 0.000% 0.6163 0.6163 0.000% 0.6136 0.6136 0.000%
8. CHIH 0.3820 0.3820 -0.006% 0.2875 0.2876 -0.012% 0.2698 0.2700 -0.023%
9. DF 0.4859 0.4859 0.000% 0.4749 0.4749 0.000% 0.4069 0.4069 0.000%
10. DGO 0.4587 0.4587 0.000% 0.4570 0.4570 0.000% 0.4055 0.4055 0.000%
11. GTO 0.4154 0.4154 0.000% 0.3377 0.3377 0.000% 0.3066 0.3066 0.000%
12. GRO 0.4560 0.4560 0.000% 0.3695 0.3695 0.000% 0.4202 0.4202 0.000%
13. HGO 0.5160 0.5160 0.000% 0.4918 0.4918 0.000% 0.6063 0.6063 0.000%
14. JAL 0.4296 0.4296 0.000% 0.3484 0.3484 0.000% 0.3541 0.3541 0.000%
15. MEX 0.4326 0.4326 0.000% 0.3703 0.3703 0.000% 0.3602 0.3602 0.000%
16. MICH 0.4322 0.4322 0.000% 0.3422 0.3422 0.000% 0.3698 0.3698 0.000%
17. MOR 0.3895 0.3895 0.000% 0.2942 0.2942 0.000% 0.2711 0.2711 0.000%
18. NAY 0.4630 0.4630 0.000% 0.4153 0.4153 0.000% 0.4351 0.4351 0.000%
19. NL 0.4396 0.4396 0.001% 0.3917 0.3916 0.002% 0.3355 0.3354 0.003%
20. OAX 0.5703 0.5703 0.000% 0.5965 0.5965 0.000% 0.7099 0.7099 0.000%
21. PUE 0.5598 0.5598 0.000% 0.8423 0.8423 0.000% 0.6626 0.6626 0.000%
22. QRO 0.4751 0.4751 0.000% 0.4741 0.4741 0.000% 0.4382 0.4382 0.000%
23. QROO 0.4171 0.4171 0.000% 0.3333 0.3333 0.000% 0.3054 0.3054 0.000%
24. SLP 0.5017 0.5017 0.000% 0.4811 0.4811 0.000% 0.5197 0.5197 0.000%
25. SIN 0.4678 0.4678 0.000% 0.4523 0.4523 0.000% 0.4041 0.4041 0.000%
26. SON 0.4181 0.4181 0.000% 0.3215 0.3215 0.000% 0.3100 0.3100 0.000%
27. TAB 0.5185 0.5185 0.000% 0.5060 0.5060 0.000% 0.5053 0.5053 0.000%
28. TAMPS 0.4245 0.4247 -0.011% 0.3549 0.3549 0.000% 0.3117 0.3120 -0.030%
29. TLAX 0.4185 0.4185 0.000% 0.3825 0.3825 0.000% 0.3349 0.3349 0.000%
30. VER 0.5101 0.5101 0.000% 0.5027 0.5027 0.000% 0.5172 0.5172 0.000%
31. YUC 0.5319 0.5319 0.000% 0.5901 0.5901 0.000% 0.5816 0.5816 0.000%
32. ZAC 0.4527 0.4527 0.000% 0.3877 0.3877 0.000% 0.3874 0.3874 0.000%
Source: Own calculations for the year 2001 (ENE)  
Table 4-8. Effect of regional prices in income distribution. 2001 (per state). 
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1991 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Gini (Inc, Nat) 0.442693 0.465018 0.486176 0.491778 0.488093 0.480507 0.487287 0.480063 0.463776 0.453938
Gini (Inc.Def, Nat) 0.436007 0.459991 0.486826 0.491696 0.487698 0.480406 0.487199 0.480096 0.463787 0.45429
Gini (Hou, Nat)* 0.504427 0.500517 0.496782 0.49367 0.483416 0.473308
Theil (Inc, Nat) 0.476957 0.499433 0.487693 0.47975 0.477592 0.491654 0.480077 0.458666 0.416903 0.390874
Theil (Inc.Def, Nat) 0.415489 0.456662 0.489352 0.479546 0.47501 0.491566 0.47981 0.458865 0.416923 0.391379
Theil (Hou, Nat)* 0.472588 0.464589 0.48161 0.449879 0.424195 0.400735
Log.dev. (Inc, Nat) 0.354963 0.400678 0.44233 0.458658 0.458778 0.444963 0.456164 0.45663 0.435032 0.413464
Log.dev. (Inc.Def, Nat) 0.34312 0.391458 0.443453 0.458279 0.457753 0.44459 0.455884 0.456655 0.43505 0.414139
Log.dev. (Hou, Nat)* 0.50178 0.505933 0.496227 0.504894 0.48794 0.461482
*  Household Id. Not Available For 1991, 1993, 1996, 2000. Measure for 1995 is only urban
Source: Author's calculations based on microdata (ENE).
Inequality per annum, different recipient unit. WHOLE country.
 
Table 4-9. Country inequality comparisons per annum. 
Gini
Region 1991 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 0.439617 0.435509 0.467648 0.467571 0.488545 0.47769 0.46208 0.480753 0.481803 0.444502 0.434173
2 0.42804 0.522121 0.584785 0.462527 0.460291 0.467879 0.468866 0.467574 0.462491 0.46228 0.460583
3 0.408488 0.415077 0.455065 0.460974 0.483887 0.461149 0.426298 0.443452 0.433795 0.436289 0.4213
4 0.403369 0.424637 0.510561 0.510396 0.521288 0.536977 0.529999 0.535632 0.542615 0.526384 0.517007
5 0.437768 0.47454 0.479639 0.489837 0.541751 0.519711 0.546876 0.52476 0.511124 0.505281 0.487916
6 0.445702 0.449564 0.625307 0.44637 0.443514 0.436477 0.434425 0.433938 0.421374 0.406226 0.41579
7 0.43752 0.485998 0.473694 0.521139 0.492121 0.465698 0.443755 0.457867 0.425366 0.41697 0.404631
8 0.414565 0.474907 0.460924 0.468648 0.442712 0.464241 0.454535 0.460325 0.452407 0.452316 0.442532
Theil
1991 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 0.433944 0.3799 0.471703 0.45444 0.49314 0.470777 0.456194 0.487045 0.493136 0.397874 0.365696
2 0.409658 0.667359 1.092412 0.4292 0.414411 0.436059 0.45935 0.426965 0.421452 0.406883 0.402587
3 0.344384 0.326861 0.403962 0.411655 0.4468 0.431774 0.351047 0.37473 0.352074 0.363146 0.33743
4 0.289918 0.358022 0.479398 0.473699 0.504165 0.535986 0.504688 0.549879 0.541242 0.504048 0.489496
5 0.380736 0.431096 0.433148 0.472304 0.583465 0.525591 0.821876 0.546232 0.504443 0.482192 0.436246
6 0.544447 0.376702 1.740419 0.408988 0.415789 0.384587 0.357026 0.36984 0.354172 0.315173 0.331411
7 0.414189 0.51677 0.480038 0.611593 0.478872 0.43378 0.409373 0.440441 0.362003 0.348272 0.328357
8 0.361214 0.645141 0.428552 0.447254 0.37147 0.428993 0.411641 0.424777 0.387484 0.395 0.358378
Log. Dev.
1991 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 0.339994 0.334541 0.402844 0.401892 0.443978 0.427974 0.396193 0.426513 0.445138 0.383293 0.357478
2 0.335417 0.499062 0.662578 0.402711 0.388694 0.410153 0.423254 0.420097 0.433796 0.460038 0.445903
3 0.297873 0.34117 0.388241 0.401946 0.451255 0.414231 0.344728 0.37494 0.365053 0.374316 0.348914
4 0.328131 0.372168 0.545881 0.525781 0.538092 0.592799 0.572839 0.592668 0.604399 0.569977 0.559571
5 0.352133 0.419255 0.439371 0.44057 0.556935 0.521296 0.581577 0.532805 0.516456 0.532785 0.487196
6 0.363172 0.374469 0.733998 0.353881 0.35644 0.349948 0.345121 0.349173 0.340274 0.311999 0.330309
7 0.335002 0.412535 0.40549 0.493817 0.46401 0.395707 0.350767 0.369819 0.313964 0.308906 0.295736
8 0.304631 0.440165 0.381679 0.383589 0.358343 0.390061 0.376632 0.377127 0.377183 0.379427 0.361654
Source: Author's calculations based on microdata (ENE ).
Individual income deflated, measures of inequality per region.
 
Table 4-10. Inequality comparisons per annum (per region). 
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Income Shares, per region
1991 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 0.35347 0.38547 0.33728 0.31598 0.32197 0.32717 0.31443 0.32183 0.32778 0.32246 0.32465
2 0.08737 0.09233 0.12337 0.09332 0.08857 0.09962 0.09849 0.09721 0.10074 0.10222 0.10505
3 0.10095 0.10263 0.10410 0.08650 0.10353 0.08465 0.08600 0.09315 0.09794 0.09947 0.10092
4 0.04774 0.06063 0.05206 0.06033 0.07374 0.06306 0.05975 0.05902 0.05518 0.06036 0.06209
5 0.08325 0.07747 0.08668 0.10143 0.10740 0.10098 0.11171 0.10089 0.09823 0.09943 0.09686
6 0.06079 0.06293 0.08897 0.06526 0.06135 0.06445 0.06826 0.06219 0.05819 0.05767 0.05814
7 0.11590 0.13029 0.11671 0.13872 0.12711 0.12417 0.12923 0.13565 0.13263 0.13209 0.12483
8 0.15054 0.08824 0.09083 0.13846 0.11632 0.13590 0.13213 0.13006 0.12930 0.12630 0.12746
Sum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Regional contribution to overall inequality (Theil)
1991 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 0.15338 0.14644 0.15910 0.14359 0.15878 0.15403 0.14344 0.15675 0.16164 0.12830 0.11872
2 0.03579 0.06162 0.13478 0.04005 0.03671 0.04344 0.04524 0.04151 0.04246 0.04159 0.04229
3 0.03477 0.03355 0.04205 0.03561 0.04626 0.03655 0.03019 0.03491 0.03448 0.03612 0.03405
4 0.01384 0.02171 0.02496 0.02858 0.03718 0.03380 0.03016 0.03246 0.02986 0.03042 0.03039
5 0.03170 0.03340 0.03755 0.04791 0.06266 0.05307 0.09181 0.05511 0.04955 0.04794 0.04225
6 0.03310 0.02371 0.15484 0.02669 0.02551 0.02479 0.02437 0.02300 0.02061 0.01818 0.01927
7 0.04801 0.06733 0.05602 0.08484 0.06087 0.05386 0.05290 0.05974 0.04801 0.04600 0.04099
8 0.05438 0.05693 0.03892 0.06193 0.04321 0.05830 0.05439 0.05525 0.05010 0.04989 0.04568
GE(b) 0.01053 0.01199 0.02015 0.00838 0.01717 0.01906 0.02110 0.02214 0.01847 0.01773
GE(w)+GE(b) 0.41549 0.45666 0.48935 0.47955 0.47501 0.49157 0.47981 0.45887 0.41692 0.39138
GE(t) 0.41549 0.45666 0.48935 0.47955 0.47501 0.49157 0.47981 0.45887 0.41692 0.39138
Dif. 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Regional contribution to overall inequality (Log. Dev)
1991 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 0.120176 0.128955 0.135872 0.126989 0.14295 0.140022 0.124574 0.137264 0.145908 0.123595 0.116056
2 0.029307 0.04608 0.081745 0.03758 0.034427 0.040861 0.041685 0.040839 0.043702 0.047025 0.046842
3 0.03007 0.035016 0.040416 0.034767 0.046718 0.035064 0.029646 0.034928 0.035754 0.037233 0.035212
4 0.015664 0.022563 0.028417 0.031722 0.039679 0.037382 0.03423 0.034982 0.033349 0.034404 0.034745
5 0.029315 0.03248 0.038087 0.044688 0.059814 0.052638 0.064966 0.053753 0.05073 0.052973 0.04719
6 0.022076 0.023565 0.065301 0.023096 0.021869 0.022553 0.023559 0.021714 0.019802 0.017994 0.019204
7 0.038828 0.05375 0.047324 0.068502 0.058981 0.049135 0.045329 0.050165 0.041641 0.040805 0.036918
8 0.045858 0.038842 0.034667 0.053112 0.041683 0.053009 0.049765 0.049048 0.048771 0.047921 0.046095
GE(b) 0.01134 0.01244 0.02044 0.00859 0.01776 0.02004 0.02202 0.02381 0.01942 0.01883
GE(w)+GE(b) 0.34263 0.39369 0.44090 0.45472 0.44843 0.43379 0.44471 0.44347 0.42137 0.40109
GE(t) 0.34312 0.39146 0.44345 0.45828 0.45775 0.44459 0.45588 0.45665 0.43505 0.41414
Dif. -0.00049 0.00223 -0.00256 -0.00356 -0.00933 -0.01080 -0.01117 -0.01319 -0.01368 -0.01305
Source: Author's calculations based on microdata (ENE ). 1995 is not available for national representativeness, only urban.
Income Inequality decomposed by population sub-group (regions), Entropy measures
 
Table 4-11. Inequality contribution (T and L) by population subgroup per annum 
(per region). 
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Income Shares, per state
1991 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 0.00575 0.00888 0.00873 0.00887 0.00771 0.00916 0.00894 0.00951 0.00946 0.01006 0.00971
2 0.04515 0.02611 0.02884 0.04905 0.03923 0.05313 0.05576 0.05619 0.05699 0.05596 0.05419
3 0.01093 0.00000 0.00000 0.00665 0.00715 0.00629 0.00586 0.00615 0.00625 0.00597 0.00629
4 0.00357 0.00588 0.00278 0.00558 0.00852 0.00691 0.00662 0.00635 0.00616 0.00653 0.00642
5 0.01671 0.02299 0.02764 0.03161 0.03374 0.03219 0.03199 0.03085 0.03070 0.02989 0.02857
6 0.02398 0.02347 0.00330 0.00600 0.00702 0.00665 0.00749 0.00651 0.00688 0.00696 0.00693
7 0.00572 0.00814 0.01533 0.01984 0.03027 0.02271 0.02101 0.02120 0.02049 0.02195 0.02245
8 0.04051 0.04032 0.04090 0.03983 0.03804 0.03933 0.04293 0.04052 0.03635 0.03692 0.03763
9 0.20937 0.20157 0.17402 0.14394 0.15464 0.14062 0.12728 0.14487 0.13974 0.13034 0.12794
10 0.00802 0.00961 0.04304 0.01550 0.01396 0.01510 0.01497 0.01335 0.01395 0.01233 0.01249
11 0.05339 0.05188 0.03103 0.04047 0.03726 0.03900 0.04202 0.03955 0.04070 0.04327 0.04285
12 0.00639 0.01971 0.01737 0.01952 0.02011 0.02015 0.02109 0.02188 0.01769 0.01996 0.02095
13 0.00758 0.00677 0.02508 0.01365 0.01433 0.01744 0.01521 0.01485 0.01513 0.01441 0.01719
14 0.06176 0.05358 0.06252 0.05220 0.06367 0.05267 0.04898 0.05804 0.05805 0.06119 0.06175
15 0.08736 0.10936 0.11803 0.12050 0.11343 0.13202 0.13410 0.12075 0.13088 0.13470 0.14002
16 0.01381 0.02438 0.03793 0.02830 0.03284 0.02530 0.02954 0.02860 0.03301 0.03132 0.03224
17 0.01027 0.02958 0.00944 0.01187 0.01111 0.01368 0.01303 0.01286 0.01295 0.01202 0.01011
18 0.01078 0.01045 0.01628 0.01084 0.01141 0.00973 0.00862 0.00823 0.00824 0.00830 0.00861
19 0.06173 0.06953 0.06487 0.07001 0.06513 0.05703 0.05866 0.06587 0.06296 0.06423 0.05795
20 0.03497 0.03207 0.01919 0.02098 0.02337 0.02017 0.01766 0.01595 0.01699 0.01845 0.01870
21 0.03863 0.03746 0.03169 0.03282 0.03673 0.03401 0.03309 0.03602 0.03646 0.03737 0.03866
22 0.01493 0.00158 0.03615 0.01335 0.01328 0.01523 0.01462 0.01525 0.01582 0.01473 0.01441
23 0.00000 0.00000 0.00141 0.00983 0.00903 0.01128 0.01099 0.01136 0.01167 0.01126 0.01195
24 0.01839 0.02214 0.02197 0.01698 0.01600 0.01876 0.01770 0.01805 0.01963 0.01974 0.02089
25 0.04660 0.02165 0.01572 0.03371 0.02894 0.03219 0.02908 0.02784 0.02887 0.02918 0.02891
26 0.03499 0.02901 0.02968 0.03821 0.02959 0.03497 0.03281 0.03166 0.02895 0.02689 0.02946
27 0.02259 0.01588 0.02094 0.01772 0.01902 0.01703 0.01756 0.01617 0.01636 0.01855 0.01829
28 0.03585 0.03625 0.02716 0.03710 0.02824 0.03489 0.03857 0.03893 0.03897 0.03797 0.03831
29 0.00293 0.00300 0.00297 0.00685 0.00607 0.00668 0.00693 0.00732 0.00776 0.00804 0.00792
30 0.04199 0.05167 0.04548 0.05264 0.05832 0.05003 0.06325 0.05339 0.04971 0.04887 0.04762
31 0.01395 0.01481 0.01578 0.01566 0.01251 0.01568 0.01329 0.01362 0.01433 0.01422 0.01258
32 0.01142 0.01227 0.00473 0.00993 0.00935 0.00998 0.01036 0.00831 0.00790 0.00842 0.00802
Sum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Regional contribution to overall inequality (Theil)
1991 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1. AGS 0.001984 0.002813 0.003287 0.004297 0.002259 0.003568 0.002924 0.003493 0.003376 0.002732 0.002517
2. BCN 0.016639 0.00571 0.009514 0.017721 0.012596 0.020018 0.016148 0.020279 0.016422 0.018391 0.013433
3. BCS 0.002409 0 0 0.002502 0.002518 0.002816 0.001894 0.001907 0.001748 0.001753 0.001751
4. CAMP 0.000671 0.002012 0.001271 0.0026 0.006663 0.004258 0.003475 0.003693 0.00303 0.003029 0.002958
5. COAH 0.006273 0.012223 0.011614 0.017432 0.014372 0.013636 0.011731 0.012369 0.008962 0.008927 0.008262
6. COL 0.004182 0.004517 0.001413 0.002001 0.003663 0.002834 0.00405 0.00263 0.002492 0.002358 0.001968
7. CHIS 0.001743 0.002878 0.008216 0.010502 0.01629 0.01171 0.010366 0.013629 0.01263 0.012054 0.010904
8. CHIH 0.015229 0.015434 0.014941 0.014342 0.015432 0.012667 0.012577 0.013959 0.010449 0.009857 0.010846
9. DF 0.091577 0.081715 0.091042 0.066911 0.07623 0.063727 0.058404 0.080215 0.066362 0.053472 0.049559
10. DGO 0.002556 0.002401 0.128492 0.006944 0.005352 0.006861 0.005728 0.004972 0.006373 0.004301 0.004371
11. GTO 0.023773 0.041702 0.019609 0.015066 0.013738 0.014168 0.020676 0.015676 0.013744 0.014962 0.015359
12. GRO 0.001583 0.00515 0.007065 0.008115 0.007974 0.01032 0.010972 0.009932 0.006538 0.008583 0.009325
13. HGO 0.00309 0.002864 0.012409 0.005849 0.007493 0.008453 0.007784 0.006891 0.007441 0.007032 0.008048
14. JAL 0.023341 0.020271 0.023368 0.02026 0.025625 0.02298 0.014246 0.020773 0.020221 0.02138 0.019423
15. MEX 0.038477 0.037451 0.042116 0.04802 0.048845 0.061328 0.058793 0.04098 0.04846 0.040003 0.039796
16. MICH 0.005737 0.008203 0.017118 0.012997 0.016557 0.009948 0.011313 0.010781 0.011299 0.011371 0.011912
17. MOR 0.002165 0.009979 0.002556 0.003194 0.003477 0.004638 0.003601 0.004182 0.003808 0.003559 0.002472
18. NAY 0.002287 0.003407 0.007463 0.005989 0.003912 0.004605 0.003171 0.003288 0.003424 0.003009 0.002816
19. NL 0.029016 0.03684 0.04486 0.04918 0.031944 0.025624 0.023441 0.030965 0.024659 0.023938 0.019466
20. OAX 0.009985 0.0122 0.009268 0.009718 0.012389 0.011718 0.008565 0.008002 0.010134 0.009285 0.009624
21. PUE 0.015539 0.011227 0.012483 0.011899 0.013519 0.013567 0.01321 0.016665 0.030706 0.021051 0.017245
22. QRO 0.050071 0.00023 0.073259 0.006455 0.006595 0.007611 0.006258 0.006366 0.007501 0.0062 0.005507
23. QROO 0 0 0.000759 0.003993 0.0051 0.004238 0.005065 0.005548 0.003889 0.004185 0.003863
24. SLP 0.006016 0.01166 0.011644 0.007422 0.006178 0.008757 0.006894 0.008342 0.009443 0.009308 0.010153
25. SIN 0.020975 0.00741 0.004978 0.012677 0.00874 0.013096 0.012893 0.011929 0.013057 0.012374 0.012012
26. SON 0.009815 0.036532 0.013602 0.020304 0.012454 0.016199 0.015515 0.012892 0.009308 0.009085 0.011098
27. TAB 0.009029 0.007121 0.009027 0.0098 0.009662 0.007515 0.007914 0.007396 0.008279 0.008478 0.007745
28. TAMPS 0.010775 0.016884 0.013554 0.016931 0.013589 0.014334 0.017559 0.015586 0.013828 0.012073 0.012878
29. TLAX 0.000537 0.000612 0.000771 0.002464 0.002339 0.00239 0.002295 0.003247 0.002969 0.002899 0.002234
30. VER 0.016026 0.067798 0.016797 0.02265 0.034055 0.026235 0.066831 0.031161 0.024988 0.023535 0.021012
31. YUC 0.00514 0.007146 0.008656 0.00753 0.005792 0.008854 0.007752 0.006392 0.008455 0.007825 0.005633
32. ZAC 0.014563 0.004366 0.002197 0.004746 0.00387 0.004511 0.0055 0.003247 0.003063 0.00336 0.003194
GE(b) 0.03648 0.02238 0.03884 0.03032 0.03393 0.03402 0.04242 0.04181 0.03656 0.03400
GE(w)+GE(b) 0.47769 0.50114 0.48935 0.47955 0.47712 0.49157 0.47981 0.45887 0.41692 0.39138
GE(t) 0.41549 0.45666 0.48935 0.47955 0.47501 0.49157 0.47981 0.45887 0.41692 0.39138
Dif. 0.06220 0.04448 0.00000 0.00000 0.00211 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Income Inequality decomposed by population sub-group (states), Entropy measures
1
 
Table 4-12. Inequality contribution (T) by population subgroup per annum (per 
state). 
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Figure 4-14. Share of population per region. 
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Figure 4-15. Share of population per state. 
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55   The Institutional View of Poverty: Recent Deprivation Measurement in Mexico.  
 
5.1 Abstract. 
 
Two important crises are the explanation for the increase of poverty and 
inequality in Mexico in the past which prompted the governmental institutions to measure 
appropriately how much the well-being of people has been affected by the rise in poverty 
and inequality. The effort to formalize the measurement of poverty was introduced by the 
Mexican President and carried out by the Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL) 
at the beginning of this decade. The resultant committee standardized the measurement of 
poverty using the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) headcount poverty measure; though 
some other methods of destitution measurement are also used by different governmental 
institutions in the present. These last institutions calculate poverty in different ways, 
mostly using the marginalization concept with the principal component analysis tool. The 
variety of laws within the legal system in Mexico makes poverty measurement sometimes 
confusing; the measurement of well-being is assigned to a variety of governmental 
offices by different regulations. The diverse results of these measures have the risk of 
using them with discretional criteria for the allocation of public resources for the very 
poor. At present, different offices carry on parallel measurements of destitution, though 
these results have been contextualized with the official measurement, there are 
methodological differences. On the other hand, in Mexico is still the case that the 
consideration of the unequal distribution of income has not been explored in depth. 
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 5.2 Introduction. 
 
This chapter will give an overview of deprivation measurement used in recent 
decades in Mexico. Both the institutional scenario and the academic research have 
influenced the measurement of deprivation over the last years. A formal research agenda 
was necessary to organize, and this happened at the beginning of the year 2000 
(Hernández-Laos, 2005, in Székely, 2005), but the motivation behind the measurement of 
deprivation in Mexico still have some inertia. So, it is the case that the task of poverty 
measurement and considerations of human development are spread among a variety of 
governmental institutions in Mexico (López-Calva and Székely, 2006, Introduction). The 
understanding of methodological, operational and theoretical discussions in regards to 
human development is not sufficient. The academic framework should be tied to the 
institutional background of human development in the country, so in this case, a clearer 
picture will make it easy to analyze the problem. This clearer understanding will allow us 
to understand and to construct better measures of inequality, as it is required for the 
construction of poverty measures, remembering in particular that “[c]onstructing 
consumption aggregates without knowledge of the country and its institutions will not 
give useful results.” (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002, p. 359). Besides the institutional 
background, the measurement of human development in Mexico should be understood in 
the context of its economy. Therefore, a brief description of the Mexican economy in 
recent years will be given together with the formal attempts to measure human 
development and the institutional background. 
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In spite of the recent advances in research about the definition of poverty in 
Mexico, inequality measurement is a topic that is still on the agenda for discussion. That 
the measurement of inequality is a topic that human development literature in Mexico 
does not mention very often will be made clear, so in this chapter, the unequal income 
distribution will not be mentioned as often as poverty measurement is. The question 
about why inequality measurement was not tackled in the same way as it was considered 
poverty or multidimensional human development will be touched upon in detail on the 
next chapter. In the mean time, this chapter will give an account of the definition of 
human development measurement in Mexico, but mostly focusing on the definition of 
poverty and marginalization measurement. Researches on human development in general 
are connected with inequality measurement, in this sense we can see the questions that 
have been answered by using poverty measurement, and which of the answers given for 
poverty measurement can be applied to inequality measurement. In this way, a good 
number of questions will be answered by the researchers on the status of inequality 
measurement, which are crucial for our understanding of the institutional view in the 
context of the framework of the Mexican economy. This section provides an intuitive 
understanding into the institutional decisions in Mexico with regards to the 
methodological approaches adopted behind measurement of poverty, inequality and in 
general human development over the last decade. 
 
201 
••   Overview.  
 
The organization of this chapter is as follows: the Mexican economy in the 
immediate past decades is described in section 5.3, followed by the institutional views of 
poverty measurement, which is tackled in section 5.4, having the picture of the Mexican 
institutions and the legal system as a starting point (5.4 I). The standardized measurement 
of poverty that started on the year 2000 is mentioned in section 5.4 II, followed by a 
discussion of the measurement of marginalization by other institutions in section 5.4 III. 
Finally, part 5.5 presents the concluding remarks. 
 
5.3 The Mexican economy.  
 
Not only endogenous and exogenous economic conditions, but also political 
shocks are responsible for economic growth, and therefore, for the increase and decrease 
on the levels of income inequality. Being far away from the import-substitution model 
that used to rule from 1930 until the early 70’s, the most important issues in the Mexican 
economy in the last 30 years are the two major crises (Lustig, 2001). The first one in the 
year 1982, as a consequence of the debt crisis, and the second one, in the year 1994, due 
to the inability and bad luck of the Mexican government to make a smooth transition 
between the administration of President Salinas de Gortari (1986-1994) and the 
administration of President Zedillo (1994-2000). The first crisis ended with a major 
devaluation of the Mexican Peso, while the second, known as the ‘Tequila’ crisis, ended 
with a major $50-billion rescue package from the IMF and the Clinton administration. 
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The adverse conditions and the inability of the Mexican Government to alleviate these 
complex situations exacerbated both crises. The poorest people suffered most of the 
consequences. Between the years 1994 to 1996, the crisis caused at least 16 million of 
new people that joined the rank of the poor (Székely, 2005, p. 23). Inequality across the 
country also increased during the 90’s, while for different reasons this tendency appeared 
to ease up during the next decade. Some people argue that inequality decreased and 
overall welfare improved due to the boosting effect of international trade (e.g. NAFTA 
agreement), while others put this down to the huge out-migration of poor nationals to the 
United States. 
The first crisis happened during the middle 80’s. Mexico experienced a lack of 
macroeconomic policy management, due primarily to the poor allocations of foreign 
direct investment. Those resources were supposed to be invested in the oil industry, 
because of the discovery of great oil resources in the middle 70’s. The Fiscal deficit rose 
from $23 billion in 1977, to $53 billion in 1981. It is true that at that time, some external 
shocks, such as some changes in fiscal policy and interest rates in the US that made their 
banks to stop inflows of money to almost all Latin American countries, were aggravating 
the situation. This became an important condition, and it negatively affected Mexico in 
such a way that in 1982 the Mexican peso had to be devalued. In those years several 
attempts failed to stop this inertia. Finally, in 1988, the Administration of President 
Salinas was finally successful in controlling this decay. On the one hand, the growth rate 
was very limited during the period from 1983 to 1988: the GDP increased by a ridiculous 
average rate of 0.2 percent, millions of Mexicans became poor and inequality increased 
substantially. On the other hand, some efforts were successful, for instance, in 1991, 
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foreign and local investment were repatriated, such that near to 10 US billion came back 
again to the Mexican financial system. An important engine for the economy, the 
NAFTA agreement (North American Free Trade Agreement), was signed in 1993. Little 
by little, the GDP grew up by an average of 1.7%, the inflation in 1994 reached its lowest 
level of the period to 7.0%, and confidence in Mexico was partially recovered. But that 
positive recovery did not last very long. 
The second crisis, which was triggered by political shocks in 1994, started with 
some negative economic environment. The atmosphere in Mexico was full of uncertainty 
regarding the inflow of foreign capital at the beginning of the decade. In 1990, the 
banking system was privatized without an adequate framework of prudential regulations 
(Lustig, 2001, p. 89). The Mexican peso was effectively pegged to the US dollar through 
some financial policies. This was supposed to alleviate and maintain the rate of inflation 
lower. This policy caused international reserves to exhaust very soon, but it was not 
considered to be a serious issue by the government. On the other hand, the benefits from 
the NAFTA agreement and all policies that opened the Mexican economy were not yet 
effective; some of the social sectors were adversely affected. Therefore, a rebellion 
occurred. The EZLN (Zapatista Army for National Freedom -Ejercito Zapatista de 
Liberación Nacional) declared hostilities to the Mexican Army in January of 1994. Three 
months later, Luis Donaldo Colosio, the most important presidential candidate from the 
ruling party –PRI, was assassinated. This disturbing fact was very close to the incoming 
election in June of the same year. Right after this election, the PRI’s General Secretary 
was also assassinated in September, only three months later after the Presidential 
election. Having such an adverse scenario for the new president Dr. Ernesto Zedillo, the 
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new government administration was unable to make the political and economical 
transition successful. As a consequence of this instability, both national and foreign 
investment flew from the country in December of 1994, causing again a major 
devaluation. This problem was partially solved with the help of the Clinton 
administration, because the Americans feared of a domino-effect affecting their own 
economy. The US treasury, jointly with the IMF, came with a $50 billion-aid rescue in 
order to support the very weak Mexican peso. It took some years of the Zedillo 
Administration to repay this loan, but an enormous $200-billion hole was opened in the 
Mexican public sector account, which is still in the process of being repaid. 
Nowadays, Mexico has been embracing a more open model of economy, but there 
are still many challenges. The government has contracted more than 8 trade agreements 
with different countries with the aim of diversifying trade. The macroeconomic indicators 
have been improving since the last crisis via the opening of the domestic market. For 
instance, the average rate tariff, which used to be near to 10% before 1994, has been 
going down rapidly, and almost half of all import tariff categories have been eliminated 
(Lustig, 2001, p. 97). Mexican exports grew faster than imports after the crisis, so trade in 
general among Canada, US and Mexico improved. But in spite of this, income 
distribution is still a problem such that there are millions of poor people: near to 20 
million Mexicans live with less than $2 dollars per day (Lustig, 2001, p. 86), in other 
words, around 20 percent of Mexicans do not have enough money to buy a very basic 
basket of goods (Székely, 2005, p. 26). The extent of the problem of poverty and 
inequality has begun to be known in increasing level of detail. The effort of the Mexican 
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government to estimate in detail about the effect of the crises on the most destitute will be 
described in the following section.  
 
5.4 The institutional view of poverty in Mexico. 
 
The same as many countries in the world, Mexico did not have a formal definition 
of poverty. It is known that countries like India and the United States have been careful to 
define official poverty lines, but Mexico did not define this officially until the beginning 
of this decade. The indicator provided by the annual per capita GDP was not longer seen 
as an appropriate measure of well-being (Hernandez and Székely, 2005). The difficulties 
involved in an effort of the formalization of poverty measurement, due to the highly 
politicized meaning of measuring of poverty, is not a secret (Székely, 2005, p. 24). 
Among other things, there are implications for the huge social spending that is attached to 
this measurement. Other implication is the political cost for the government of accepting 
publicly the existence of high levels of poverty, which can change people’s political 
preferences. On one side, the government wants to control this task as much as possible, 
but on the other side, the social institutions and people’s representatives want to be sure 
that the government is not giving false or biased information. Sometimes these demands 
contradict one another.  
The most important effort in the measurement of poverty was done in the 
following way. The Secretariat of Social Development (or SEDESOL by its acronym in 
Spanish), which depends directly on the President’s office, created in the year 2000 the 
Technical Committee for Poverty Measurement (Comité Técnico para la Medición de la 
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Pobreza or CTMP) (Székely, 2005; CTMP, 2002). This committee, after a year of work, 
institutionalized one of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) poverty indices, using an 
expenditure survey as a basis (ENIGH) and having the household as a recipient unit. 
They neither formalized any measure of inequality, nor included any sort of dispersion 
analysis on the poverty measurement. Nowadays, that Committee is virtually dissolved, 
but CONEVAL (National Evaluation Council for the Social Development Policy), a 
decentralized institution that mostly depends of SEDESOL, took CTMP’s role in poverty 
measurement. The next paragraphs will give an account of these institutions, and how 
these institutions, among others, are interrelated with poverty research and its 
measurement. 
 
 I SEDESOL, CONEVAL and Legal Concerns.  
 
The detail of the definition of poverty measurements might be seen as a 
complicated task in Mexico, because of the laws that stipulate how and who should make 
deprivation assessment. The present legislation is not always interpreted identically by all 
parties. Firstly, we need to know who SEDESOL is. In regards to social expenditure, 
SEDESOL is the main organization in charge of social spending in Mexico, for instance, 
the federal budget for the year 2006 was around 3 billion USD on social spending 
programs, the equivalent to 1.7% of the GDP.128 From this social expenditure, the most 
important government program for poverty alleviation is OPORTUNIDADES. With 5 
                                                 
128 Own estimations based on the Statistical Annexe of the First Presidential Report (Presidencia de la 
República, Felipe Calderón, 2007b, pp. 4, 15, 55-56). One US dollar is equivalent to 10.5 Mexican pesos.  
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million household recipients, 129 the spending is around 700 USD per family per annum 
(Presidencia de la República, Felipe Calderón, 2007, p. 251). On the other hand, 
SEDESOL has been assigned by law, among others responsibilities, with the tasks of 
making evaluations in order to improve social development, and also to inform the 
society about the actions that are needed to be taken in these regards (General Law of 
Social Development –LGDS, 2004, Art. 43, Part IX). In regards to the administrative 
responsibilities, SEDESOL is the head of two departments that are connected with the 
issue of poverty measurement, such as CONEVAL (National Evaluation Council for the 
Social Development Policy) and the General Direction of Analysis and Prospective 
(GDAP). SEDESOL was also in charge of the creation and organization of the CTMP 
Technical Committee for Poverty Measurement. These two offices that depend on 
SEDESOL, plus the committee, will be described below briefly. 
Mentioning briefly, CTMP (2002) recommended the use of the Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke (1984) family of indices for poverty measurement, using an expenditure 
survey (ENIGH) and having the household as a recipient unit (CTMP, 2002). They 
defined poverty in relation to 3 poverty lines, but remained silent about the formalization 
of calculation of inequality (World Bank, 2004, p. 8), mostly because of the ‘undefined’ 
effect of inequality when poverty increases (CTMP, 2002, p. 20).130 The next section 
contains more detailed information about CTMP and their effort, but here is mentioned to 
understand the role of CONEVAL. 
CONEVAL was created under the law of social development that was published 
on December of 2003 (LGDS, 2004, Arts. 36, 37 and 72), but it started to operate from 
                                                 
129 A detail of how these households are chosen in Hernández and Székely (2005, p. 92-101). 
130 The ‘undefined’ part comes from the consideration about the increase of inequality because of 
impoverishment (Cortes and Rubalcava, 1991). This discussion is tackled in detail in the following chapter. 
208 
May of 2006 (CONEVAL, 2007, p. 6). CONEVAL is a decentralized institute created for 
the purpose to the evaluation of poverty, and in general, the evaluation of any social 
development policy; CONEVAL has the power even to be able to modify or suspend any 
program of SEDESOL.131 CONEVAL took as a basis the research made by CTMP on the 
issue of poverty measurement; that is the reason CTMP does no longer exist. CONEVAL 
is the organism that should define poverty guides about deprivation measurement: “The 
guidelines and criteria that [CONEVAL] established for the definition, identification and 
measurement of poverty are mandatory for entities and public organisms that are 
participating in the execution of social development programs,” (LGDS, 2004, Art. 36, 
emphasis added, translated from the original). The measurement provided by CONEVAL 
is rather important, such that the Mexican President “will review annually the regions that 
needed more attention, in regards to the evaluations and the results of the studies of 
poverty measurement, which will be provided by [CONEVAL] …” (LGDS, 2004, Art. 
30, emphasis added, translated from the original). Nowadays, the methodology of the 
information provided about the levels of poverty is controlled by CONEVAL. Therefore, 
the evaluation made by the President, taking into account CONEVAL’s measurement, 
should help to define the allocation of resources to the most deprived; by now 
CONEVAL’s measurement is mainly used as an indicator of well-being, an example of 
which can be seen in the last presidential report (Presidencia de la Republica, Felipe 
Calderón, 2007, p. 250). 
On the other hand, SEDESOL is in charge of the GDAP through its internal 
regulation (RISDS); this internal regulation comes from the general law of social 
                                                 
131 There is actually a legal controversy between the President and the Congress about the assessment of the 
programs and policy of SEDESOL, The problem is CONEVAL depends on SEDESOL, so it is difficult for 
it to be an ‘independent’ institution (Boltvinik, 2006). 
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development (LGDS). It is said in the law that this Direction has among other 
responsibilities, that of “[t]o elaborate indicators and make measurements in order to 
identify and evaluate the evolution during time of variables related with poverty and 
marginalization…” (RISDS, 2004, Art. 30, translated from the original). In practical 
terms, this Direction is focused on the assessment of poverty in a disaggregated level, so 
in this case SEDESOL, through this department, is responsible for the ‘focalization’132 of 
alleviation programs for the poorest communities. 
There is another measure of destitution, which is done by SEDESOL also. This 
index is called the ‘Indice de masas carenciales’, and it is stated in the article 34 of the 
Law of Fiscal Coordination (LCF, 2007). This measurement has the purpose of giving the 
fair allocation of federal funding resources (Federal Funding for Social Infrastructure, 
FAIS) to every state in the country. The amount of money shared among the states was 
near to $328 million for the year 2006 (Presidencia de la República, Felipe Calderón, 
2007b, p. 84), which is similar to one tenth of the federal spending for the program of 
OPORTUNIDADES. Since the year 1996, the amount of money is distributed among the 
states using an ad-hoc composite index that measures destitution in five different 
dimensions, such as health, education, dwelling, drainage and energy (Hernandez and 
Székely, 2005, p. 91). These funds are given directly to the states in order to be used for 
the building of infrastructure to provide with interregional benefit among the 
communities within the state (LCF, 2007, Art. 33). 
In regards to the institutions linked with SEDESOL (1), we have CONEVAL (2), 
and GDAP (3). CTMP (4) was also part of SEDESOL, but it does no longer exist. Using 
the above information, providing a picture of which institutions make poverty 
                                                 
132 This term refers to a particular focus in certain geographical location. 
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measurement might be useful. These institutions are shown on the diagram in Figure 5-1. 
Besides the mentioned institutions, there are two additional offices that are not part of 
SEDESOL, but these two offices contribute with measures of destitution, such as indices 
of multidimensional well-being. These two offices are the National Population Council 
(CONAPO) (5), and the National Institute of Statistical and Geographical Information 
(INEGI) (6), the role of the measurement provided by these institutions will be explained 
later. The following diagram explains better who is who in the Mexican scenario of 
poverty measurement.  
 
PRESIDENT 
Other Secretariats Secretariat of Secretariat of 
Governance 
INEGI 
(Decentralized 
Statistical 
Department) 
Social 
Development 
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(Decentralized, 
head SEDESOL, 
has members of 
other secretariats)
(It does not exist 
anymore, now the 
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realized by 
CONEVAL) 
(GDAP) 
 
Figure 5-1. Institutions and Poverty measurement in Mexico. 
 
211 
 II CTMP and detail of poverty measurement.  
 
Because of the importance of the CTMP in Mexico, it is important to highlight 
particular details of the measurement proposed by this committee. As we mentioned, 
there has been an effort in order to standardize the most common measures of the 
standard of living in Mexico, such measure is poverty. During the administration of 
President Fox, through SEDESOL, a research agenda about measurement of poverty was 
established on the year 2000 (Cortés, 2005, p. 846). Josefina Vázquez-Mota, the head of 
SEDESOL, gathered a team of recognized academics and public sector personalities in 
order to arrive at a formal definition of poverty measurement (World Bank, 2004, p. 6). 
The legacy of her administration was a committee (CTMP) that provided a formal 
definition of poverty, with reference to the broad international literature on the topic. The 
effort of the committee was finally presented in a document called ‘Medición de la 
pobreza: variantes metodológicas y estimación preliminar’ (‘Measurement of poverty: 
methodological variants and preliminary estimation’). It was published in 2002 (CTMP, 
2002). In this document that was the result of a year of work, the CTMP institutionalized 
the headcount Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) poverty measure ( 0=α ), using the 
household as the recipient unit and the expenditure survey ENIGH as the main source of 
data. The estimation of per capita deprivation was done using non-equivalized data. They 
did not formalize any measure or approach to inequality, but highlighted some research 
agenda about other issues (CTMP, 2002, pp. 20 & 87). 
 What was the definition of poverty due to CTMP in detail? In regards to some 
philosophical and ethical considerations, they defined poverty with reference to a 
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deprivation of necessary elements for the human life, not only because without these 
elements it is impossible to live in the society, but also because of the perverse effect of 
deprivation, such that deprivation reinforces itself (CTMP, 2002, p. 17). The role of 
cultural values and social relationships that are important in the context of poverty 
assessment is mentioned in the document (Idem., p. 17-19). They defined poverty using 
the terminology of capabilities, usually equating this term with the one of functionings, 
having in mind a multidimensional space, similar to the one proposed by Amartya Sen. 
This means that income is not a space, but income was seen as an image of 
multidimensional capabilities (CTMP, p. 17-8).133 The definition of inequality was not 
considered, mostly because of the [apparent] ambiguous relationship of inequality and 
poverty (CTMP, 2002, p. 20). 
On the operational decisions, the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) family of 
indices was chosen for poverty measurement, mostly because of its decomposability by 
population subgroups (CTMP, 2002, p. 22). They use per capita income, dividing total 
household income among the total of persons within the household, with the same weight 
assigned to children and adults (Idem., p. 43), and they choose an expenditure survey, in 
preference to employment surveys and census data (Idem., p. 49). They decided not to 
rely on employment surveys because of the problems associated with unreported or 
misreported income, and they did not use census data because of the inconvenient long 
period of time between each survey data collection. They did not adjust income with 
national accounts (CTMP, 2002, p. 61). Finally, they focused on the first of the Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke poverty measures ( 0=α ), showing the results at the national level, 
with separations between urban and rural areas (CTMP, 2002, p. 74), and giving 
                                                 
133 An account of the Mexican case and the capability approach can be seen in the last part of chapter 7. 
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information of the characteristics of the poorest households. They defined the household 
as the basis for the measurement, and they also define three poverty ‘lines’. 
Regarding the concept of the definition of poverty lines, three levels of poverty 
were chosen.134 With certain minimum income, the household is supposed to be able to 
acquire a basic basket of goods. This first poverty line is known as the ‘food’ poverty 
line. The second one is the ‘capability’ poverty line, which is the required amount of 
income that every household needs for food, plus health and educational goods. The third 
line is the ‘asset’ poverty line, which is the required amount to afford items as housing 
and public transportation, besides the required amount of ‘food’ and ‘capabilities’ 
(CTMP, 2002, p. 9). The minimal requirements for subsistence, such as minimum caloric 
intake and some other goods, these were taken from earlier Mexican literature (Coplamar, 
1983; INEGI-CEPAL, 1993). Following the general discussion of the basket of goods in 
Ravallion (1998), the definition of the basket of goods and its equivalent on income was 
done using the theory of the Engel coefficient (CTMP, 2002, pp. 36 & 41).135 The rest of 
the operational, methodological and technical decisions on the measurement of poverty 
are described by Székely (2005, chapter 2). 
However, immediately after such a big effort of the formalization of poverty 
measures by the CTMP, some governmental offices were nonetheless kept reporting 
poverty statistics without considering the CTMP methodology (La Jornada, 2003). This 
incident could be seen as undermining the scientific effort of CTMP, but the most 
probable explanation for that could be that the CTMP research was ‘too recent’ to be 
considered ‘definitive’, so the fact that those offices published statistics in such a way, it 
                                                 
134 A reference to the definition of poverty lines in relation to the capability approach is available chapter 7. 
135 A detail of the Engel coefficient in CTMP (2002, Annexe 1). 
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could be seen as a normal adjustment while the CTMP methodology was progressively 
absorbed at all governmental levels.  
 
 III Marginalization measurement: CONAPO and INEGI.  
 
The term of marginalization and social exclusion has been traced to the work of 
Max Weber (1924),136 but more recently in France during the 1970’s, mostly referring to 
the unprotected (‘les exclus’) by social policy (Burchardt et al., 2002). The term of 
marginalization later included a set of different kinds of social deprivations; this idea has 
been used mostly in European countries (Hills, 2004, p. 52). This terminology might be 
interchangeably used with known concepts such as income poverty or social deprivation, 
and can be understood as a multidimensional face of poverty that considers not only 
material deprivation, but particularly, the limited access to public services as well. For 
instance, the following multidimensional space has been proposed by authors like 
Atkinson et al. (2002) in order to measure social exclusion: material deprivation, 
education, employment opportunities, health and housing. Therefore, the term social 
exclusion is trying to give us a broader definition of deprivation rather than only income 
poverty, explaining the principles of social deprivation with a ‘multi-layered’ concept, 
either of households, individuals, or communities (Hills, 2004, p. 54). The 
marginalization concept try to focus not just in the poor, but in the subset of the poor that 
is affected more heavily by several deprivations, such that the government shall be 
capable (because it is responsible) of alleviating the status of that poor people. This is the 
                                                 
136 See his essay Class, Status and Party. 
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idea that has been used by the next two following institutions in their measurement of 
well-being. 
 
 a) CONAPO.  
 
The next institution that makes ‘poverty’ measurement is CONAPO. To explain 
the poverty measure of their choice, it this is necessary to understand the political role of 
this institution, because of its dependence on the Governance Secretariat, the right hand 
of the President. According to the second Article of the General Population Law (LGP, 
1996), it is stipulated that the president will perform, through the Governance Secretariat, 
coordination and promotion of solutions for demographic problems. Problems such as 
population distribution, reduction of mortality, contraception programs, women 
participation, in and out-migration and integration of marginalized groups to society.  
CONAPO was created in 1974, with the aim to help the Governance Secretariat with 
demographic projection, in order to “include the population in the economic development 
and social programs…, and to link the program objectives with the necessities that arise 
because of demographic phenomena” (LGP, 1996, Art. 5, translated from the original). 
CONAPO in its website explain this in detail: “[CONAPO] has the mission of regulating 
the phenomena that affects population regarding its volume, structure, dynamics and 
national territory distribution, with the purpose of making the population have a fair and 
egalitarian participation in the social and economic benefits”. (Emphasis added, 
translated from the original).137 The sentence in regards to the egalitarian focus is not 
                                                 
137 In “General Information”. (http://www.conapo.gob.mx/00que/01.htm) 
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directly relevant to the law that created CONAPO. Without entering in this discussion, 
the fact is that CONAPO makes their own assessment of marginalization based on the 
philosophy of social exclusion, 138 even though it is stated in the RISDS that SEDESOL, 
through the office of GDAP, should be in charge of that measurement.  
CONAPO’s measure of marginalization, which is based on census data using the 
statistical method of the principal component analysis,139 is virtually a multidimensional 
measurement of poverty, similar to the concept of functionings and capabilities due to 
Amartya Sen. CONAPO’s marginalization index uses five classifications of deprivation 
vectors with the technique developed by Dalenius and Hodges (Lopez-Calva and 
Székely, 2006, p. 30-31). The ranking comes from dimensions with information such as 
literacy, schooling, water and drainage supply, electricity, stacking household level, size 
of community and income level (CONAPO, 2005, Annexe C). Using this index as a 
basis, CONAPO classifies municipalities and states in five levels of marginalization; such 
index goes from ‘very high’ to ‘very low’. The index is published periodically, and is 
extensively used by state and municipal governments. It is supposed that the government 
should focus on the indicators where marginalization is higher, applying more resources 
when needed. 
There are some theoretical problems with marginalization measures. These are not 
decomposable by population sub-group, so there is no possibility of knowing the 
contribution of marginalization by each group, because this measurement provides only a 
ranking of communities. We do not know with certainty which dimension is causing the 
                                                 
138 About ‘marginalization’ see footnote 2 in CTMP (2002, p. 20). 
139 Under the assumption of correlation among vectors, this technique captures in fewer dimensions the 
highest variance present in the data set using the best eigenvector of those dimensions. This technique is 
applied in computer systems, particularly on data management of graphic files and file encryption.  
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community marginalization, because of the artificial weight that the method attaches to 
each dimension of destitution. It is a measure that is relative per se, so this measure does 
not take into account absolute destitution, as other formal poverty measures do. In regards 
to the representation that this ‘virtual’ measurement of poverty is, during the year 2000, 
CONAPO tried to link their findings with standard poverty measures, before the attempt 
provided by CTMP. After making a comparison between this ranking and the Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke measures (CONAPO, 2000, Chapter 4),140  they conclude that “the 
general data about the intensity of poverty approximates to the one on marginalization” 
(CONAPO, 2000, p. 34). For the policy maker it might be confusing to look at measures 
provided by the CTMP if they look at the ranking provided by CONAPO, because the 
measurement of CONAPO might be considered as a substitute measure, rather than a 
complementary way to assess well-being. There might be a legal conflict here between 
marginalization measurement and poverty measurement that is assigned by law to 
SEDESOL. 
 
 b) INEGI.  
 
The last institution which might be making measurement of poverty or 
marginalization is INEGI, which is the institute that provides data for all the previously 
mentioned institutions, despite the fact that their role is usually restricted for collection of 
data. INEGI have a ‘product’ called ‘Socioeconomic Regions of Mexico’.141 This product 
                                                 
140 It is not clear in the tables which were exactly the calculations for the FGT indices, because they 
classified them later in the same ranking as the marginalization index. 
141 Found in http://jweb.inegi.gob.mx/niveles/jsp/index.jsp
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used to be published as a list of 15 indicators from the census data, and now, besides 
those indicators, they construct a composite index of marginalization that is called ‘well-
being index’ (Lopez-Calva and Székely, 2006, p. 31). They have clearly stated in their 
methodology the following: “[i]t is important to insist that this product has not been 
designed for, or has the purpose of measuring poverty, well being or marginalization. As 
is known, the Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL) is responsible of giving the 
official poverty measures” (INEGI, 2004, part III.6, emphasis added, translated from the 
original). Even tough they claim not be carrying out any poverty measurement, they seem 
to produce one such measure. They use a very interesting geographical interactive web 
tool to show results. The methodology for the data base is similar to the one used by 
CONAPO, but is focalized on the AGEB, which is a smaller geographical unit than a 
municipality. 142  The calculation method is based on the optimal stratification for 
multiparametric samples, as suggested by Jarque (1981), as an improvement of the 
principal component method, because the method uses more information for the 
assessment of the ranking, and not only the ‘principal component’ vector. There are 36 
variables included, these are described by Lopez-Calva and Székely (2006, p. 32). The 
audience of this product is intended to be not only the municipal government, but also the 
state and the federal governments. This product can be accessed by the private, academic, 
and the social sectors as well. The purpose of this product is to help “the tasks of 
projection, design and formulation of policy rules and specific programs in their own 
action spaces” (2004, part II.2, translated from the original). In the view of the author of 
this chapter, there is no problem with the presentation of raw indicators of census data, 
                                                 
142 For an explanation of AGEB and its classification, see note a in the same Methodological document 
(INEGI, 2004, p.1) 
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those are easily available with the interactive tool, but there can be an overlap with the 
composite ranking provided by INEGI, which can be considered as a virtual measure of 
poverty or well-being. They might be ignoring the fact that the President should use only 
CONEVAL’s poverty measures in order to propose programs and allocate spending for 
the alleviation of poverty (LGDS, 2004, Art. 30).  
 
5.5 Concluding remarks. 
 
The consideration of various approaches in regards to poverty can be valuable 
because of the complex nature of poverty as a social phenomenon. As it was described 
for the Mexican case, the previous crises affected the poorest people in many ways. An 
understanding of the multidimensional faces of poverty can be helpful. However, when 
important public resources are to be distributed, there should be a unique consistent and 
fairer tool that allocates public spending, otherwise, the provision of resources suffers the 
risk of being discretionary. If there is no coordination in human development research, 
the efforts of isolated institutional research might be a waste of time. Arguably, the best 
exercise in Mexico regarding poverty measurement is the one proposed by the CTMP that 
was adopted later by CONEVAL. CTMP’s poverty measurement recognized the broad 
spectrum of the task, standardizing poverty measures mostly based on international and 
recognized development literature (World Bank, 2004, p. 6). They include ethical 
judgments of fairness and justice and also suggested a research agenda. The literature in 
destitution measurement was stimulated later by the effort of CTMP and the conclusions 
they arrived at. 
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The inertia on poverty measurement should be considered, because even though 
the effort of the CTMP was very influential, such that now it is the official 
measurement,143 there are still traditions in other governmental institutions that assess 
some sort of well-being measurement. There are also regulations that seems to support 
ad-hoc ways to measure well-being in order to allocate federal resources. On the side of 
the institutions, for instance, there are rankings that use the principal component method, 
such as those proposed by CONAPO or INEGI. The constructed indicators of 
marginalization are used to generate policies and to allocate resources as well. But these 
multidimensional indicators are not always consistent with official poverty literature. In 
the event that marginalization measures become totally consistent with the official 
measure, carrying out any further research would be a waste of resources and efforts. 
Considering the current legislation, the ‘Indice of masas carenciales’, which is stated on 
the LCF, it does provide a measurement that does not take into account the measurement 
of poverty as defined by CTMP, so the distribution of resources using their measures as a 
guide might not be the most efficient. With a large list of alternative methods to measure 
destitution to choose from, the researcher might be confused on the selection among the 
plethora of ‘poverty’ measures available.  
The measurement of poverty and destitution in Mexico is not perfect. There are 
still many things to consider. For instance, as a central part of this work, inequality 
measurement has not been considered in full. On the other hand, it is important to note 
that in practice, SEDESOL only takes into account the headcount ratio of the Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke family of indices ( 0=α ). Neither the meaning of the intensity of 
                                                 
143 CONEVAL measures are used officially for poverty assessment, for that see the last Presidential 
Mexican Report (Primer Informe de Gobierno, Felipe Calderon, 2007, p. 250). 
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poverty ( 1=α ) has been exploited, nor the measurement of poverty that is transfer 
sensitive ( 2=α ) has been considered, even though these alternative measures has been 
suggested and calculated in some Mexican studies (CTMP, 2002, p. 111). Recently, 
multidimensional indices of human development (HDI) that have their root in the 
capability approach of Sen are being considered more seriously (Lopez-Calva and 
Székely, 2006). HDI measurement could be a more complete way to measure well-being, 
being fully consistent with CTMP and CONEVAL measurement of poverty, but that 
issue, which entitles a methodological discussion of Sen’s work, will be tackled in 
chapter 7, on the issue of inequality and the capability approach. 
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66   Poverty and Inequality in Mexico: Some Theory, History, and Empirical 
Testing. 
 
6.1 Abstract. 
 
Recently, the study of income distribution in Mexico has been revived. The study 
of income inequality was put aside for years because of the influence of certain literature. 
During the 90’s, it was claimed an ambiguous relationship between inequality and 
poverty, therefore, the consideration of inequality was not seen as another dimension of 
human deprivation. Because of this reason, the assessment of welfare was mainly 
centered on poverty measurement on the following decade, with the inclusion of some of 
the capability approach concepts. Now in the Mexican literature, there are serious 
concerns about the inclusion of distributive considerations in the human welfare 
measurement. This chapter gives some insights on the historical, theoretical, and 
empirical reasons to support a clear unambiguous connection between the indicators of 
inequality with other measures of welfare. So the study of inequality as an important 
aspect of welfare should continue. The empirical part includes a regional assessment with 
various correlations checks. It is acknowledged household heterogeneity with the use of 
equivalence scales. The empirical part sheds light in regards to the proposed positive 
relationship of inequality and other measures of destitution. 
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6.2 Introduction. 
 
The study of poverty and inequality, as a measurement of welfare, was revived 
following the publication of to the seminal contribution of Sen (1976) and Atkinson 
(1970), which stimulated research that proposed certain types of measurements with 
several properties, some of which are still being investigated. The new perspectives, due 
to these authors, influenced policy changes in several countries, as the old fashioned 
poverty measurement used to be focused only using the headcount ratio and the 
discussion in this regards used to be about the absolute or relative nature of poverty. 
Inequality measurement also changed. Inequality used to be calculated using common 
arbitrarily selected deciles, it was measured using statistical tools to measure the 
dispersion of the income distribution, or it was mostly calculated with such ad-hoc 
measures as the Gini coefficient. That tradition started to change later on with a variety of 
new developed measures of poverty and inequality. 
During the middle 80’s, the theoretical relationship of poverty and inequality was 
discussed through a tool named ‘stochastic dominance’ (Foster and Shorrocks, 1988; 
Atkinson, 1987; among others). The studies of this condition lead to a deeper 
understanding of the (theoretical) relationship between poverty and inequality. Since 
because in order to rank two different distributions, it was known that if the stochastic 
dominance condition holds (approached with certain types of inequality measures and 
their graphical representation), there is no need to check for poverty measures, therefore, 
the dominance condition would be enough to rank two different states of any income 
distribution (Zheng, 2000, p. 443). In the present time, the dominance condition, which is 
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a virtual consideration of inequality, is not always checked when some income 
distribution is considered on the grounds of poverty assessment. It is still the case that 
between measurement of inequality and well-being, usually well-being (poverty and 
human development indicators) has been chosen as the most important topic in the 
discourse of standard of living. However, in recent discussions, not only the discussion 
about definition of the poverty line but the consideration of inequality of income 
distribution is also included, together with the sub-group consistency property and the 
multidimensional nature of well-being.  
The central point of discussion of this chapter focuses on the unambiguous 
relationship of poverty and inequality, being those topics two very important indicators of 
deprivation. For the case of Mexico, that there was an ambiguous relationship between 
poverty and inequality was said (CTMP 2002), and that will be commented in detail later 
on the chapter. This finding is theoretically possible, relaxing the fixed mean income 
condition, but it is against the traditional predictions, something only likely to happen in 
extreme cases of crisis. In spite of the argument that sustained some ambiguity of this 
relationship, using empirical tests will be proved that the relationship of measures of 
inequality and poverty in Mexico holds in strong positive direction, which is consistent 
with the present theory, a finding that is consistent even with some robustness checks as 
well. Because of the nature of deprivation that entails the notion of inequality, it is argued 
that this important side of human well-being should be included in the recent agenda, so 
inequality should be a matter of study on the assessment of well being (e.g. López-Calva 
and Székely, 2006).  
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There is the classic question of why inequality and poverty should be considered 
together. In the case of the Latin American countries, there are various answers, and all of 
them are important. In the macro level, the relationship of poverty and inequality is not 
only positively correlated, but the latter has proven to be countercyclical for the case of 
Mexico (World Bank, 2004, p. xxii; Esquivel et al., 2006, in Lopez-Calva and Székely, 
2006, p. 187). Inequality has also been seen as an obstacle for poverty alleviation: “Even 
with steady growth, poverty reduction tends to be slow, as a consequence of Mexico’s 
high income inequality” (Idem, p. xvii), and not only that, “high inequality of 
opportunities and outcomes reduces the rate of growth itself” (De Ferranti et al. 2004, p. 
24). On the other hand, it is fair to say that in the micro level, the existence of excessively 
high inequality hurts the self-esteem of the low-middle class and the very poor, because 
for them is clearly visible that the problem of their condition is not a lack of resources, 
but a problem of a possible unfair distribution. Therefore, regardless of the people’s poor 
circumstance, high inequality might be a clear (and sufficient) condition for social 
problems. In spite of the clear or unfair perception of inequality, whether inequality is 
perceived as a social deprivation or in some cases as a measurement of ‘social envy’, 145 
in both cases, the uncomfortable feeling attached to any sense of inequality, should be of 
interest for policy makers, because of the possibility of rebellion (Sen, 1973, p. 1). 
 
                                                 
145 The idea of fairness and envy is mentioned in Sen (1987b, p. 1041), where ‘equity’ happens if no one 
wishes to have or preferred a bundle of goods that belongs to other person instead of his own, see 
references therein. See also Simmel (1922) in Coleman (1987, p. 170). 
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••  Overview.  
 
The organization of the chapter is the following: after this short introduction, 
section 6.3 includes some stylized facts about some of the underlying reasons that exist 
behind inequality and poverty, mainly in the context of Latin American countries, in 
particular for the case of Mexico. A very brief theoretical survey of the relationship of 
poverty and inequality follows in section 6.4, mentioning the research about poverty 
orderings. Section 6.5 shows the empirical testing and robustness checks of the main 
claim of this paper, that the relationship of poverty and inequality across regions remains 
unambiguously determined. Finally, section 6.6 has the concluding remarks. 
 
6.3 Traditions and Literature of Inequality and Poverty in Mexico. 
 
Inequality in Latin America is difficult to comprehend without the understanding 
of the historical facts that, five centuries ago, started the tortuous process that allowed the 
European ‘colonizers’ the control of the selected territories. The institutions that were 
sowed instead of the existing organizations were designed in order to exercise control 
over the mass population, composed of indigenous people (whenever not exterminated), 
imported slaves, and a growing sector of interracially mixed population. That control was 
designed to be done by very few in the conquered territory, because of the necessity of 
guarantee the effective transfer of resources from the recently discovered territories to the 
European nations. It has been empirically proved by authors like Angeles (2007) that in 
certain countries, including most of the Latin Americans, inequality was artificially 
227 
raised, such that “…colonialism brought into the country an amount of European settlers 
whose number was considerable but still inferior to that of the local population. This 
minority was able to concentrate most of the countries’ income in their hands, mainly by 
excluding the rest of the population from owning land or mining resources” (p. 1173). 
That form of organization was prevalent by near to 300 years, when later on, most of the 
Latin American societies gained independence. However, two hundred years after the 
independence, that rooted form of organization is still prevalent in our society, and 
because of that, it might be perceived as normal, it has been there for a long period of 
time, and some people had possibly become used to it. For the superficial observer, it 
might be clear that the present institutions, but not the historical reasons, are usually 
responsible for the persistent inequality in Latin America (De Ferranti et al. 2004, p. 
109). But it is necessary to consider not only the present but also previous facts that 
enhanced inequality, so the phenomena might be better understood. 
There had been a speculation of why it is the case that inequality in Latin America 
has not been studied in depth in economic science. The lack of people’s proper education 
has been held responsible for the lack of interest in inequality assessment. The acquisition 
of the model of import-substitution that isolated those countries from the rest of the world 
has been mentioned as another explanation, but there are not sufficient grounds in order 
to affirm categorically which issue is responsible for the improper study of inequality (De 
Ferranti et al. 2004, 121). If we take as the truth that there exist institutions that still 
follow the colonial mode, that the study of inequality would be uncomfortable for the 
ruling class might also be said, and a very popular topic in the research agenda might not 
be. Nowadays, there might be a problem in Latin countries due to the (financial) control 
228 
of the most important institutions by groups of very few families. Moreover, a reduced 
number of these families have been mentioned elsewhere (it can be seen Haggard et al. 
1993), such that they exercise control to the most strategic institutions in the country. 
 
 I Traditions in Inequality Measurement 
 
In regards to the traditions of measurement of welfare in Mexico, it can be said 
that one of these traditions has been related with the definition of the poverty line, but not 
as a matter of relative or absolute value, but as a matter of the definition of the basic 
basket of goods.146 This discussion is still prevalent in recent publications (Székely, 2005, 
ch. 11 & 12). 147 Mexican literature has seldom questioned the absolute character of this 
definition. It is said that “in this part are taken into account several theoretical and 
methodological aspects that is convenient to take into account in order to define a poverty 
line that is measured from a certain basic basket of necessary goods.” (CTMP, 2002, p. 
35, translated from the original). This issue left out any discussion about the possible 
relativity of the poverty line, which is common to consider in certain European countries 
or others like Canada. This chapter does not argue in favor of a relative definition of the 
poverty line, it just mentions that the inequality consideration embedded in the 
measurement of relative poverty, is not considered in the Mexican case. 
In relation to the above paragraph, we can suspect that this ignored relativity of 
the poverty measurement might be connected to the inherent relative concept of 
                                                 
146 See the references in the note 17, CTMP (2002, p. 36). 
147 The discussion is related with the equivalence of scales that are present in the household, the update that 
is needed in the composition of the goods that are part of the basic basket, and the definition of the non 
alimentary goods. (Szekely, 2005, pp 29-30). 
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inequality, and that might be the reason why the concept of inequality has not been 
studied in depth. For the common policy maker, it might be blurred the definition of 
‘inequality’ with ‘relative poverty’. The methodological implications of these two 
different challenges invite philosophical discussions as well.148 On the one hand, relative 
poverty does measure welfare, using as a benchmark a changing poverty line. In this case, 
the poverty line can be a fraction of the median of the income, or other arbitrarily 
predefined value that is usually related to some endogenous characteristic of the 
population. The relative poverty measurement indicates more deprivation if the 
distribution of the population is more unequal, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, income 
inequality is a comparison of each member of the community in regards to the income of 
other peoples [within the group], and it might be a comparison of a person’s income with 
every member of the community, regardless of the sufficient or insufficient satisfaction of 
their needs.149 Having those two distinct concepts in mind, it can be clear that inequality 
measurement is not only a comparison of the personal income with the average income of 
the population, as the relative poverty measure does, but a different type of deprivation 
that might hurt the feeling of the population, mostly of the very poor. 
 
 II The ‘ambiguous’ relationship of Poverty and Inequality 
 
Some of the papers that studied income inequality in Mexico affirmed that the 
relationship between inequality and poverty is ambiguous. Almost all the papers that 
                                                 
148 The relative dimension of poverty, is understood differently by sociologist than economists, see the Sen-
Townsend issue in Foster and Sen (1997, p. 184, n. 107), and the references therein. 
149 See the topic of a third degree stochastic dominance in chapter 2, where inequality assessment might be 
equivalent to poverty measurement with distributional sensitiveness. 
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affirmed this issue, took the study published in 1991 by Cortés and Rubalcava. In that 
publication, it was a finding that during a special period of crisis, during the 80’s, a 
poverty increment was observed while the opposite was happening to the level of 
inequality (CTMP, 2000, p. 20). Some authors were conservative in order to assert such a 
thing. For instance, Boltvinik (1989) only showed that poverty increased during the 
mentioned period. In the case of Hernandez-Laos (1991) and INEGI-SPP (in Tuirán, 
1992), they estimated and confirmed that inequality remained virtually unchanged during 
the period near before and after the crisis of 1984. Cortés and Rubalcava maintained that 
this result was due to some particular behavior of householders that attempted to offset 
their losses during the period of crisis (1991, pp. 11 & 21).  
This result might not be particularly interesting, but it is remarkable because of 
the fact that such study was used by the Mexican official committee of poverty 
measurement (CTMP) in order to support the idea that, as a matter of study, only poverty 
should be the prevalent concept of study of true well-being. In favor of an ‘awkward’ 
relationship between inequality and true well-being was argued. The following was said: 
“[a]n increase in poverty does not necessarily imply higher inequality when the income of 
the poor diminishes, neither an increase in inequality implies necessarily a higher level of 
poverty” (CTMP, 2002, p. 20, translated from the original). It was argued in a persuasive 
way that this relationship could be possible due to a higher dispersion of the income 
distribution of the non poor. Our research argue that it was overstated the basic claim of 
Cortés and Rubalcava. They did not claim a general thing (1991, pp. 26 & 34), as the 
CTMP emphasized. That might be the reason why, virtually all the study of inequality, in 
regards to the assessment of well-being was taken as a secondary topic in the Mexican 
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literature. Important theoretical and empirical relationships among inequality, poverty, 
and overall welfare seems to be ignored.  
In detail, the study of Cortés and Rubalcava covered an important period between 
the years of 1977 through 1984. They tried to explain the adverse scenario of Mexico in a 
particular time of crisis, which ended with large currency devaluation in 1982. This 
scenario was responsible for a generalized decrease of well-being. The deep study of 
Cortés and Rubalcava claimed a consistent, but a very small inequality reduction while 
headcount poverty was increasing (1991, pp. 26 & 34). This finding was possible, 
according to them, through the offset of losses of the poor people with alternative labor 
supply (e.g. female and children labor), rent of assets and through the transfer of 
resources coming from social networks (Idem., p. 25). The intuition to support this 
empirical finding came from the sociological literature of that time (Idem., pp. 25 & 60). 
It is fair to assert that all our remarks about this study need to be placed on the right 
temporal context. At that time, there were a variety of methodological ways to do the 
measurement of welfare, and even the most basic poverty measurement was done 
differently by different authors (CTMP, 2002; Cortés and Rubalcava, 1991, pp. 88, 118). 
Cortés and Rubalcava explored inequality differences using a very basic statistical 
measurement of dispersion, which is the variance as a measure of inequality. Even though 
the narrative arguments there were rather convincing, those were empirically weak. They 
faced both data limitations because they only account with aggregated data, and also they 
have limitations because of the use of primitive tools to measure inequality, besides some 
inconvenient technical decisions in the assessment of the distribution. These three issues 
will be commented below. 
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Cortés and Rubalcava decided for some technical issues, as it was the use of the 
variance as a measure of inequality. They pointed out the difficulty to use the Gini 
coefficient as a reliable source (Cortés and Rubalcava, 1991, p. 35). Considering their 
decisions, there are various critiques in order to use the variance as a measure of 
inequality because of measurement error. It is true that the measure of the variance 
satisfies the Pigou-Dalton condition, where any transfer from the poorer person to a 
richer person always shows an increase of the level of inequality, but the variance has the 
problem of being attached to the mean income level (Sen, 1973, p. 27). In Mexico, the 
mean income was changing drastically during the period of crisis in 1982 because of the 
huge devaluation.150 So, at first glance, it seems to be dangerous to draw conclusions on 
the basis of a measure of inequality using the variance alone, more so if the weakness of 
that inequality measure relies in a condition that was changing heavily in that period. In 
order to alleviate that weakness, Cortés and Rubalcava said they checked for the next 
measure independent of the mean income, which is the coefficient of variation (1991, 
Appendix II, p. 168). They claimed a similarity of the results with those achieved by 
using the variance. But again, they were relying only on aggregate data and only 
accounting for the rate of inflation using national price deflator, not a regional price 
deflator (Idem., pp. 24, 120 & 169). The pervasive effect of the devaluation was 
progressive, and not all the regions were affected in the same way (Bank of Mexico, 
2006). Our claim is that a regional price consideration should be performed. 151 On the 
other hand, even if we consider that the coefficient of variation measurement was done in 
a proper way, we find a particular flaw of this measure that attaches the same weight to 
                                                 
150 The exchange rate at the beginning of 1982 was 1 dollar for 26.79 pesos. At the end of the same year, 
the same dollar cost 150.00 pesos, almost four times its value (Cortés and Rubalcava, 1991, p. 14).  
151 In chapter 4 was shown that inequality measurement is sensitive to the consideration of regional prices. 
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transfers, irrespective of the different income level where this transfer takes place (Sen, 
1973, p. 28). Cortés and Rubalcava were relying on this type of measure in order to 
assess differences on each distributional level (1991, pp. 58-83); where the issue in 
dispute is precisely the awkward relationship of high poverty with the supposedly less 
unequal distribution across the different income levels, such a methodological constraint 
of weight of transfers should not be ignored. 
Considering their methodological decision, they could use other type of measures, 
particularly those that applied a transformation that highlight the differences at the lower 
end of the scale. The standard deviation of logarithms measure or the Theil index satisfies 
that condition (Sen, 1973, p. 29), but they were constrained by the data available to them 
(Cortés and Rubalcava, 1991, pp. 70, 91 & 114). On the other hand, they took as given 
other thing, which is the common assumption about the independence of the measure to a 
changing population, known as the symmetry axiom for population (Sen, 1973, p. 59), 
which allows the comparability of two income distributions with different number of 
individuals in two different periods of time. During that period, even though they were 
suspecting that some out-migration was taking place (Cortés and Rubalcava, 1991, pp. 
79, 85 & 86), they did not perform a robustness check for this condition. The real 
dimension of the problem was not known, where millions of Mexicans were traveling and 
establishing themselves in the US (Massey and Espinosa, 1997; among others). So in that 
case, that assumption of independence of population was also in fact violated. 
It was mentioned above that Cortés and Rubalcava did not use the Gini coefficient 
as a measure of inequality, they pointed out that Gini coefficient is not population sub-
group consistent (Cortés and Rubalcava, 1991, p. 35). We think that the real reason was 
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that the data constraint did not allow them to measure inequality using this method. 
Because of the same data constraint, they could not use a tool that satisfies the condition 
of population sub-group consistency neither, as it could be any of the indices of the 
Entropy family. Giving the fact that they reject the Gini coefficient as a reliable source of 
measure, it is curious to notice that they use the Gini measurement from other authors in 
order to support their claim that inequality was decreased, or at least not increased (Idem., 
p. 112). They did not perform robustness checks on those Gini levels, as it is common to 
do using bootstrap techniques and measuring standard errors; neither have they 
mentioned any use of stochastic dominance. Because of data constraint, they could not 
apply equivalence scales neither, so all the measurement was done using only the 
aggregates that came from household totals (Idem., p. 46); we do not know if they 
considered either per-capita income or household aggregates. 
Finally, they made some assumptions in order to explain the measurement error 
that comes from underreported and misreported income. They were aware of the highly 
misreported data (Idem., pp. 47 & 68). On the one hand, they recognize the misreported 
income from the poorest people, and they acknowledge this error with various researches 
(Idem., p. 25). They in fact recognize a huge increase on informal activities that could 
just increase the measurement error (Idem., p. 89). On the other hand, they claimed that 
high income classes were unable to behave in the same way for their own benefit as a 
reaction of the crisis. That rich people were insensitive to their own deprivation is 
particularly problematic to believe. At that time, rich people were investing in financial 
assets at that time, and corruption was taking place during this chaos. We suspect that 
those activities will not be reported or captured in a survey in any way. In spite of this, 
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Cortés and Rubalcava claimed that the underreported income should be proportionally the 
same in the two different periods of time, before and after the crisis (Idem., p. 26, n. 15). 
It is our claim that they in fact were analyzing two different objects with the same 
microscope, assuming that only the poor people changed their behavior from 1977 to 
1984. 
In spite of Cortés and Rubalcava finding, that of the negative relationship of 
poverty and inequality, the next section will show why this ‘ambiguous’ finding, even 
though is theoretically possible in extreme cases, it might be particularly difficult to 
prove, as it was explained above. It will be made a theoretical a review and we will see if 
the ambiguous argument could have a proper support. 
 
6.4 Theoretical relationship of poverty and inequality. 
 
In the following section is mentioned briefly about three known reasons in order 
to say that, at least theoretically, poverty and inequality should be related with 
unambiguous direction, holding the mean income constant. Using the standard definitions 
in this subject, a clear connection between those two indicators of deprivation has been 
shown, For instance, proposed in 1973, Sen’s poverty measure accounts with a 
connection among a headcount ratio, a poverty gap, and certain inequality measure; in 
this setting, poverty increases as inequality increases. Later on, one of the indices that 
belong to the family of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) poverty measures includes a 
(sub-group consistent) relationship of inequality and poverty that is evident. The 
literature that also enlighten the unambiguous relationship of poverty and inequality is 
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about the ‘poverty orderings’, developed by Foster and Shorrocks (1988). These three 
discussions will be briefly mentioned. 
In order to discuss the issue, some notations will be introduced. Let y be the 
vector of personal incomes for the community as a whole, so ],,[ ,21 nyyyy …= , where n 
is the number of people in the community. The average overall level of income isµ , such 
that∑ . The average level of income for the poor population 
=
=
n
i
i ny
1
µ pµ is analogously 
defined
1
q
i
i
y q pµ
=
=∑ . Let be z the defined poverty line (it is convenient to assume 
that ). The number of the poor q represents people who have fallen below the 
poverty line z, so . The headcount ratio H, as a first measure of poverty, is 
simply q/n. The intensity of the poor person’s poverty can be measured by the extent of 
the gap between the poverty line z and the person’s income
++∈Rz
),( zyqq =
)( ii yzg −= . The income-gap 
ratio became zz p /)( µ−=Ι ,152 which is a widely used measure of poverty and reflects 
the share that the average shortfall of the incomes of the poor departed from the 
predefined poverty line z. 
a) Lets us consider first the definition of poverty according to Sen (1973; 1976; 
also in Foster and Sen, 1997). Going beyond the simple measures of poverty, such as H 
and , that only capture respectively the number of the poor and some idea of departure 
from the poverty line, an ideal poverty measure might include not only these properties, 
but also a sense of inequality of the income distribution of the community. Sen argued 
Ι
                                                 
152 Please note the difference of the Greek letter Ι , which means the income-gap ratio, with the letter I , 
which is used later on as a generalization of any inequality measure. Gini coefficient can be described 
interchangeably as G or as GI . 
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that a proper poverty measure should be distribution sensitive (Foster and Sen, 1997, p. 
170). Starting with an absolute poverty line, and stating basic intuitive axioms, such as 
ordinal ranking weights, monotonic welfare and a normalized poverty value (Sen, 1982, 
p. 378), the proposed measure of poverty, named S, became (asymptotically) the 
following: 
(1 ) pS H H G= Ι + − Ι  
This population invariance measure shows an unambiguous positive contribution 
of inequality to the overall measure of poverty if the mean income remains constant, 
given by the Gini coefficient of the poor . It is important to note that the Gini 
coefficient was not artificially imposed on the S measure, but it was a consequential 
implication of one of the axioms that were intuitively invoked, giving a proportional 
higher weight to the person’s income with larger distance from the poverty line (Sen, 
1982, pp. 376-379; Foster and Sen, 1997, p. 171). Thus, the community with more 
unequal distribution (higher G) shall be considered poorer (higher S). The critique of this 
measure by Shorrocks (1995) focused on other aspects of the measure, but not in the sign 
of this relationship,
pG
153  which remains positive. With some small rearrangement 
( ), it can be made clear that the poverty measure attaches bigger 
importance to inequality when the income-gap ratio is small, with small emphasis on 
inequality as the income-gap becomes bigger. That would be the reason why it might be 
believed that the measurement of inequality might be ambiguous with the measurement 
))1(( pp GGHS +−Ι⋅=
                                                 
153 This measure, and also its generalization (by Blackorby and Donaldson, 1980b), might violate the very 
basic Pigou-Dalton condition, not only the sub-group consistency, as was discussed by Shorrocks (1995) 
(see also Foster and Sen, 1997, p. 169). 
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of poverty. The fact that this relationship is not linear, does not hide the fact that the 
relationship is unambiguously positive, if the mean income remains constant.154
b) As a second issue, in other theoretical development in the measurement of 
poverty, there is other set of poverty measures showing also a positive relationship 
between inequality and poverty. It is the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) family of 
poverty measures  , which are defined in the following way:  αP
1
1( , ) ( )
q
i
i
gP y z
n z
α
α
=
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ for 0≥α  
The connection between poverty and inequality is not straightforward for the first 
two poverty indices of this family, because  is only equivalent to the headcount ratio 
(H), and that is the same as
0P
1P H ⋅ Ι , it captures only the intensity of poverty but not of 
inequality. On the other hand, that  can be expressed in relation to a measure of 
inequality can be shown, and this is consistent with the fact that this measure of poverty 
is transfer sensitive (Foster et al., 1984, p. 763; Foster and Sen, 1997, p. 179). Being  
the square of the coefficient of variation, which is a well known measure of inequality,
2P
2
pC
155 
 could be rewritten as follows: 2P
])1([ 2222 pCHP Ι−+Ι=  
This measure shows the same theoretical implications of S. In any case, the 
relationship of inequality and poverty remains always positive, holding the mean income 
                                                 
)2p
154 The only exception for this could be a very strong change of I, either in the definition of the poverty line, 
or in a change of the mean income, but we assume both are fixed.  
155 The squared coefficient of variation of the poor (2 2
1
( ) /
q
p i p
i
C y qµ µ
=
= −∑ , is the measure of 
inequality, when n andµ are substituted for q and pµ respectively (Foster et al., 1984, p. 762). 
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constant. The effect of inequality on poverty becomes stronger when the income-gap ratio 
is small, loosing its meaning when this gap increases.156
c) The third issue that is related with the link between poverty and inequality, it is 
the relation of the poverty indices just presented above with the distributional judgment 
embedded in the stochastic dominance. The theoretical connection of  measures with 
distributional judgments has been discussed in the ground of the ‘poverty orderings’. It 
was said that “[o]ne interesting finding of this line of enquiry is that the two conceptually 
distinct forms of [variable-line and variable-measure] poverty orderings are closely 
related, and link up with other well-known quasi-orderings such as the stochastic 
dominance relations…. Consequently, this general approach to measurement is a 
significant unifying theme across welfare, inequality, and poverty measurement” (Foster 
and Sen, 1997, p. 188, [comments added]). Using a more general way to rank different 
distributions, the stochastic dominance criterion relaxes the completeness of the ranking 
that is usually provided by most of the inequality measures. Stochastic dominance is a 
weaker way to provide a ranking between a pair of income distributions, assuming less 
restrictive properties that are usually attached to traditional inequality measures (Sen, 
1973, p. 47-48). The stochastic dominance relationship can usually be verified (in the 
second degree) with the Generalized Lorenz dominance criterion, in order to present 
consistent results of ranking of distributions. Defining 
αP
α  as the n-degree of the stochastic 
                                                 
156 is a measure of inequality that is also sub-group consistent, because it can be derived from the 
Entropy family of indices, being a multiple of the coefficient of variation  (Foster and Sen, 1997, p. 
140). 
2C
2I
2C
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dominance relation ( ),αD
157 and using the family of poverty measures ( ) to compare 
any two income distributions (x and y), the basic theorem of Foster and Shorrocks (1988, 
Proposition 1, p. 175) stated the following: 
αP
x y if and only if x y, for )(zPα αD 0≥α , and .0≥z 158
 This means that if we have a clear (non-intersecting) inequality relationship 
provided by the ranking of stochastic dominance ( ) of two distributions, that will 
imply that the poverty ranking ( ) that applies to the same distributions should be 
equivalent to that stochastic dominance ranking, regardless the definition of the poverty 
line z, whether those distributions are two regions in the country, or the same region in 
two different periods of time (Foster and Sen, 1997, pp. 188-191). In some cases non-
intersecting relationships are not always present, that is known, but for the case of 
Mexico, during the period correspondent to 1991-2003, the stochastic dominance 
condition holds in general at national level.
αD
)(zPα
159 So in the presence of stochastic dominance, 
the ranking relationship of the compared distributions in regards of poverty and 
                                                 
157 The dominance relation is the first degree stochastic dominance, and implies unanimity for all 
symmetric, population-invariant, and monotonically increasing welfare functions, it is also called quantile 
comparison (Dutta 2002, p. 608). The second degree stochastic dominance ( ) add it up the Pigou-
Dalton transfer condition (equivalent to the Generalized Lorenz dominance), and finally , which is the 
third degree stochastic dominance relation, includes ‘transfer sensitivity’, which attaches greater 
importance to the transfers at the lower level of the distribution, in other words, is ‘poor sensitive’ (Foster 
and Shorrocks, 1988, p. 176; Foster and Sen, 1997, pp. 137-138; Cowell, 2000, pp. 102-103). 
0D
1D
2D
158 Is defined that x y (distribution x is unambiguously less poor than y) if and only if 
x  for all 
)(zPα
),(),( zyPzxP αα ≤ Zz∈  and ),(),( zyPzxP αα < for some Zz∈ . For some implications 
of this theorem see Zheng (2000, p. 434-6). 
159 The author checked for second degree stochastic dominance with the plot of Lorenz curves for selected 
years at a country level in chapter 4. The relationship became more clear when it was applied the 
generalized dominance criteria, which is the Lorenz curved scaled by the mean income. This relationship 
holds both at individual and at household level.  
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inequality remains unambiguous, and we can not deny the theoretical relationship of less-
poverty being equal to less-inequality. 
 
The points a) to c) are rather important, so any apparent deviation of the 
traditional setting must be considered in this regards in advance to assess the ambiguity 
of inequality and poverty.  There might be a violation of some of the axioms embedded in 
the measurement indices, or an extreme change in the mean income of the population, as 
is our hypothesis that it happened for the case of Mexico, when in certain periods of 
crisis, the income of the people was seriously affected. 
 
6.5 Data and Empirical Testing. 
 
A data set with household characteristics for the year 2003, with close to a half 
million records, is used (ENE-INEGI, details in chapter 4); includes both urban and rural 
areas. Some general characteristic of the indicators of the 749 available municipalities are 
shown in Table 6-1, and the regional coverage in Figure 6-1.  
 
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Mean inc. (µ) 1230.82 593.41 20.97 3499.40
Mean inc. (poor) 232.41 78.15 0.00 617.31
P0 0.338 0.204 0.021 1.000
P1 0.202 0.150 0.006 0.955
P2 0.160 0.125 0.000 0.915
Gini 0.424 0.070 0.083 0.724
Theil 0.344 0.136 0.030 1.296
(n=749)
2003. Based on per capita income. Own calculations.  
Table 6-1.  Main variables for correlation checks, (ENE-INEGI),  2003. 
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Figure 6-1. Survey Coverage, 2003. 
 
In regards to the data set, it might be noticed that there is clear heterogeneity 
among the explored communities explored, for that it will be easy to recall that our Gini 
and Poverty estimates are different across the country. The minimum value of a Gini 
estimate is about 0.083, while the maximum is about 0.724, the degree of variability is 
similar for poverty measurements. Our estimates for poverty (Table 6-2), at a national 
level, are consistent with the literature on official poverty measurement (CTMP, 2002 
and Teruel et al. 2005). There is an understandable variability in the measures, due to the 
fact that our estimates come from an income-based survey, and not from a consumption-
based survey. Our estimates of national poverty in our segment (H), without any 
equivalence scales, are around 33%, which is sensibly bigger than the official one for 
2002, which is 24.1% (Teruel et al. 2005, p. 34). But that can be explained by the normal 
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underreported income in higher deciles in income-surveys, and also the fact that we are 
including families with zero income. The similarity of our data when is considered 
equivalence scales is also shown, because the consideration of equivalence scales reduce 
the poverty measure by 10% on the official results, and our estimates reduce the ratio by 
8.6%. Equivalized income will be used in order to make robustness checks.  
 
Non equivalized income W/equivalizing methods W/equivalizing methods
P0 (Engel method) (Parametric Method)
(H), Official, 2002 0.241 0.140 N.A.
(H) Our results, 2003 0.338 0.252 0.217
Sources: CTMP (2003), Teruel et al (2005) and Own calculations  
Table 6-2. Comparison of Poverty measurement, different sources. 
 
Before going to some of the results, it should be explained the choice of the 
poverty and inequality variables. It was chosen for poverty measure  , which is the 
headcount ratio calculated in an absolute way. For inequality measure was chosen 
primarily the Gini coefficient ( ). Even though our theoretical insights show a 
relationship between the Coefficient of Variation ( ), and the poverty measure ( ), it 
might be argued that it is a clear mechanical account and therefore a resultant 
endogeneity if those indicators are used for empirical testing. We want to make sure that 
our findings are not based on mechanical accounts of those measures of inequality and 
poverty, so our measures are not endogenous estimates. The results will explain if the 
measures that are not related in theory show some relationship. The measures that are not 
related in theory are the poverty headcount ratio and the Gini coefficient. The poverty 
measure  and the Theil Index ( ) were used as a comparison (results not shown but 
0P
GI
2C 2P
2P 1I
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available upon request), but the general results are mostly based on the previous 
measures. 
The hypothesis that our estimates per community will show a positive relationship 
between poverty and inequality is tested, so if this is not true, we should expect a 
correlation coefficient between the associated indicators close to zero. A covariance 
relationship is not used because of the possible problem with the interpretation of the 
units of measure. Instead, a correlation coefficient that accounts with weights in regards 
of the population size is used. In the same way, in order to clear any doubt in our results 
about the cardinality of our tests, we drop any assumption about linearity in the 
correlation test, using the Spearman rank correlation coefficient. The null hypothesis is 
that the ranks of one of the variables do not covary with the ranks of the other; in other 
words, as the ranks of one variable tend to increase, the ranks of the other variable are not 
more likely to increase or decrease. The same as the traditional correlation coefficient, the 
possible values of this test go from -1 to 1.  
 
 I Main results. 
 
There are various findings in our Table 6-3, which is a set of different correlation 
checks; the upper part is traditional correlation coefficients while the lower part is the 
correlation coefficients using the Spearman method. We can follow our result of interest, 
which is the relationship of  with our measure of Gini coefficients. Our estimated 
results of inequality and poverty are working as it is theoretically predicted (.518), having 
a clear positive relationship not only when it is considered for the national sample, but 
0P
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also when the urban (.155) and rural (.613) municipalities are treated separately. This 
relationship is stronger for the rural areas, which suggests that in rural communities there 
is a stronger correlation between deprivation and inequality.160 The relationship runs in 
the same direction when the other measure of poverty ( ) is considered (.577). The 
Spearman test made our results robust, because in all cases it shows similar findings, with 
only some changes in the size of the coefficients of the positive relationship. In almost all 
cases, the results are statistically significant at 99% percent level. Therefore, we reject the 
null hypothesis that the rankings of the inequality measures do not covary with the ranks 
of the poverty measures.
2P
161
Having also the mean income variable, which is also presented in the same table, 
we checked correlation estimates against the other variables, first, with the measures of 
poverty (  and ).  A strong negative relationship between the mean income (0P 2P µ ) and 
both poverty measures is clear at a national level. This is consistent with our findings, 
because if the relationship of poverty and inequality is positive, we would expect that 
both inequality and poverty behaves more or less the same with the mean income. 
Consistent with the findings for other Latin American countries, it is noticed that the 
mean income is negatively related with Inequality in the rural areas, and positively 
related in the urban areas, but the overall relation of the mean income with inequality is 
negative. The explanation for this different behavior of the mean income with inequality 
measures between urban and rural areas might be interesting to explore in future research. 
 
                                                 
160 Knowing that in other regions of the world the facts prove to be totally the opposite, for the intuition of 
this strange behavior see the particular case of Mexico in section 8.3 II, This behavior might be generalized 
to rural communities in Latin American countries. 
161 Our analysis is strong even using other type of inequality measures. It was tested the Theil index, and in 
all cases, both the significance and the positive estimated results remained with the same sign. 
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Different Correlation Coefficients of Poverty,Inequality levels and mean income (2003)
National Urban Rural
µ P0 P2 µ P0 P2 µ P0 P2
Correlation P0 -0.789 -0.655 -0.872
Coefficient P2 -0.626 0.897 -0.335 0.770 -0.732 0.902
Gini -0.109 0.518 0.577 0.464 0.155 0.294 -0.334 0.613 0.651
Spearman P0 -0.8745* -0.8075* -0.9162*
Correlation P2 -0.7230* 0.8347* -0.4191* 0.6722* -0.7821* 0.8721*
(ranks) Gini -0.2476* 0.4965* 0.5514* 0.4422* 0.004 0.2885* -0.3724* 0.6027* 0.5982*
n= 749 n=203 n=595
* Significant at 99% level. Own calculations  
Table 6-3.  Traditional correlation coefficients with the Spearman Test (2003). 
 
 II Robustness checks. 
 
As a second check to our estimates, we suspect that there might be some 
measurement errors, due to the calculation of the measures just in terms of the per capita 
income of the households, without any consideration for weights when the family 
composition is diverse or without assuming any economy of scales within them. On the 
one hand, per capita income provides identical value for the adults, females and children; 
in this simple approach, the usual way to compensate for family composition is to divide 
the total household expenditure among the number of people within the household, and 
then, this per capita compensated expenditure is carried on for poverty and inequality 
computations. The weakness of the per capita income approach is such that it does not 
recognize individual heterogeneity within the households. This approach implicitly 
assumes that the male family members consume the same as the female members, and 
also that the adults have quite similar tastes to that of the children. Considering just the 
per capita expenditure, “it also fails to recognize the fact that not everyone in the 
household is the same and has the same needs … it is true that children consume special 
goods, they surely require less of most things than do adults.” (Deaton, 1997, p. 241). On 
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the other hand, not only the weight to family members is important, but also the presence 
of economies of scales in bigger households.162 And if those economies of scales are not 
included, we might be ignoring the fact that it is usually cheaper, in per capita terms, to 
maintain a household with many individuals rather than a household with fewer of them, 
all things remaining the same. This can be explained by the presence of ‘public’ goods 
within the households. 
In order to get rid of the possible error due to the use of the per capita income 
method, and also trying to acknowledge any variability in the family composition of the 
regions in Mexico, we use two ways to perform this scale equivalence. The parametric 
formula proposed by the National Research Council is used first (in Deaton and Zaidi, 
2002, Chapter 5; NRC, 1995). In order to compensate for the economies of scale and 
family composition, children are assigned a weight of 0.7 (α ), and economies of scale 
with a value of 0.75 (θ ). In second instance, and for the particular composition of 
Mexican households, the estimates of Teruel et al. (2005) according to the Engel method 
are considered, including economy of scale and without making a difference between the 
males and the females, because in their case the difference was not statistically 
significant.163  
The newer results provided after the consideration of equivalence scales, available 
in Table 6-4, they show the same direction of the coefficients (.600 and .563 using 
equivalized income methods). The economic significance, given by the size of the 
coefficients, does emphasize the relationships between poverty and inequality at all 
national, rural and urban level. The Spearman correlation test (in the Appendix 6.7 I) was 
                                                 
162 In chapter 7 is discussed the different methods and some of the implications of using equivalence scales. 
163 Teruel et al. (2005, p. 22). Engel method with economy of scales, children 0-12=.65, young 13-18=.61, 
and adults 19 and up =.82.  
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also checked and it shows similar stronger results, even the correlation between Gini 
coefficient and on the urban area, which in the previous Spearman table was not 
significant, it gets significance in the same direction.  
0P
 
Correlation coefficients, different equivalizing methods. Poverty and Inequality levels with mean income (2003)
National Urban Rural
µ P0 P2 µ P0 P2 µ P0 P2
Per capita P0 -0.789 -0.655 -0.872
income P2 -0.626 0.897 -0.335 0.770 -0.732 0.902
(Not Equivalized) Gini -0.109 0.518 0.577 0.464 0.155 0.294 -0.334 0.613 0.651
Equivalized Inc. P0 -0.694 -0.438 -0.787
Param. Method. P2 -0.529 0.904 -0.265 0.932 -0.656 0.914
(α=.7, θ=.75) Gini -0.159 0.600 0.558 0.413 0.311 0.296 -0.363 0.666 0.621
Equivalized Inc. P0 -0.739 -0.532 -0.825
Engel Method P2 -0.569 0.902 -0.288 0.887 -0.684 0.907
(Teruel et. al) Gini -0.124 0.563 0.571 0.443 0.263 0.308 -0.340 0.643 0.637
n= 749 n=206 n=599
Own calculations  
Table 6-4.  Robust checks, correlation coefficients with equivalized income. 
 
6.6 Concluding Remarks. 
 
In regards to the theory and the empirical tests presented, it is argued that the 
recent agenda should include a careful study of the relationship of poverty and income 
distribution in Mexico. Findings that gave contradictory results must be revisited. On the 
one hand, the possible causes behind these ambiguous relationships between poverty and 
inequality might not hold anymore. The argument of this paper is that it is not convenient 
to generalize very strongly the apparently ambiguous relationships, because of the 
possible contamination of the data set used. This data set could have been contaminated 
by the prevalent scenario of crisis at that time. The fact that the people’s income was 
changing drastically during that period of crisis was not totally understood, neither was 
understood that the composition of the country’s population was changing importantly. 
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This last concern was mainly due to the huge out-migration of nationals to the US. On the 
other hand, the tools available for the researcher nowadays are better, and the simple 
comparison of inequality only in regards to certain types of indices without disaggregated 
data might be misleading. The results of this paper show that inequality is related 
unambiguously with other type of deprivations, as it was the case with the various 
calculations of poverty. Now the scenario is different, and conditions at present time are 
more stable. That would enable the researchers to look into this relationship more 
carefully. For next research, it might be tested this relationship using time series data; 
because the available data set allowed us to do our regional level estimations only using 
cross sectional data. 
 
6.7 Appendix. 
 
 I Tables. 
 
Spearman Correlation Ranking, different equivalizing methods. Poverty and Inequality levels with mean income (2003)
National Urban Rural
µ P0 P2 µ P0 P2 µ P0 P2
Per capita P0 -0.8745* -0.8075* -0.9162*
income P2 -0.7230* 0.8347* -0.4191* 0.6722* -0.7821* 0.8721*
(Not Equivalized) Gini -0.2476* 0.4965* 0.5514* 0.4422* 0.004 0.2885* -0.3724* 0.6027* 0.5982*
Equivalized Inc. P0 -0.7865* -0.5477* -0.8362*
Param. Method. P2 -0.6253* 0.8909* -0.2631* 0.8296* -0.6933* 0.9051*
(α=.7, θ=.75) Gini -0.2723* 0.5783* 0.5050* 0.3930* 0.2929* 0.2776* -0.3870* 0.6311* 0.5393*
Equivalized Inc. P0 -0.8338* -0.6508* -0.8746*
Engel Method P2 -0.6559* 0.8577* -0.2977* 0.7532* -0.7231* 0.8808*
(Teruel et. al) Gini -0.2513* 0.5453* 0.5328* 0.4279* 0.1994* 0.3117* -0.3739* 0.6158* 0.5685*
n= 749 n=206 n=599
Own calculations. *=Significant at 99% level.  
Table 6-5.  Robust checks, Spearman correlation coefficients with equivalized 
income. 
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Inequality and the Capability Approach: Functionings, Equivalence Scales and the 
Mexican Literature. 
 
7.1 Abstract. 
 
This chapter explains the Mexican literature in regards to inequality measurement 
in connection with the capability approach. Inequality measurement is methodologically 
related with other types of deprivation measures, just like poverty measurement and 
human development assessment are. Because of the importance of the capability 
approach in recent development literature, the identification of functionings is discussed. 
The inequality concept as a separate form of destitution fits the capability framework, 
both in the original ‘incomplete’ method of Sen that is enlarged by Robeyns, and also in 
the ‘universal’ approach that uses a fixed list of capabilities in the fashion of Nussbaum. 
So inequality indices should be considered as a proper way to assess a capability 
deprivation. In another way, the indirect way to deal with inequality measurement is 
considered with the use of equivalence scales. In the multidimensional setting, the 
Mexican literature has merged a Human Development Index (HDI) with inequality 
considerations, issue that is done through some sort of transfer sensitivity. Rejecting the 
assumption of individual homogeneity, equivalence scales have a variety of methods that 
have been applied in the Mexican literature. That real poverty levels have been 
overestimated applying those scales has been found. Summing up, this is a descriptive 
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analysis that recognizes what has been done, and how the present research compares now 
with the theoretical framework, so what has been possibly misunderstood is highlighted, 
pointing out what can be done about it. 
 
7.2 Introduction. 
 
The different conceptual foundations for the consideration of income distribution 
have affected differently the application to development economics and empirical 
research. For instance, the capability approach of Sen has been very influential in the 
development literature. One important example is the multidimensional measurement of 
deprivation in the first Human Development Report, which is published by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) since 1990. UNDP credited Sen with 
providing the conceptual foundations of this new measurement when he rejected income 
as the sole space for the calculations.165 There are also numerous contributions emerging 
from the capability approach, not only in the development literature, but in the theoretical 
side of this measurement as well, as was surveyed by Robeyns (2005). Another 
conceptual foundation for the assessment of income distribution is the acknowledgment 
of household heterogeneity by the use of equivalence scales, rejecting the measurement 
of homogenous per capita valuations. The inconvenient assumption of individual 
homogeneity, which can be traced to the welfaristic tradition, makes difficult the 
measurement of real deprivation. At least, the equivalence scales research accounts for 
                                                 
165 “The work of Amartya Sen and others provided the conceptual foundation for an alternative and broader 
human development approach defined as a process of enlarging people’s choices and enhancing human 
capabilities (the range of things people can be and do) and freedoms, enabling them to: live a long and 
healthy life, have access to knowledge and a decent standard of living, and participate in the life of their 
community and decisions affecting their lives.” (UNDP, http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/origins/). 
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the differences of needs in regards to gender an age, following the applied 
microeconomic setting. To some degree, both the capability approach and the 
consideration of equivalence of scales do tackle the issue of unequal distribution. 
The Mexican case has not been the exception to the influence of this research. In 
most cases, the literature about poverty measurement, like the research on human 
development, have both included several references to Sen’s work.166 On the other hand 
and to a lesser extent, the literature has also included inequality considerations with the 
estimation of equivalence scales for the particular population of Mexico (Teruel and 
Rubalcava, 2005; Teruel et al., 2005). Taking account of those advances in research, this 
paper will argue that the consideration of income distribution in Mexico has skipped or 
mishandled some of the basic concepts, particularly referring to measurement of 
inequality, and also concerning to some basic concepts of functionings and capabilities. 
However, this might have happened because of the progressive introduction of the new 
methodological concepts in the development literature, as is the case of the capability 
approach. Therefore, it is the aim of this paper to offer an alternative clarification of some 
of the points in the discussion. 
In recent Mexican Literature, the distributional judgment has been introduced in 
the measurement of human development (Foster et al., 2005; Lopez-Calva and Székely, 
2006). The proposed human development measurement has tried to include the 
consideration of inequality, but this issue is presented together with transfer sensitiveness 
in HDI assessments. We need to recall that for the particular case of Mexico, the topic of 
the measurement of inequality was left out for some time, because of the belief during the 
90’s of an ‘ambiguous’ relationship of inequality with other indicators of welfare (Cortés 
                                                 
166  For instance CTMP (2002), Székely (2005), Lopez-Calva and Székely (2006). 
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and Rubalcava, 1991).167 This important consideration of distribution was missing from 
the Mexican literature, and maybe from other Latin American countries as well. On the 
other hand, the capability approach and its theory has been providing the intuition to 
consider other aspects of deprivation, broadening the scope for the study of well-being in 
Latin America, rather than focusing only on the lack of income. This broadened range of 
the space to measure human well-being might be helpful to see to what extent the 
consideration of inequality as a social deprivation is important. 
 
•• 
                                                
 Overview.  
 
This paper will develop 3 insights. The first topic is a theoretical background of 
the capability approach and the use of equivalence scales in regards to income 
distribution, so the definition of (social) inequality is discussed in section 7.3. This 
section includes, on the one hand, the consideration of inequality as a dimension of the 
capability approach in the measurement of well-being (7.3 I). On the other hand, defining 
also social inequality, the natural heterogeneity of the population is considered with the 
use of equivalence scales. The assessment of the distribution in regards to gender and age 
is effectively an indirect way to consider inequality in the empirical literature (7.3 II). In 
section 7.4 is presented the second topic of this paper, which is a brief survey of the 
Mexican literature in the particular topic of income distribution, discussed along with the 
theoretical findings of the previous section, both in the sense of the capability approach 
(7.4 I) and also to the estimation of equivalence scales (7.4 II). The last part, in section 
 
167 This finding is discussed in detail in chapter 6, but the basic claim was that it was possible a less unequal 
distribution with higher poverty levels at the same time. 
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7.5, presents the concluding remarks and some clarifications of different measures of 
inequality and human development for the Mexican case.   
 
7.3 Inequality and Methodological Foundations.  
 
There are various ways to consider deprivation and social inequality in 
economics. The most traditional methods are discussed in chapter 2, such as estimation of 
Gini coefficients, measurement of coefficients of variation, and similar measures. But 
there are other indirect ways to consider inequality as well. For instance, when the 
econometrician ‘controls’ for characteristics, putting those variables in the right hand side 
of the equation, he is assuming that extracting the influence of the covariates will help to 
determine the true meaning of the main independent variable. In that sense, the ‘unequal’ 
characteristics of the covariates, after include these in the equation, they might be helping 
to show the ‘true degree of inequality’ (Shorrocks, 1987, p. 824). Another way to 
consider inequality is to adjust income in such a way that household circumstances, such 
as gender, age, or the number of members of the family are included in the computations; 
this is possible with the use of household equivalence scales (Idem). Another indirect 
way to focus on the unequal distribution is to make transformations to the income 
variable. That is the case when logarithmic transformations are used; the result is a 
softened shape of the distribution with the penalization of higher incomes, as happens in 
the measurement of Human Development Indices (Anand and Sen, 2000). With 
logarithmic transformations, the impact of a ‘high’ income is almost the same as the one 
of a ‘very high’ income, and the logarithmic tool produces the effect of focusing on the 
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dispersion at the lower end of the distribution, which represents the very poor (Sen, 1973, 
p. 29). Therefore in economics, there is always the interest to consider some 
distributional judgment, even though this is not always done with the same tool or with 
the same traditional measure (Foster and Sen, 1997, p. 145). With a degree of 
methodological rigor, the next part will explain how the consideration of inequality in 
two frameworks can be done: first the deprivation in the framework of the capability 
approach, and later with the consideration of inequality in the family composition. 
 
 I Looking for other deprivations: The Capability Approach.  
 
The capability approach has been seen lately as a complete normative framework 
for the evaluation of overall well-being. It has also been used as a reference point in order 
to make policy recommendations for welfare improvement (Robeyns, 2005, p. 93). This 
approach was started by Sen and his rejection of utilitarianism.168 He considered as 
highly deficient other approaches in regards to justice, such as the approaches of Rawls, 
Nozick and Dworkin (Sen, 1984b). In one of his main critiques, he questioned about the 
problems of having just utility or income as the sole space for the measurement of 
poverty (Sen, 1999, p. 20). Sen was puzzled by a paradox: the existence of very high 
deprivation in certain communities in India, and the acceptance of this fact by some of 
the most deprived members of the same community. In this case, the utilitarian 
framework consents that as long as the members of the community agree with their own 
condition, there is no real deprivation that needs to be alleviated. As a reaction, Sen 
opposed the utilitarian framework that ‘gave sanctity’ to the distortion of the acceptance 
                                                 
168 Methodologically discussed (Sen, 1985b, Ch. 3), and previously rejected in Sen (1973, p. 15-9; 1984). 
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of people’s deprivation (Sen, 1984b, p. 309), same thing that is still common in very poor 
communities, either because of religious beliefs or because of biased governmental 
propaganda. The capability approach tries to enlarge the understanding of human well-
being, focusing not only on income deprivation but also trying to go beyond traditional 
perceptions of destitution. 
Once the comfortable and measurable income space is rejected, we enter into a 
possible blurred characterization. The idea that Sen uses in order to enlarge human 
welfare is taken from the concept of ‘functioning’ contained in Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics (Sen, 1999, p. 73, Basu and Lopez-Calva, 2002, p. 6).  In this case, neither the 
level of satisfaction perceived by the individual, nor only the ability and freedom to 
consume a particular good was the most important, but the achieved welfare contained in 
this process altogether. The word capability is sometimes used interchangeably in this 
setting by the word ‘freedom’, for instance, Alkire (2002) explains about the concept of 
‘capability’ that “[it] refers to a person’s or group’s freedom to promote or achieve 
valuable functionings” (Idem, p. 6; emphasis on the original). In other words, it can be 
said that the achieved functioning bundle is important, but it is not the only thing that 
matters; the process that promotes the access to those valuable functionings also counts. 
This process might be understood as a capability, which includes the idea of opportunities 
as well. 
Assuming that additional spaces are found, the methodological characterization 
under the capability approach is more or less clear: the different functionings (doing and 
beings that people value), once those are achieved, they define the individual’s well-
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being.169  Further, capabilities represent the freedom to choose among the vector of 
functionings, not only this process of choosing having an instrumental value, but this 
choice process has also a value itself (Sen, 1992, pp. 39-42). In this framework, the 
achieved functioning bundle should be chosen from a set of different options (named the 
‘capability set’). The link between a capability (e.g. the right to be adequately nourished) 
and its representative achieved functioning (e.g. individual’s caloric intake) is the 
individual’s rationality. So the individual, using her rational ability to decide, should be 
able to enjoy a more legitimate welfare that comes also from her own decision, if the 
society has provided her with the freedom to choose. Going further, the society will enjoy 
a better outcome if it is possible to expand this capability set for each individual, bringing 
more valuable choices to her. This includes not only freedom, but also ‘agency’, that is 
the power of change (Alkire, 2002, p. 6, note 18; Sen, 1999, p. 19; Sen, 1992, pp. 39-40). 
The next paragraphs will sketch briefly some of the main points that are needed in order 
to define a dimension, in the framework provided by the capability approach. 
 
 a) Identifying a dimension.  
 
When income or utility are rejected as the appropriate space to measure welfare, 
the question immediately comes about which aspects of welfare have been left out by the 
traditional economic theory, or which are the alternatives that offer the capability 
approach (Basu and Lopez-Calva, 2002, p. 1). The identification of the missing 
                                                 
169 See a formal definition in Basu and Lopez-Calva (2002), or Kuklys and Robeyns (in Kuklys, 2005, 
ch.2). The linguistic use of the words ‘capability’ and ‘functioning’ is found in Robeyns (2005, pp. 100-
101), and Sen (1992, pp. 49-50). 
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dimensions on the consideration of well-being is a subject of useful debate (Sen, 1992, p. 
44). The procedure to get a complete list of functionings and capabilities has been largely 
discussed in welfare analysis. On the one hand, the original proposition about which 
capabilities shall be incorporated was discussed by Sen (1992) in his Inequality 
Reexamined: the identification of the evaluative space in terms of functionings and 
capabilities (Idem, p. 43). It is essential in Sen’s approach that the search for evaluative 
spaces is fundamentally incomplete, either because of the dimension’s fuzziness or 
because of the practical difficulty to find the suitable spaces with full certainty (Idem, p. 
49). Following the incomplete approach, it should be a task of every community or 
culture to find their own possible deprivation spaces, depending on their own context and 
their own values. It will also depend on the same communities that they attach more 
importance to either one space or the other in the assessment of well being (Sen, 1992, p. 
46; Alkire, 2002, p. 10; Robeyns, 2005b, p.70). On the other hand, some authors argue in 
regards to a predefined definition of well-being dimensions with the aim to ‘universalize’ 
human rights.170  One of the most quoted lists of capabilities has been produced by 
Nussbaum (2000), but this list has various criticisms, as does the validity of its sources 
(Alkire, 2002, p. 33, n. 41-42). Nussbaum’s approach seems to ignore the very basic 
ideology of Aristotle in regards to the construction of a just city, the construction of the 
polis through people’s participation (Aristotle, 335 BC [1999], Book I, Part XIII), but she 
might be emphasizing the right that the ‘philosopher’ has to dictate what is good for the 
society, as Plato argued (Slote, 2006) (here we can raise a question, which 
‘philosopher’?). An argument of Robeyns enlightens a practical issue. Robeyns said that 
even if the list of values produced by the Sen’s approach is the same as any of those 
                                                 
170 A survey of lists of capabilities by different authors is in Alkire (2002, chapter 2) 
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produced by the universal approaches (e.g. Nussbaum’s), the process of generating the 
list of functionings and capabilities would imply a favorable agreement in the community 
(Robeyns, 2005b, p. 71), and this exercise will indeed legitimate the process of getting 
the list. It is the claim of this paper that in either the incomplete definition of the 
capability approach of Sen (preferred by the author of this paper because of some issues 
coming later), or in the list provided by the authors that support a universal view of 
capabilities, inequality deprivation is always a measurable dimension of human welfare.  
In Sen’s ‘incomplete’ approach, the way to do the search for evaluative spaces 
seems to be not very much elaborated, but he argues firmly about every community’s 
right to decide their own spaces of well-being: “The functioning vectors can be ranked 
and partially ordered in line with some common valuations,” (Sen, 1985e, p. 198, 
emphasis added). The notion of what is valuable starts with individual tastes and 
preferences, followed by the consideration of the criteria of all the members in the 
community.171 In order to have a proper functioning vector, what is negligible should be 
discarded, according to such predefined criteria (Sen, 1992, p. 44). In his original setting, 
in order to define which functionings are more important, Sen endorsed the ‘urgency’ 
criteria of Scanlon (1975) based on consensus, 172 only adding that the description of what 
is ‘urgent’ does not need to be based only on a moral setting, but also needs to take into 
account the natural heterogeneity of diverse people’s tastes and preferences (Sen, 1985e, 
                                                 
171 Sen takes from Scanlon that the starting point for moral facts is the consideration of individual well-
being, which is the philosophical basis of overall human welfare, described in his acronym WAIF: ‘well-
being as informational foundation’ (1985e, p. 185).   
172 It is fair to say that Scanlon’s urgency approach, more precisely the ‘relative urgency’ approach, has a 
basis, not surprisingly, in the social equality concept: “… relative urgency seem to be appeals to a 
consensus about how much people care about certain benefits, protections, etc.” (Scanlon, 1975, p. 667), he 
also said “The second approach would be to preserve the idea of consensus and to defend the notion of 
urgency as a construct put together for the purposes of moral argument” (Idem, p. 668). In his writing, the 
way to assess what is important in regards to well-being, seems to be that it is more important to be 
protected, rather than enjoy a future benefit (Idem, p. 668). 
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p. 196). Following the same incompleteness of Sen, a more elaborated way to define a 
particular list of capabilities has been proposed by other authors, like the set of five 
criteria spelled out by Robeyns (2005b).173 She proposes that a) any list should be clearly 
stated in order to be discussed, b) that the methodological foundations of that list should 
be justified, c) that the list should be spelled out in the appropriate language considering 
the audience that discusses it, d) that the normative definition and the pragmatic 
measurement limitations of those functionings should be distinguished in that list, and 
finally, e) that the list should only include topics that are mostly self contained, in order 
to avoid repetition.  This way to spell out a list of functionings is not against Sen’s initial 
proposal; it might be only a way to clarify the issue and to make the discussion more 
tractable. 
 
 b) Inequality as a dimension of the capability approach.  
 
According to the previous section, both the incomplete definition of capabilities 
and functionings and the universal view will consider inequality as a dimension in any of 
the mentioned criteria. For instance, if we consider the moral validity of the criteria in 
order to define a functioning, as Sen interprets on Scanlon’s consensus, we know that 
inequality has been defined as a deprivation by almost all philosophers (e.g. Marx, Rawls 
or Nozick). Even in regards to religious thought, the moral consideration of inequality has 
been targeted both as a deprivation, and also as an opportunity to help fellows, but in both 
cases, inequality is a characteristic of the society that should be diminished by their own 
                                                 
173 Alkire elaborates an ‘intuitive’ way to define functionings in a Kantian-Aquinas fashion, following 
Finnis and other Catholic authors, like Grisez (Alkire 2002, p. 43-59).  
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members and institutions, with the aim to maintain it as low as possible.174 Thus by 
consensus, equality is always a desired state. Departing from the moral background, if we 
consider the pragmatic view of Sen and his addendum insofar as to consider human 
heterogeneity, there is always an admonishment for giving more to the most deprived, the 
persons with disabilities or the chronically deprived (e.g. females in India or the African 
American community). There is no place for considering social inequality as a social 
benefit. If we follow the elaborated version of Robeyns with her procedure of five points 
in order to define what should be a desired functioning, we find that a) inequality is a 
concept that has been clearly stated, we find also that b) inequality measurement has a 
solid foundation in regards to social justice unless we talk about natural inequalities, we 
find that c) inequality discussion can be understood by any reasonable person in any 
language, d) we also know about the discussion of the measurement of inequality, and e) 
that inequality discussion is almost self contained, so it can be disentangled this 
deprivation from other type of deprivations (e.g. food deprivation). The last concern in 
the methodology of Robeyns can be enlarged for the dimension of inequality; there are 
countless the philosophical foundations that mention the right to be able to live in a more 
equal society, issue that has been largely discussed. Moreover, equality as been described 
sometimes as the final desired human state, which is the extremist egalitarian claim. 
Coming back to the identification of functionings and capabilities, we mentioned 
that some authors propose ‘universal’ lists of those vectors, as opposed to those that argue 
in regards to incomplete lists. This author will claim that, selecting any of these lists, it 
can also be found that inequality is a dimension of human deprivation, the same result 
                                                 
174 See the Greek and the Jewish traditions in relation to distributional judgments, in chapter 1. 
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that is found using the incomplete criteria.175 For instance, in one of the most mentioned 
lists we can find clear inequality implications, which is the Nussbaum’s list of central 
human functional capabilities (2000). In this many-times-revised version of her list, she 
defined that we should have the social basis for self respect, such that we should be able 
“to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others”. In the 
emotional side, she claims that humans should have the freedom to feel ‘justified anger’ 
(Nussbaum, 2000, p. 78-80). In this regards, equality of treatment among humans is a 
direct declaration about the need to consider inequality as a social deprivation, and 
‘justified anger’ might be solely understood by the lack of opportunities, feeling that is 
exacerbated in the presence of unfairness. Another example from the World Bank’s 
Poverty Reduction Group can be taken: Narayan et al. (2000, in Alkire, 2002, p. 64) 
describe well-being according to the ‘voices of the poor’. In this setting, inequality might 
be related with “self-respect and dignity” at the level of social well-being. The same 
authors discussed in that list that humans should be able to enjoy a “physically safe and 
secure environment”. So, it can be argued that low levels of inequality are required for a 
stable community, a stable community that is free from rebellion. From a psychological 
perspective, Shalom Schwartz (1994, in Alkire, 2002, p. 63-66) declares a list of 
universal human values: under the point of ‘conformity’, it is a universal value to restrain 
violations of social expectations, and under the point of ‘security’, it is mandatory to have 
harmony and a stable society. The previous two issues of Schwartz do indeed need low 
inequality in order to be achieved. As a final example, in the list of prudential values of 
Qizilbash (1996 in Alkire, 2002, p. 71-72), it is central that the ‘significant relations with 
                                                 
175 Alkire (2002) made a survey of 39 of these lists (pp. 32-43, 75-84).  
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others and some participation in social life’ do also imply low levels of inequality, which 
are needed in order to achieve the desired relations and the beneficial participation. 
Regardless of the incomplete or the fixed approach to the definition of 
functionings and capabilities, at this point can be asserted with no doubt that the 
capability related with inequality is the right that every individual has in order to appear 
in his community with no embarrassment. Using Smithian terminology, it is the right to 
appear in public without being ashamed (1776, WN, 5.II). Has been proved above that 
using any of the two methodological bases, the existence of lower levels of inequality is 
necessary, both for social stability and also for the individual sense of fairness in the 
community. The related achieved functioning is the real access that individuals have in 
their community to a certain standard of living with low inequality, same thing that can 
be captured by suitable inequality measures in one or more spaces. The achieved 
functioning is both a ‘being’ and a ‘doing’. It is obvious that it should be a desired state to 
‘be’ in a fairer and unequal society, but it should also be a task of everyone to ‘do’ 
actions in order to use inequality as a matter of opportunity, the opportunity to help the 
poorest people. It is acknowledged that most of the people focus on the ‘being’ nature of 
this functioning (e.g. the Marxist tradition). In this sense, people usually expect that the 
governmental institutions provide a more equal environment. However, people ignore 
their responsibility for the ‘doing’ part, which is to be an active member in the 
community in order to alleviate natural and artificial inequalities (e.g. helping people 
with disabilities or avoiding labor discrimination).  
Because of the need to define other things related with inequality measurement, 
the author of this chapter will show strong reasons to use the ‘incomplete’ approach of 
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Sen about the definition of capabilities and functionings. There are three things that 
belong to the society in regards to the measurement of inequality. First, the society needs 
to define the space where inequality is to be calculated. For instance, income inequality 
can serve as a proxy for real social inequality, but if the community decide that it is not 
enough, additional or alternative spaces can be chosen. Second, the assessment of this 
measurement and more than that, the interpretation of this inequality measurement, do 
belong to every community (who else can do that?). It is necessary to remember that 
inequality measurement, even calculated with mathematical precision, is always 
subjectively perceived. So, as long as the members of the community have voice, the 
judgment about how the community read those indicators belongs to their members. In 
other words, every community has the right to decide which level of inequality is 
acceptable for them. The only philosophical constraint would be that, ceteris paribus, a 
more and more equal distribution across time will always be preferred. The third issue 
that belongs to the society, is the importance that this society attaches to the consideration 
of inequality in regards to the other achieved functionings. The ‘relative weight’ 
connected with this functioning can not be decided by any other people than by the same 
members of the community, the only advice of the researcher is to say that, as long as the 
community put more weight to this functioning, this community will be enrolling in the 
virtuous circle of social cohesion (Sen, 1999, p. 93). These three definitions can not be 
understood without people’s participation.  
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 c) To operationalise a dimension.  
 
Basu and Lopez-Calva (2002) claim that “… the idea of capability is not fully 
formalized and perhaps not even fully formalizable” (p. 5). It is clear that inequality is a 
dimension of human welfare, but, what then is the appropriate way to measure it? After 
defining a suitable dimension, the challenge comes to operationalise in an easy way the 
measurement in the empirical analysis (Kuklys, 2005). Inequality does share the same 
incomplete formalization of the measurement as almost any functioning and capability. 
There is a necessary set of assumptions, methodological and theoretical, in order to assess 
inequality in a proper way, thus the procedures are not always the same. For our case, the 
formal way to do income inequality measurement is already covered by the multiple 
options in the kinds of measures available.176 There are handbooks that spell out how and 
why this measurement might be done, for instance Foster and Sen (1997), Cowell (1995) 
or Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000), among many others. Even though there is a lot of 
research in this regard, the issue of considering inequality is still open, and it will be like 
that because of the different possible methodological assumptions that can be made.  
In the particular case of income inequality measurement, there are interesting 
distributional considerations in regards to the multidimensional setting. It is true that 
social inequality can be approximated with the measurement of income inequality, but it 
is also true that there are measures that consider not only deprivation in a particular 
dimension, but also a distributional judgment on the same calculation. One has been 
applied precisely to the case of Mexico (Foster et al., 2005), where it is shown, with a 
                                                 
176 See the chapter 2 about standard measures of inequality. 
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new class of parametric indices, that there are indeed differences when human 
development is measured with and without distributional judgments. An extension of this 
family of indices, which allows distributional judgments and expands the understanding 
of the method of identification, has been developed by Foster and Alkire (2007). It needs 
to be clarified that most of the problems are not related with mathematical issues, but 
mostly with the methodological decisions that the researcher makes in order to pursue a 
particular measure of inequality. Given the constraint of the mathematical language and 
the empirical setting, there will be important issues that would be left out on the 
measurement of inequality as long as those issues are not presented in the aforementioned 
language, or as long as the data sets available constrain the researcher to explore 
inequality in other dimensions. On the opposite case, the next topic will deal with an 
issue that has been studied more in the theoretical framework, so we will expect 
sometime in the future to see the capability approach studied in depth in such a way. 
 
 II Equivalizing methods.  
 
There are issues of concern in regards to family that are related with inequality 
assessment. An issue that was largely ignored in the traditional economic framework was 
the family, even though its importance was highlighted many years before (Becker, 1987, 
p. 281). The most remarkable contribution of family issues in the applied economic 
setting is due to Becker (1981) with the use of mathematical language. Considering this, 
there are many relationships within the household that can be discussed in regards to 
inequality (e.g. power relationships), but traditional economic science usually deals with 
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those issues that are observable, then the rigorous language can be applied here as well. 
So, issues like intrahousehold allocation of resources, gender bias and individual weights 
within the family are important issues that are intrinsically related with inequality 
measurement, and those have been tackled somehow by economic theory. 177  The 
empirical application of equivalence scales deals with some of the referred concerns 
within the framework of economic theory. 
There is the concern in applied welfare economics about making comparable the 
different levels of utility or satisfaction of the individuals who belong to different 
households (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1991, p. 164). The usual way to compensate for 
family composition is to divide the total household expenditure among the number of 
people within the household. This per capita ‘compensated’ expenditure, which is 
considered as a proxy for individual welfare, is carried on in poverty or inequality 
computations. On the contrary, it does make sense to consider, in regards to consumption, 
that children have different needs than adults, that female body composition is different 
from than of males, and also that bigger households have the opportunity to use more 
efficiently their ‘public’ goods. In this case, intrahousehold distribution might be seen as 
another way to consider a capability dimension of well-being, which is inequality among 
the individuals that acknowledge their natural heterogeneity. It might be the case that the 
rejection of the utilitarian approach, which questioned the assumption of homogeneity of 
population, made possible the study of interpersonal comparisons. 178 The progressive use 
of equivalizing methods has been possible in real applications because of the availability 
                                                 
177 Intrahousehold allocation and gender bias is discussed in Deaton (1997, p. 223-241) and the references 
therein. 
178 Sen claimed to account with natural heterogeneity of diverse people’s tastes and preferences, but he 
indeed rejected the utilitarian framework (Sen, 1985e, p. 196), which is the most used in the equivalence 
scales research. 
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of household data. Then it is possible to know more in detail the patterns of consumption. 
But this data availability has some limits, such as the level of detail available. The 
information do not show individual consumption, but household aggregated consumption, 
because of the implicit familiar nature of the household consumption. This discrepancy 
gives space for multiple theoretical settings that try to produce reasonable explanations 
for individual behavior, taking household aggregates in consideration.  
The result of these theoretical considerations in the empirical framework gives the 
researcher an ‘equivalized’ space, which most of the times it makes more sense to 
consider, particularly when the aim is to understand the different levels of deprivation in 
the community. 179  The problem of adjusting income for family size is known in 
economics jargon as ‘equivalizing’ incomes (Cowell, 1995, p. 98). When household 
inequality is calculated, some kind of weight by family size is often included. As it is 
said, per capita considerations assume that each individual has a weight of one, so it is 
implied that everyone in the household receives an equal allocation of resources. 
Considering only per capita expenditure, Deaton says that “[per capita income] also fails 
to recognize the fact that not everyone in the household is the same and has the same 
needs. While it is true that children consume special goods, they surely require less of 
most things than do adults” (1997, p. 241). But other equivalence considerations should 
be considered, not only family size. For instance, the distribution of members within the 
house can be considered, as can be the number of children and the consumption goods 
devoted to them. The economies of scale in bigger households can also be mentioned, 
                                                 
179 This paper will focus on the empirical application of this theory, but for the reader interested in the 
theoretical background, there are questions in regards to the validity of this approach and its representation 
in the neoclassical framework, so it is recommended Blackorby and Donaldson (1991), Deaton (1997, pp. 
243-251), and the theoretical background on Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, chapter 7) together with 
Deaton and Zaidi (2002, chapter 5), and all the references therein. 
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because it should be cheaper to run a house with many individuals in the presence of 
‘public’ goods within the household. The proportion of income devoted to food compared 
with the proportion of income spent in other goods is another important issue in regards 
to the equivalence considerations.  
With the different use of a variety of theoretical assumptions, equivalence scales 
methods consider indirectly the measurement of inequality, making clearer for the 
researcher the true component of deprivation, which is either approximated with poverty 
measures, with human development indices, or even with standard inequality measures 
(e.g. Gini coefficient).180 There are different ways to assign the proper weights to each 
individual in regards to their personal characteristics, so the literature is broad in this 
sense. Some of the empirical approaches are a) the Engel (1857) method, b) the 
Rothbarth (1943) procedure, c) the Prais and Houthakker (1955; in Houthakker, 1987) 
method, d) the Barten (1964) method, d) Subjective approaches or d) the ‘parametric’ 
setting, like the formula proposed by the National Research Council (Deaton and Zaidi, 
2002; NRC, 1995). Some of these methods, discussed briefly in the following paragraphs, 
do claim superiority over the others, but there is no consensus about the use of one of 
them as a general rule:  “How these adult equivalents should be calculated, and whether it 
even makes sense to try, have been (occasional) topics of discussion in the economics 
literature for more than a century… as a result, there is no consensus on the matter” 
(Deaton, 1997, p. 242). All these methods require deep computational skills. The 
empirical results show that even no consensus, the use of any of those methods is 
                                                 
180 Shorrocks (1987) made a difference between inequality that considers opportunities, and inequality 
arising from natural abilities and characteristics. Equivalence scales focus on the unequal natural attributes 
of the individuals, such as their age, gender and the number of them in the household. Any endogenous 
determination of these attributes on the household composition is excluded from this research. 
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preferred, than the use of none of them; per capita income is a very rough estimate that 
does not account for individual heterogeneity. 
 
 a) Engel’s method.  
 
Using household data from Belgian surveys, Engel (1857) was the first person 
that showed that, ceteris paribus, when the income of the household increased, the budget 
share spent on food decreased. So the household preferred to increase their consumption 
in non-food goods as their absolute income increased. In the neoclassical framework, 
Engel curves have been conveniently characterized by the income elasticity, which is the 
change in household expenditure with respect to the household overall resources 
(Houthakker, 1987, p. 142). 
Being the share of some particular kind of goods, where is the 
correspondent share of the expenditure devoted to food, and being x the letter that 
describes the total expenditure, we have two cases of Engel curves that describe 
household preferences and their behavior. In this case, the implication of Engel’s Law is 
satisfied, because it represents the negative relationship between the food share and the 
total expenditure. In Figure 7-1, the curve 
iw
Fw
A describes the small reference household, 
while 'A  does the same for the larger one. The hypothetical maximum amount of income 
that the smaller reference household spends on food is shown by the letter , similarly, 
 for the bigger one. For a given share of food of the reference household , which is 
achieved with the expenditure , the equivalent to compensate the larger household with 
0x
1x
Fw0
0x
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the inclusion of a new family member (e.g. children) will be the distance between the 
budgets . This difference is known as the ‘cost of children’.)( 01 xx − 181
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Figure 7-1. Engel method. 
 
Using suitable approximations, the Engel curve can be computed if consumption 
data is available for many households. This law was first explained in a linear fashion by 
Allen and Bowley (1935), but later on, this representation was dropped off because of the 
lack of resemblance with reality (Houthakker, 1987, p. 143). Nowadays there are many 
variations of the Engel curve, but the traditional logarithmic form proposed by Working 
(1943) still remains, such that the income food share can be defined in the following way: 
 
(9)  xbaw ii
F
i log+=
                                                 
181 The assumption is that children enter into the utility function of parents via the expenses made on them. 
This paper is just borrowing from this terminology, see Becker (1987, p. 282). 
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where , n is the number of households in the community, x is the 
amount of expenditure devoted to food, and a and b are estimated parameters. This 
formula provides a traditional framework for econometric calculations.  
}...1{ ni =
 
 b) Rothbarth Procedure.  
 
The procedure to estimate the Rothbarth (1943) approach is very similar to the 
one of Engel, even though the variable used is rather different. Both approaches need to 
estimate an equation where a dependent variable is explained by a proportion of some 
expenditure, and some personal characteristics might be included. In the case of the 
Rothbarth method, different from the Engel procedure, the dependent variable is the 
expenditure on consumption of goods for adults rather than the food share. The 
independent variable is assumed to be the overall expenditure, which is explained by the 
total value of the basket of goods consumed. In this case, some characteristics of children 
are included (Teruel et al., 2005, p. 28). Deaton explains that “Rothbarth chose a very 
broad group of adult goods (including saving), calculated how much the total was 
reduced by the presence of an additional child, and calculated the cost of the children to 
the adults by the amount that income would have to rise to restore the original 
expenditures.” (1997, p. 230-1).   
The indicator of welfare used in this method, which is expenditure on goods 
consumed by adults rather than food share, is represented in the Figure 7-2 by . This is 
the valued quantity of expenditure consumed in adult goods. The positive relationship of 
adult goods with the total expenditure (assuming that adult goods are normal) is indicated 
Ax0
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below by the curve A , which is the small household, then 'A  that is the bigger one with 
additional children. Ceteris paribus, we assume that both households consume the same 
amount of adult goods if their preferences are the same, but the larger household has a 
higher expenditure in other goods ( ) compared with the household reference ( ), and 
again, the cost of children is determined by the distance determined by the subtraction 
. 
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Figure 7-2. Rothbarth procedure. 
 
In order to represent this relationship empirically, we just change equation (9) 
with the value of the expenditure of adult goods instead of the share of food in the Engel 
method, and the rest of the calculations are quite similar. The version of this method 
using economies of scale was suggested first by Jean Dreze (in Deaton, 1997, p. 264). 
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 c) Others. 
 
Some of the other methods available for equivalence scales estimates might be 
theoretically more precise, or can take into account more variables than the previous two 
examples, but then we face empirical problems. For instance, the method proposed by 
Prais and Houthakker (1955, in Houthakker, 1987) is more precise in terms of commodity 
specifics, but it requires detailed data about consumption goods and some idea about the 
functional forms of the demand functions: “The calculation of the Prais-Houthakker 
scales requires estimation of a potentially large system of nonlinear equations, a task that 
is a good deal easier than it once was, but the effort requires a justification that is not 
apparent” (Deaton, 1997, p. 261). Another method was proposed by Barten (1964),182 
which is less suitable for applied applications, but contains important insights in regards 
to economies of scale within the household (Deaton, 1997, p. 261). This model needs a 
proper set of price data variations, which is usually not available. Thus the simplified 
application by the Rothbarth procedure or the Engel method is superior either to the 
Barten or the Prais-Houthakker method, having empirical grounds as a basis. 
There are other approaches for equivalence scales that are based on alternative 
methodological roots. One is the subjective method pioneered by van Praag and his 
colleagues (van Praag and Warnaar, 1997 in Deaton and Zaidi, 2002, p. 50). This 
methodology uses household surveys where the respondents give an assessment about 
how certain goods satisfy their needs, using a suitable scale. The subjective nature of this 
approach is questionable in regards to the utilitarian paradox described by Sen, which is 
                                                 
182 This method was extended by Gorman (1976), and generalized by Blackorby and Donaldson (1991, p. 
187). See references in Blackorby and Donaldson (1991, p. 173, n. 7) 
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discussed at the beginning of section  I, and it is difficult to generalize about these 
estimates, much more when the perception of satisfaction could vary from household to 
household.  
The last method, which is also based on alternative grounds, is the parametric 
approach of Deaton and Zaidi (2002, pp. 51-52).183 It uses the formula proposed by the 
National Research Council (NRC, 1995). The number of adult equivalents (AE) is 
defined by the following formula: 
 
(10) ( )AE A K θα= +  
 
Where A is the number of adults in the household, K is the number of children, α  
and θ  are parameters of the model. The parameterα , which goes from 0 to 1, defines the 
cost of a child relative to an adult, and the parameter θ  is a suitable parameter, also 
between 0 and 1, which controls for economies of scale. In the extreme per capita case, 
both parameters are equal to the unit: no discount for children neither a bigger household 
has more efficient allocation of resources. The usefulness of this approach lies in the 
simplicity of the mathematical formula, which also provides room to apply various 
empirical tests. There are similar formulas to (10), for instance, if it is desired to account 
for the addition of subsequent adults, in this case A is replaced by the more complex 
expression: 1 ( 1) 0Aβ+ − < <1β
                                                
, but in any case, it might be pointed out the arbitrary 
way that the relationship is defined. There might be reasons to use this formula, rather 
than only point out the reality of the expression, such as the pragmatic use of the 
 
183 This is named by them the ‘arbitrary approach’, but other literature named it ‘parametric’, for instance, 
Teruel et al. (2005). 
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estimates on the calculations, or the usefulness of this kind of expression in the 
mathematical language. In empirical tests, this formula has proven to make sense, and 
just the calibration is a subject of discussion. 
 
7.4 Mexican Literature 
 
The relevant functionings and capabilities for the Mexican population have been 
established historically in their written laws. The general public and the governmental 
institutions take for granted that any source of deprivation mentioned in those laws 
should be tackled. The most important document for Mexico, its Political Constitution 
(CPEUM), establishes a particular set of rights for all inhabitants. Besides the traditional 
freedoms, it states that every head of household should have access to a decent job, which 
should be remunerated with a sufficient minimum wage (CPEUM, Art. 123.VI). The 
right to a minimum wage is explained in detail in the Federal Labor Law (LFT) in its 90th 
Article. Considering the different economic activities, this wage should be sufficient to 
cover all the family needs in regards to their material, social and cultural spending. It 
should also provide enough resources for the children’s education. Access to health 
services and housing credit is also granted (CPEUM, Art. 4). On the other hand, the 
General Law for Social Development (LGDS) establishes special considerations for 
marginalized groups (LGDS, Article 8), so it is the aim of this law to take care of the 
more destitute through responsible social spending, promoting programs that diminish 
unequal opportunities. It is the objective of these programs that are run by the Secretariat 
of Social Development, to promote economic progress with social justice, to foster the 
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creation of stable jobs, and to improve the household income level, at the same time that 
it should be improved the income distribution across the communities (LGDS, Art. 11). 
There has been the concern in the Mexican literature to assess human 
development properly once the desired functionings to be achieved are known, as these 
are expressed explicitly in the different laws (e.g. material, social and cultural needs). In 
the Mexican literature, the first organized attempt of poverty measurement, in 2002, 
included the capability approach of Sen in its considerations (CTMP, 2002, p. 18).  
However, the main concern at that time was the formalization of the assessment of well-
being, and that was approached with traditional income poverty measurement. The 
product of this research was twofold, the first objective was to put in order the disarray 
caused because of the non-standardized measurement of welfare, because Mexico did not 
have a regular definition of poverty, even at the government level. The second aim was to 
establish a research agenda, because the many opportunity areas were acknowledged that 
needed the collaboration of scientists, government officials and representatives of society. 
Due to this research agenda, later on the issue of heterogeneity of the population 
embedded into the considerations of equivalence of scales was also covered, but it is fair 
to assert that this issue was covered more like a technical decision in the computations 
and not like a methodological flaw of this assessment. The next sections will explain, in 
the light of the framework explained in the entire section 7.3, how the Mexican literature 
had superficially tackled the issue of inequality deprivation in different ways and how the 
research agenda has covered subjects in regards to the capability approach. 
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 I The capability approach and Mexico.  
 
One of the first issues that the capability approach requires is public agreement on 
the measurement of well-being. In Mexico, this public exercise started with a symposium 
organized by President Fox in the year 2001. The event had the purpose to discuss how 
poverty was evaluated. Recognized scholars, both Mexican and international, were 
reunited to discuss poverty measurement. This group also included representatives of 
different institutions together with members of the society (Foster, in Székely, 2005, p. 
6). The result of this exercise was the immediate creation of the Technical Committee for 
Poverty Measurement (CTMP). We can not say that the aim of this exercise was to 
explicitly create a complete list of functionings, or to apply the capability approach to the 
Mexican case. It was trying to understand and to formalize the definition of well-being 
using standardized indices of poverty. The measurement considered a very basic basket 
of goods that was valued with suitable prices expressed in monetary terms. 
 
 a) A formal attempt: The Technical Committee for Poverty 
Measurement and the Capability Approach. 
 
In this exercise poverty was defined with reference to a certain level of 
deprivation, to a certain amount of necessary elements for human life. The negative effect 
of deprivation in humans was acknowledged, so this deprivation more likely would 
reinforce itself (CTMP, 2002, p. 17). Their definition of poverty used some of the 
terminology embedded in the capability approach, thinking of ‘capabilities’ as some 
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unaccounted dimension of welfare. It was considered a multidimensional space, similar to 
the one proposed by Amartya Sen. In this document was institutionalized the Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke headcount poverty measure. Measuring poverty in absolute terms,184 
CTMP focused on non-equivalized household income, using an expenditure survey as the 
main source for data (CTMP, 2002, pp. 20 & 87). The highlighted agenda included issues 
on capabilities and functionings bundles, definition of basket of goods, equivalence 
scales, and non-monetary indices of welfare, among other issues. 
The document from the CTMP attempted to include a multidimensional 
measurement of poverty, mentioning several types of deprivation such as participation, 
human capital, income, subjective welfare and human rights (CTMP, 2002, p. 17). The 
document considered in theory that social inequality was closely linked with individual 
destitution of social participation, so inequality was another type of deprivation (Idem, p. 
18), but finally, the committee followed the Unsatisfied Basic Needs approach tradition. 
The document used income as the unique reflection of the welfare space, albeit the 
committee tried to enlarge the income scope. It was a mixture of poverty measurement 
with a possibly misunderstood capability approach. This means that income was not the 
focal space, but income was seen as a reflection of multidimensional capabilities (CTMP, 
2002, p. 17-18). In this case, income would be only an instrument to measure welfare. 
In the discussion of the suitable identification space, the discussion was about 
deciding whether income was measuring basic consumption goods or other ‘capabilities’ 
(CTMP, 2002, p. 23). The definition of income as suitable space took into account five 
minimal desired characteristics on the desired poverty measure. One of these 
characteristics, the ‘possibility’ characteristic, definitely influenced the methodological 
                                                 
184 As defined in Sen (1983). 
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decision. The decision was that the chosen index should be practically measured, so it 
was stated that the poverty measure should be made with the available statistical 
information. In that scenario, even though it was desirable to measure other dimensions 
or spaces, such as the ‘non-monetary’ dimensions, it happens that income, approximated 
with expenditure data, was the only dimension available for the measurement of well-
being (CTMP, 2002, pp. 24 & 56; Székely, 2005, p. 19). Multidimensionality was 
considered as a mixture of the monetary and non-monetary spaces available, and those 
were mentioned as a complimentary way to measure welfare (CTMP, 2002, p. 26), but 
the definitions of those alternative spaces were not explicitly stated at that time. 
In spite of the decision made for the income space only, the committee was 
reluctant to dismiss the capability approach so easily. The way they deal with this issue 
was through a ‘capability consideration’ within the ‘income’ space. They propose three 
‘poverty lines’ (CTMP, 2002, p. 66-68). The first one is the ‘food poverty line’ ( ), 
that means deprivation of the sufficient amount of money to buy a particular basket of 
basic goods. The second was the ‘capability’ poverty line ( ). The ‘capability’ term 
here might produce some confusion, because of the use of the ‘capability’ word in a 
poverty line definition. This ‘capability’ level of deprivation incorporated the sufficient 
amount of money to buy other kind of goods, such as clothing, shelter, transportation, 
health and educational (human capital) goods. Those were the ‘capability’ goods, so the 
average of those goods was calculated and their equivalent were expressed in income-
money.
1PL
2PL
185 The third poverty line was called ‘asset poverty line’ ( ), this line was 3PL
                                                 
185 The Engel coefficient method, which measures the proportion of the spending on food with the spending 
on other kind of goods, was used. This relationship was explained in the Appendix 1 of the document 
(CTMP, 2002, p. 97-101), see also Cortés (2005, p. 863). 
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supposed to measure the ability of the household to have some savings in the form of 
assets. The poverty lines were nested, so the second poverty line includes not only 
‘capability’ goods, but also ‘food’ goods ( ). By the same token, the third 
poverty line includes ‘food’ and ‘capability’ goods as well ( ). 
21 PLPL ⊂
321 PLPLPL ⊂⊂
 i) Discussion. 
There might be issues that could result in confusion with the present development 
literature. ‘Capabilities’ were used to describe mostly non-basic goods (e.g. shelter, 
clothing), and also the access to public goods (e.g. transportation or education), but this is 
not a definition of ‘capability’ in the sense of Sen (see section  I); they were defining 
some desired functionings together with some of the capabilities. It could be expressed 
that, in order to achieved a better outcome, individuals should have the right to be well 
nourished, but that idea was used interchangeably with the achieved functioning of 
nutrition. Free access of all individuals to the good markets was assumed. Also assumed, 
but not mentioned, was the capability to have access to buy the all goods needed, 
something that is still a problem in rural communities. Also ignored was the issue that 
having the opportunity to make savings, which is measured in the third poverty line, is 
the ‘capability’ to have access to market goods in future time. So the initial Mexican 
literature confused some of the concepts of freedoms embedded in the term of capabilities 
with the terminology of achieved functionings. 
The Mexican trial for poverty measurement was an attempt to include the 
capability approach in the income space. This trial posed a methodological challenge 
from the very beginning. In the theoretical welfare literature, income has been rejected 
many times as the appropriate space for calculations. In spite of this, the approach of the 
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Mexican committee tried to entangle the capability approach using the income space, 
alleging data restrictions. The extra information included in the surveys was used to 
approximate a more general welfare measurement, even thought it was necessary to go 
against the original proposal of Sen, which rejects income as the suitable space for 
calculations. The information available in the surveys was not just income or 
consumption of basic goods, but also included information about other kind of goods, 
which would be shameful to waste. Interestingly, in order to show the different levels of 
destitution in the country, the dimensions that could be approached with some monetary 
value were the only ones included using the three poverty lines. 
Multidimensional measures and mixed indices, like the Human Development 
Index (HDI) or indices of Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN), were highlighted as a clear 
part of the research agenda. On the one hand, for instance, the UBN approach pointed out 
the use of a variety of mathematical tools in order to deal with the data, either using 
correspondence analysis, or multinomial log-regressions, among other tools. Using these 
complex indices, some weight was given to the different functionings. About the HDI, 
that this approach proposed new information about destitution was believed, but that the 
extra information provided was not sufficient was said, even more when the extra effort 
in the data collection was considered. It was said that HDI might be ‘conceptually 
attractive’, but “the cost in terms of resources and time is not enough justification in 
regards to the poor population or their ranking” (CTMP, 2002, p. 31, translated from the 
original). 
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 b) Numbers that move the world. 
 
The second attempt to consider some topics of the capability approach was 
included in the volume edited by Miguel Székely, ‘Números que mueven al mundo: La 
medición de la pobreza en México’ (Numbers that move the world: Poverty measurement 
in Mexico) in 2005. This book was an addendum to the effort made by the CTMP in 
2002. The publication explained in more detail how the literature was before in regards to 
welfare measurement, and it also mentioned the influence made of the CTMP document 
right after it was published. Multiple issues were discussed here, but in regards to the 
capability approach, that the poverty measurement has intrinsically embedded 
multidimensional features was recognized again, but the calculation was done in a 
traditional way because of the data limitations. That the inclusion of non-monetary 
dimensions in the measurement of welfare was also desirable was also said (Cortés, 2005, 
pp. 887 & 889). 
 i) Alternative functionings. 
Cortés (2005) made an empirical test: deprivation expressed in non-monetary 
dimensions was compared with headcount income poverty. A probit regression was 
constructed, which considered the headcount poverty measurement on the left hand side, 
and multiple variables of deprivation of other dimensions in the right hand side. The 
eleven dimensions considered were the following:  
 
a) Two dimensions on education, approximated with the level of instruction of the 
head of the household, and the school attendance of children.  
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b) One dimension on health, access to medical services by at least one person. 
c) Three dimensions on quality of living, using possible indicators of child labor 
(working children between the ages 12-15), agglomeration indices (four or more 
people in one room) and a variable that indicates the presence of a refrigerator in 
the house.  
d) Three dimensions on the quality of shelter, such as roof, walls and floor 
housing material. 
e) Two dimensions on access to public services measured with the access to clean 
water and bathrooms with water supply (Cortes, 2005, p. 888). 
 
Using as a benchmark the first poverty line ( ), it was found that the 
explanatory power of the 11 dimensions did not disagree ‘very much’ with the simple 
headcount income poverty measure. The measurement of income poverty was described 
as sufficient: “Given the available information, the income poverty measure is an 
acceptable way, though imperfect, in order to express the multiple dimensions that are 
embedded on it” (Cortes, 2005, p. 889, translated from the original). On the other hand, 
the problem that represented the definition of the second and third poverty lines was 
addressed (  and ). Focusing on the ‘capability’ poverty line ( ) that was 
approximated with the Engel method, the issue of including a better alternative of non-
basic basket of good was discussed, but this topic was left for future research (Cortés, 
2005, p. 890). 
1PL
2PL 3PL 2PL
285 
 ii) Non-monetary dimensions. 
The intention in the book published by Székely in 2005 was to enlarge the 
understanding of human development in other spheres of people’s life. One of the points 
in the research agenda stated a recommendation: “To measure monetary income poverty 
but complement this measurement with non-monetary indicators, so issues can be added 
like access to public services, socio-economical indicators, indices of political 
participation, self-esteem, personal safety and labor conditions” (Cortés, 2005, p. 892, 
translated from the original). The data constraint prevented the CTMP from doing 
something about this recommendation; for instance, it is difficult to express public 
services in a monetary way. That is the reason the CTMP decided to put aside the 
valuation of governmental transfers in kind. Using the same criteria, the impact of the 
functioning to be sheltered was not included, so the tacit rent of the house was not 
considered either, among other problems with functioning’s valuations. 
 iii) Multidimensional measurement. 
A literature survey of multidimensional literature was done by Lopez-Calva and 
Rodriguez-Chamussy (2005). They discussed several approaches. The first approach was 
the methodological discussion by Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003), generalizing the 
one-dimensional setting to the multidimensional one, using the case of Brazil as an 
example. They mentioned the methodological recommendations of Ravallion (1996) and 
his research towards better multidimensional poverty measures (Lopez-Calva and 
Rodriguez-Chamussy, 2005, p. 654). The literature review also included some of the 
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fuzzy logic research,186 theory of information, subjective measurement of welfare and the 
method of the unsatisfied needs (UBN) developed by CEPAL.  
In the empirical section of their paper, Lopez-Calva and Rodriguez-Chamussy 
used multi-factor indices through the application of discriminant analysis, in order to 
compare the relationship between income and the other dimensions that evaluate welfare 
(2005, p. 666). In the fuzzy part, they used probits (Idem, p. 687). After some elaborated 
tables and graphs (Idem, pp. 671-691), they conclude that those measures could explain 
other shapes of destitution, but the measure of poverty proposed by the CTMP in 2002 
was sufficient. They commented that “[a] simple econometrical analysis shows us that 
income is indeed, a very reasonable predictor of our multidimensional aggregate measure, 
which is confirmed by our previous analysis… ” (Idem., p. 689, translated from the 
original). Therefore, they concluded that the income poverty measure, though imperfect, 
was an acceptable way to measure poverty (Idem., p. 692), regardless of the differences 
shown by the multidimensional analysis. 
 
 c) A Closer View to the Capability Approach, Inequality and HDI. 
 
The consideration of unequal distribution remained absent from the previous 
attempts of the CTMP, as can be noticed in the previous section. The committee 
determined a higher priority for the definition of poverty measurement, so inequality 
measurement was not considered in practice as an important topic. Then later, in the 
                                                 
186 Fuzzy set theory implies the introduction of uncertainty and inaccuracy in certain situations, without 
loosing the opportunity of analyzing the relationships with formal rigor (Chiappero-Martinetti, 1994, p. 
372). For a list of references see Sen (1999, p. 310, n. 43). 
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contribution of Lopez-Calva and Székely (2006), three different lines of research were 
opened, the first one was the continuation of the multidimensional approach of Sen, such 
that the Human Development Index was explored and compared with a variety of new 
multidimensional measures. The second line was the significance of the HDI in the 
regional analysis of Mexico and the relationship with economic growth. The third one 
was the consideration of income distribution through a series of sensitive analysis of the 
original poverty measurement, but now accounting with inequality assessments. 
 i) Formal view of the capability approach and state ranking. 
In the introduction to the book Measurement of Human Development in Mexico 
(López-Calva and Székely, 2006), the authors discussed formally the capability approach 
of Sen (López-Calva and Székely, 2006, pp. 21-25 & chapter I), so they recognized the 
attractiveness of this framework in regards to the proposed multidimensional setting, and 
they accepted the usefulness of the Human Development Index (HDI) as a good proposal 
of Sen’s approach: “The public sector and academia accept that the HDI provides 
relevant information on the development situation, using a more open point of view” 
(Idem. p. 60, translated from the original). Alternatively to the HDI, the variety of 
aggregated measures was discussed, such as those including the technique of the principal 
component. Those aggregated indices were for instance, the marginalization index of 
CONAPO, or the well-being index of INEGI.187 It was mentioned also the headcount 
poverty measure provided by the CTMP on 2002, and how this poverty measure tried to 
encompass such a variety of needs such as food, ‘capabilities’ and assets (López-Calva 
and Székely, 2006, pp. 28-37).   
                                                 
187 The relevance of those indices is explained in chapter 5. 
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Important differences were noted in a simple comparison of the HDI state ranking 
with the GDP per capita positions (Lopez-Calva and Vélez, in Lopez-Calva and Székely, 
2006, chapter I). Considering the other two additional dimensions of the HDI (health and 
education), rather than only income, not surprisingly, the difference was that the image of 
human development changed dramatically. Some states should be positioned up to 6 
places below their original ranking. In this part, they recognized the difficulty to come 
across with a standard HDI measure, because other authors had shown different rankings, 
using other methodological decisions with the same HDI (Idem, p. 66; discussed in 
chapter II of the same publication as well). They also tried to include inequality 
judgment, including a ‘correction’ with a logarithmically-transformed Gini index per 
state. The practical meaning of this transformation is not know to this author, but at least 
for them, higher inequality meant higher underdevelopment (Idem, p. 62).  
 ii) Inequality measurement and the HDI. 
The most important chapter of Lopez-Calva and Székely’s book is chapter 5, 
which is a translation of the paper of Foster et al. (2005) and an application for the 
Mexican case. Both authors, together with Foster, explored a multidimensional 
measurement of poverty with inequality sensitiveness. The initial Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke one-dimensional poverty measure included here not only an enlargement in its 
single space, but also an inequality consideration within each of their vectors.  This new 
measure tried to encompass both the multidimensional setting of the capability approach 
and a distribution consideration using the method of the ‘general means’. The novelty of 
this family of indices was their sub-group consistency (Foster et al., 2005, p. 7). In the 
empirical part, not surprisingly for this author, they found that this new measurement of 
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human development was indeed ‘inequality sensitive’, such that the ranking of the states 
would change considering a higher ‘inequality aversion’ (Idem, p. 22, Table 1).   
The problem with this measurement is that the measure tries to apply arbitrary 
values to the inequality sensitiveness, a problem that they already recognized (Idem. p. 
26). The problem comes from the subjective nature of the perception of inequality 
measurement.  Inequality judgments are values that are subjectively perceived, and more 
than that, these should be subjectively decided by the community (see Sen’s participation 
method on the last paragraph of section 7.3 I b), and our previous methodological chapter 
1 on distributional justice). This author sees a problem in applying an a priori social 
welfare transformation to a human development index. Foster et al. (2005) applied a 
method for inequality measurement consistent with Atkinson’s (1970) family of 
inequality indices, where an arbitrary value is applied to the social welfare function. The 
imposition of this form of inequality measurement on the grounds of sub-group 
consistency is hardly generalized. We might suggest another way to assess distributive 
judgment in a multidimensional approach. For instance, inequality should be measured 
separately, or with a not so restrictive inequality consideration as the Atkinson 
measurement is (e.g. Entropy indices). An HDI might be a better measure if it includes 
distributional judgments, but the way to do it can not be fully discussed on mathematical 
grounds; it is a methodological issue.  
Other issues in regards to inequality consideration are discussed in this volume. 
For instance, the capability to have the right to live in a more equal society, free of gender 
discrimination, is discussed by Ibarrarán and Robles in chapter VI (in López-Calva and 
Székely, 2006). The capability is approached with the achieved functioning of political 
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participation, measured by the number of places in the congress. They include also the 
traditional income gap between male and females, and also a measurement of proportion 
of females in higher decision-making positions in different job sectors. This aggregated 
mixed measurement has found that progressively, but at a low pace, females have been 
‘empowered’ since the 90’s. On another topic, in order to trace the origins of the unequal 
distribution, Freije et al. (2006; in López-Calva and Székely, 2006, chapter VII) focused 
on the decomposition of income inequality, using an ad-hoc technical approach proposed 
by Juhn et al. (1993, in López-Calva and Székely, 2006, p. 291). They found an increase 
in inequality in the urban sector from the year 1989 to the year 2000, with some 
variations within this period of time (Idem, p. 302). They also found some variations of 
inequality considering the regional distribution (Idem. p. 311), inequality being 
exacerbated in the area around Mexico City and the southern states (Idem. p. 315). The 
rest of the book discussed issues in regards to policy valuations and government transfer 
effectiveness (in López-Calva and Székely, 2006, chapter VIII and IX).  
 
 II Equivalizing methods In Mexico.  
 
The Mexican literature has been cautious about the introduction of equivalence 
scales in the calculations, and there is an important reason: the reported number of poor 
people diminishes dramatically with this inclusion (Teruel et al. 2005, p. 34). Officially, 
it is still the case that income poverty is measured using per capita valuations, but there is 
some history about it. The first time this topic was mentioned was by the CTMP on 2002: 
they conclude that the use of equivalence scales “… would introduce unknown errors in 
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the calculations” (CTMP, 2002, p. 60, translated from the original). Thus, the per capita 
income was the only one considered. The CTMP document surveyed a variety of 
equivalence scales methods, using as a reference a variety of authors (CTMP, 2002, pp. 
41-43),188 but the committee was reluctant to accept the use of any of those methods 
described. The reason put forward was that the use of equivalence scales was a theme 
without consensus, and the related topic of economies of scale within the household was 
not thoroughly studied in empirical terms (CTMP, 2002, p. 43, and p.43, n. 28). We can 
feel a strong skepticism about the use of these methods in the CTMP document, but there 
might be another reason why the committee took that decision in those regards: the 
political cost of showing a lesser amount of poor people will be something that might not 
be very pleasant to the public opinion. We need to remember that at the time of the 
CTMP, the number of the poor used to be believed to be between 40 to 60 million, 
depending on the source quoted. The CTMP showed that the number of people in 
extreme poverty was about 25 million. But taking in consideration the equivalence of 
scales, this figure would diminish the number of the reported poor by up to 15 million, 
which means 10 million less. We think that such a report would be affecting seriously the 
credibility of the poverty measurement by the CTMP, so we believe that that was the 
reason why it was decided not to be followed any of the equivalence scales methods by 
the committee. 
Teruel et al. (2005) took seriously the definition of equivalence scales for the case 
of Mexico. With empirical methods, they found no statistical bias between males and 
females (Idem, p. 22), and taking a single adult as the unit, they found a weight for 
children under 5 years to be 0.64~0.77, children from 5 to 12 years to be 0.69~0.81, and 
                                                 
188 See section 7.3 II. 
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young people from 13 to 18 to be 0.62~0.76, depending of the method used (Idem, p. 35). 
After these findings, Teruel et al. (2005) introduced adjustments by adult equivalent to 
the official measures of poverty following the same procedure of the CTMP in 2002. 
They found that there is a change in welfare measures when family equivalences are 
included, and this difference is not small at all. Using either the Engel or the Rothbarth 
method, with and without economies of scale, they showed that the results of poverty 
measurement are always overestimated. The results are categorical: “This figure confirms 
that poverty estimations are always bigger if the number of individuals in the household 
is taken into account only rather than considering that individuals have different needs” 
(Teruel et al., 2005, p. 30, translated from the original). The gap of overestimation does 
indeed vary from 3 to almost 13 points, and all those results are statistically significant. 
The importance of this issue relies on the fact that those points represent sometimes 
almost half of the reported poor. They conclude that in general, poverty measures were 
not insensible to considerations of equivalent scales, but their calculations have not yet 
been taken in account in the official estimates. 
Teruel and Rubalcava (2005), following the research of Teruel et al. (2005), went 
a step further in the consideration of equivalence scales, taking care of the economies of 
scale in more detail. They rejected the use of any subjective method, as the one proposed 
by van Praag (Teruel and Rubalcava, 2005, p. 634). They considered the parametric 
formula of the Deaton and Zaidi (2002), focusing on the literature review of different 
countries in order to get an appropriate estimate of the economies of scales parameter θ  
(discussed in section  II). After an extensive analysis and a careful empirical test, they 
found problems with the estimation using the Engel method, so they find more suitable 
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for Mexico the Rothbarth procedure with economies of scale instead (Teruel and 
Rubalcava, 2005, pp. 634 & 648). With the new set of calculations, they showed that 
poverty measurement was sensitive to the use of equivalence scales, much more when 
economies of scale within the household were considered (Idem, p. 646). The new 
proposed poverty measurement was similar to the one proposed in Teruel et. al (2005). 
 
7.5 Concluding remarks. 
 
Traditional economic theory tackles in a variety of forms the issue of inequality, 
because it is clearly perceived that a lot of it is harmful for the society. The study of the 
capability approach of Sen has opened the research for alternative views of human 
deprivation. In this framework, it is argued in this paper that inequality measurement 
serves as an additional space to measure destitution, rather than to consider only poverty 
measurement, that is the space of income deprivation. In both space specifications, either 
in the ‘incomplete’ definition or in the ‘universalist’ approach, the functioning of 
inequality does indeed capture the social shape of human deprivation. The incomplete 
definition of functionings and capabilities is preferred to this author, because inequality 
measurement needs predefined criteria, not only in its measurement but also in its 
perception. Thus, many of the problems of inequality measurement rely on this 
methodological struggle. If income is the only data available, it was discussed that social 
inequality can be captured by any standard measurement of income inequality. Another 
way to consider inequality assessment is the consideration of equivalence scales. Using 
the utilitarian framework, which is many times rejected by the capability approach, the 
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equivalence scales uses the traditional microeconomic setting in order to consider human 
heterogeneity. In the household framework, the assignment of different weights to 
females, children and young people is a more realistic assumption in regards to human 
needs. The use of equivalence scales does change the perceived level of human 
deprivation, and the use of any of these methods is preferred, rather than considering only 
the rough value of per capita income.  
For the case of Mexico, the capability approach of Sen has been progressively 
introduced, and it also has been better understood in methodological and empirical 
literature. In the beginning, the attempt of the CTMP of 2002 that formalized the poverty 
measurement was constrained by the data sources, so this issue implied the non-inclusion 
of the multidimensional setting. It was desirable, but not practically calculated with the 
data available. The important topic of income distribution in regards to inequality as such 
was left out because of an alleged ambiguous relationship with poverty measurement. 
The capability approach was introduced in the definition of the second and the third 
poverty line. Later on in 2005, the people close to the CTMP identified a 
multidimensional ‘hole’, so some research was done to support the predefined one-
dimensional income poverty measure, and the multidimensional approach was considered 
redundant. Equivalence scales were introduced in this attempt, but there were political 
and practical implications that made this new lower poverty ratio to be postponed in the 
official measurement. Finally, a formal consideration of a HDI was developed in 2006, 
with a new joint effort of a multidimensional measure with distributional judgments. Not 
surprisingly, the new measurement showed that inequality measurement should be a 
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component of a valid human development index. This last point supports our main 
argument that inequality is a separate face of human deprivation. 
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88   Inequality and the Capability Approach in Mexico: Empirical Relationship 
between Income Inequality and other Functionings. 
 
8.1 Abstract. 
 
It is expected that, without artificial intervention, different aspects of human 
deprivation would be positively correlated. If inequality is considered to be a separate 
functioning of human well-being, we expect it to be related with other functionings in 
such a way. For the case of Mexico, we made an empirical test that support the claim that 
inequality measures are positively and significantly related with destitution measures 
using other vectors, finding that is also supported by dispersion analysis charts. The 
implication of this finding might be such that whenever other types of measures of 
destitution are not available, such as poverty or human development indices, then 
inequality measurement might be used as a proxy for destitution. The results of the model 
show that whenever higher income inequality is present in a community, it is more likely 
to find other sorts of destitutions, such as poorer availability of public services, lower 
quality of dwelling and overall higher marginalization and underdevelopment as well. 
These results are found to be consistent over the different geographical regions and after 
controlling for municipal characteristics. The results are strong when urban and rural 
communities are considered separately, the results are also consistent after taking into 
account intrahousehold distribution with the use of equivalence scales, and finally, the 
results seem to be free of the type of inequality measure chosen. 
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8.2 Introduction. 
 
If the consideration of social inequality, approximated by the measurement of 
income inequality, is another shape of human deprivation, the measurement of this 
deprivation would be expected to be related consistently with the lack of achievement in 
other dimensions as well. In a country where there is no intended mechanism of the 
government (e.g. unemployment benefits) in order to compensate the part of the 
population who are suffering higher levels of inequality, the negative effect of higher 
levels of social inequality would be expected to be related in the same direction as the 
other sorts of destitutions (Sen, 1999. p. 94). The link of inequality deprivation with other 
sources of destitution compel us to understand the central concern of the vicious circle 
that represents social inequality with the increase of other sorts of destitution: there is a 
problem of getting access to services when there is high inequality, so “[t]he latter  tends 
to intensify the inequality problem already reflected in income inequality” (Sen, 1999, p. 
119). Because the pervasive negative effect of higher levels of inequality in the society is 
linked with non-efficient outcomes for the society (Sen, 1999, p. 93), the interest for a 
researcher would be to highlight the issue. The impact of higher inequality is also 
problematic for the society in terms that this issue ‘inhibit overall poverty reduction’ 
(Ravallion, 2004, p. 68). 
Inequality is a measure of deprivation that can be measured within any dimension 
of human well-being as an approximation of social inequality, but is traditionally 
assessed in the dimension of income.190 Once the effect of social inequality is determined, 
or at least approximated, we can explore empirically the extent of the relationship with 
                                                 
190 See the discussion of income and the capability approach in the chapters 1 and 7. 
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other dimensions of well-being. An unambiguous positive relationship of inequality 
measures with income poverty has been already highlighted in chapter 6; therefore, a 
natural expansion of this exercise would be to explore the extent to which the 
measurement of inequality is related with deprivation on other dimensions of well-being, 
or, in other words, to see the link of inequality with other functionings. The advantage of 
this exercise would be that, if we find an unambiguous relationship of inequality levels 
with other kinds of functionings, we can find alternative ways to assess human 
development with a simpler tool that is inequality measurement.  
The correct way to interpret those results would not be to use inequality as ‘the’ 
measure of destitution,191 but as a parallel device in order to measure welfare, such that 
whenever other kind of measures are not available, inequality measurement can serve as a 
proxy for well-being. The intuition is that for a person who suffers from high inequality 
in her/his community, it would be more difficult to achieve other functionings in order to 
live well (Sen, 1999, p. 119). For instance, a better provision of public services will allow 
the community to improve their quality of life through the utilization of these services, so 
the distribution of resources in the community might be more egalitarian due to the 
positive effect of the achieved functionings. In the same way, a community that have 
electricity supply will be more likely to have established firms that provide jobs to the 
community, and then the community will be able to have households with better wages. 
A community with better water supply would be more likely to have healthier members, 
then their jobs would be more stable and so their wages, and so on. On the other hand, if 
we know the relationship of income inequality and other capability vectors, we might 
                                                 
191 See the section 2.5 where the approach of Miller and Roby (1971) of inequality as the measurement of 
poverty is rejected by Sen (1983). 
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have an idea of what is driving such social inequality. We might use the results of the 
research for policy recommendations, because if the government wants to alleviate 
feelings of social injustice, they might focus first on certain deprivations that are more 
related with the issue of inequality. 
Not all the time human development indices or absolute poverty measures are 
available in a detailed spatial level of aggregation: some times these indicators are 
available only for the country overall or with a long period of time between one survey 
and the other. These constraints are not usually applied to inequality measurement. These 
estimates of inequality can be made with more regularity, considering Mexico as an 
example, employment surveys are quarterly available, compared with the biannual period 
of the consumption surveys, or even compared with the five or ten year periodicity of 
census data. The more detailed level of aggregation of employment surveys is also an 
advantage. So, inequality assessment can guide policy makers, if they wish so, in order to 
concentrate primarily in places where the communities are not so equal. The government 
intervention would allow the community to be benefited from better sorts of public 
programs. In that sense, it will not be dangerous to think that the government can use 
estimates of inequality measurement in order to predict underachievement in other 
functionings, in other words, the relationship of inequality might measure the impact of 
other achieved functionings that are levels of individual well-being. Once the estimates of 
achieved functionings or other selected indicators of capabilities are available, the results 
can be compared with inequality estimates in order to have a clear picture of how the 
relationship is working through time. 
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••  Overview.  
 
We will highlight a model that includes the relationship of several achieved 
functionings in the community and see how those indicators are related, after several 
control tests, with the measure of inequality in the community; this is presented in section 
8.3 together with the description of the variables used in the model. The hypothesis 
would be that the levels of inequality will covariate in the same direction as the other 
functioning levels. The results that confirm this hypothesis are shown in section 8.4, 
followed by some robustness checks in section 8.5. Finally, section 8.6 has some 
concluding remarks. 
 
8.3 Data and Empirical Model. 
 
Using the terminology of Sen (1985b) in regards to the capability approach, which 
is discussed in the previous chapter, we know that (achieved) functionings (doings and 
beings that people value) can be empirically assessed by the researcher if the definitions 
are made clear, but the definition of capabilities are not so easy to operationalise, neither 
it is straightforward to make their measurement (Alkire, 2002; Kuklys, 2005). 
Considering functionings, we can compare how the expressed social inequality embedded 
in the standard measurement of income inequality is related with achieved functionings, 
such as the provision of public services (e.g. water supply, electricity, etc.). On the other 
hand, it would be difficult to know how the capability of living in a more equal society 
would be related with other types of freedoms, such as the right to live in a more 
participatory society, or the right to live in a society with access to functional markets in 
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order to buy necessary goods. We maintain our focus in measurable functionings and 
achieved functionings because of the pragmatic empirical approach of this chapter. 
Even though our interest relies more in the sign and the significance of the 
empirical relationship between measures of inequality with other indicators of destitution, 
we can take suggestions not only from the econometrical experience, but also from the 
intuitive factors that are present for the case of Mexico, so this underlying theory would 
specify the dependent and the independent variables in this model as is suggested by 
Greene (2003), such that this decision would be outside of the consideration of the basic 
econometric model (p. 7). 
 
 I Description of the Data. 
 
The data come from a variety of sources as is shown in Table 8-1. The indices of 
poverty and inequality are our own calculations using the ENE data set, using the 
methodology explained in chapter 4. The year 2003 was chosen because of the 
availability of detailed household information. The information is available for 749 from 
a total of 2456 municipalities. The achieved functionings are estimates from the same 
ENE survey; the people reported the availability of services in their home in a section of 
the questionnaire, services such as electricity connection, water supply, drainage supply 
and phone service. The services are ‘achieved’ because people reported to have not only 
the opportunity of having the access to the service, but the service is reported to be indeed 
provided at their home.  
Marginalization indices are provided by CONAPO for the years 2000 and 2005, 
constructed on the basis of census data. Both indices use the technique of the principal 
302 
component method, but there are differences between them. The HDI constructed in 2000 
is a measure of human development, in the contrary, the index of 2005 is an 
agglomerated measure of deprivation, so the direction of the measure of HDI tends to be 
more positive as long as the community is better off, while the other indicator is bigger if 
there is more deprivation. The dimensions that compose the HDI of 2000 are child 
mortality, literacy and per capita GDP in the municipality. The dimensions of the 
marginalization index of 2005 does not include dimensions of health, but includes vectors 
of education, quality of dwelling, access to public services such as electricity and water 
supply, level of urbanization, overcrowding levels and indicators of low wage 
employment.  
The next six functioning vectors in the municipalities are taken from the 
CONAPO (2005) data base. These values were indeed used to construct the composite 
index for 2005, but it will be helpful to look at them as individual functionings 
separately. 192  There is no problem to include these functionings on the equations 
considering that they are from different year than 2003. The reason to compare inequality 
levels of 2003 with levels of achievement of other functionings for 2005 is such that no 
economic crisis or an important economic event took place between 2003 and 2005. So, 
the possibility of a bias due to this change of year is minimal on the reported levels of 
inequality or on the reported levels of functioning achievement. These vectors are used 
because of the better detail provided by census data. From these 6 vectors, three are 
public services, and the other three are averages of quality of living, such as indicators of 
overcrowding in the household, poor quality of dwelling and percentage of households in 
                                                 
192 These six indicators are considered as functionings, but not as ‘achieved’ functionings, because these 
indicators show the availability of services within the community, and it is not for sure that these services 
were effectively achieved by household members at that time. 
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the community that earn less than twice the minimum wage. Finally, some characteristics 
of the municipalities, such as a the proportion of females in the community and the 
percentage of people living in the rural areas, are included, together with the mean 
income level of the community and the mean income level of the poor as well. In this 
paper we use a logarithmic transformation on the mean income variable, as it is the 
legacy of the Paretian (1897) log-normal distribution. In doing so, we could see clearly 
the estimated coefficients in economic sense.193
 
Main variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Common Deprivation Indices
   P0 0.339 0.204 0.047 1.000
   P1 0.202 0.151 0.006 0.955
   P2 0.161 0.125 0.000 0.915
   Gini 0.424 0.070 0.083 0.724
   Theil 0.344 0.136 0.030 1.296
Achieved Functionings (Services)
   % Lack of Electricity Supply 0.020 0.047 0.000 0.935
   % Lack of Water Supply 0.084 0.164 0.000 0.992
   % Lack of Drainage Supply 0.151 0.219 0.000 0.988
   % No Phones (land lines) 0.530 0.258 0.000 0.995
Composite Indices
   Human Dev. Index (2000) 0.778 0.072 0.469 0.930
   Margin. Index (2005) -1.024 0.945 -2.366 3.251
Functionings in the municipalities (2005)
   % Lack of Drainage Supply 0.054 0.091 0.000 0.734
   % Lack of Electricity 0.023 0.044 0.001 0.704
   % Lack of Water Supply 0.105 0.161 0.000 0.947
   % Overcrowding households 0.411 0.122 0.107 0.838
   % Poor quality dwelling. 0.110 0.144 0.002 0.915
   % Employed < 2 min.wages 0.465 0.187 0.117 0.937
Control Variables
   Log-Mean inc. (µ) 6.961 0.624 3.043 8.160
   Log-Mean inc. (poor) 5.387 0.398 1.567 6.425
   % rural 0.516 0.481 0.000 1.000
   % female 0.522 0.029 0.377 0.667
(n=749)
Own calculations (2003 from ENE), and CONAPO indices (2000, 2005).  
Table 8-1. Main variables. 
 
                                                 
193 However, the transformation of a variable in a logarithmic fashion does consider implicitly a different 
treatment to the income of the people in the lower part of the distribution (Sen, 1973, p. 28). This 
consideration is a property of some of the inequality measures. 
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 II Inequality and Destitution in the Historical Context. 
 
The methodological relationship of measures of inequality with other indices of 
destitution of other functionings has been addressed in classical and development 
literature. It is clear that inequality is an indicator of ‘social destitution’ (Smith, 1776, 
WN, 5, II; Sen, 1976 in Sen 1982, p. 377), and has been argued consistently that higher 
levels of inequality induce higher levels of destitution in other functionings. In this sense, 
inequality is a kind of deprivation. Social inequality is associated also with social 
rebellion, which produces a lack of cohesion among the individuals in the community 
(Sen, 1973, p. 1). In this regards, rebellion and social problems enforce cycles of 
underdevelopment, with the consequent deprivation not only on the family income, but 
also on the underachievement of other functionings and the lesser possibility to have 
access to a bigger set of opportunities. 
The relationship of measures of inequality with other measures of destitutions 
might be difficult to explain in an empirical model, we do not know for sure which 
phenomenon causes the other: it is possible that social levels of inequality might be 
driving destitution in other functionings, but it also makes sense to think that destitution 
in other functionings, such as lack of basic services, might be accentuating the increase of 
inequality in the communities. In the econometric setting, it is necessary to support a 
causal relationship in order to use a regression model. There is no question that high 
inequality in the society is related with other destitutions, because of the vicious circle 
that is the outcome of the lack of cohesion in the community, which is the main argument 
of this chapter, but it can also make sense to consider that the lack of achievement in 
other functionings might explain the more unequal distribution in the society. So, once 
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that the model is specified as a causal relationship, the definition of the dependent and the 
independent variable makes sense to consider with a variety of possibilities. For instance, 
Maddala (1992) suggests doing a ‘reverse’ regression whenever the direction of causation 
is not clear (p. 75). For our case, that reverse relationship would be that inequality is 
caused by destitution in other functionings. Econometric theory also suggests that in the 
case of a not very clear designation of the dependent and the independent variable, the 
variable that is easier to predict might be more wisely chosen as an independent variable 
(Amemiya, 1994, p. 229). Considering this criteria, inequality measures seem to be ideal 
candidates to be chosen as independent variables. 
The phenomenon of inequality in Mexico has its roots in the artificial change of 
the social conditions during the period of the European conquest, almost five hundreds 
years ago. The European settlers fought for the prevalence of their sowed European-style 
institutions against the will of the native inhabitants of the conquered territories 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001, p. 1374). The majority of the indigenous groups that survived the 
bloodiest battles were surrendered by the European colonizers, and the rest of them fled 
to the mountains. These last ones, separated from the growing civilization, could not get 
easily caught by the established army. While the colonizers where organizing the social 
structures in order to get the most from the American territories (Angeles, 2007), the 
indigenous groups tried to preserve their own traditions, living a life the most separated 
as possible from the European and the growing ‘mestizo’ (mixed) population. This 
process endured for about 300 years, when most of the colonies around the world started 
to gain independence from the European settlers. So, the established social organization 
in Latin American countries that scattered inhabitants in remote rural areas, made the 
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economic distribution very unequal through this very long process of European 
colonization. 
After the independence, the resultant mixed population tried to gain access to 
more distant territories controlled by indigenous people and their leaders (‘caciques’), 
because of the vast natural resources available in that land. With legalistic arguments and 
the help of national armies, these indigenous groups were again expelled from their own 
land to more inaccessible rural areas. In order to stay alive, they develop a survival 
device: they scattered themselves along the territory. They did this because living in well 
defined communities would imply for them a higher risk to be surrendered.  The 
advantage of being distributed along the territory in small groups would gave them the 
confidence that, whenever any small group was attacked by their enemies, the rest of the 
community living in scattered regions would easily move through the mountains, without 
the risk of being captured. This device has been present for hundreds of years, and that is 
the reason indigenous people are very much dispersed across the territory. This unnatural 
dispersion increased again the unequal distribution of resources among the rural 
communities, because of the unavailability of cheaper public services. This is the main 
reason why recently the provision of public services by the governmental programs has 
been so expensive to provide. The very low density of population of these communities 
makes very difficult to give them public services and health access, but we need to 
consider that this method of self-isolation gave them the opportunity to survive during 
five hundred years of persecution. 
Coming back to the issue of the causal relationship, it has been pointed out by 
governmental offices, that the services provided to the population are much related with 
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the density of population. The more unequal communities have the less probability to 
have a better provision of public services. In the case of Mexico, for instance, the Federal 
Commission of Electricity (CFE), a national public monopoly since the year 1960, 
follows a ‘rule of thumb’ to provide electricity to remote communities wherever “a 
community is located less than 10 km from the grid and has a road to facilitate movement 
of equipment” (ITC, 2005, p. 5).  The social inequality captured by our measures of 
inequality can be used as independent variables that can explain the lack of provision of 
public services. Since 1996, a program of decentralization by the federal government 
tried to put the decision-making process of electricity allocation on the municipal and the 
state governments, therefore, CFE has been working only as a contractor with federal 
funding 12 years ago. In spite of this decentralization, unluckily for the most destitute 
communities, it happens that both municipal and state governments are ‘vote-
maximizers’. The main concern for them is to be reelected, so the decision to allocate 
public services seems to be again related with the density of population, where the most 
benefited would be the communities with higher number of people, and because of that, 
the less unequal. So, it seems to be that the unequal distribution of resources has been 
enforcing a vicious cycle of underdevelopment.  
A similar problem is faced by the institutions that provide water supply and 
drainage, but it is accentuated this problem with the scarcity of water stock in certain 
areas. Not surprisingly, the most deprived communities in terms of clean water supply 
and drainage are the states of Guerrero, Oaxaca and Chiapas (CONAGUA, 2007, p. 89), 
even though these states accounts with important natural water resources. It is of notice 
that these states have the highest indigenous population density across the Mexican 
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territory. For the above mentioned reasons, we think that to construct an empirical model 
is sensible, and that the causal relationship works as we hypothesize seems to be clear, 
such that the measures of functionings are dependent variables and inequality measures, 
which approximate the phenomenon of social inequality, can be used as independent 
variables because of the historic process that caused the unequal distribution. 
 
 III Empirical Model. 
 
The first glance of the relationship of inequality with other functionings indicates 
a positive relationship of inequality with measures of income poverty. The first achieved 
functioning that is sensible to consider is the sufficient availability of money in order to 
buy a basket of basic goods. This functioning is well captured by traditional poverty 
measures. The dispersion analysis of income inequality with income poverty (in Figure 
8-1) gives a hint of a positive relationship between them. But that was already discussed 
more formally in chapter 6, where the positive correlation between poverty and inequality 
was shown, even after some robustness checks. In our diagram, both indicators of 
inequality such as Gini coefficient and Theil index present a higher level of inequality 
that is correspondent to a higher number of poor people in the community.194  
                                                 
194 The relationship holds with other measures of poverty as well, in the Appendix ( is shown 
the Gini coefficient and the Theil Index with other measure of poverty in the same direction. 
Figure 8-4) 
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Figure 8-1. Dispersion Analysis, Inequality (Gini and Theil) with Headcount 
Poverty, 2003. 
 
The dispersion analysis is helpful. However, it is obvious that other factors might 
be affecting the relationship between poverty and inequality; moreover, there might be 
factors that would be affecting also the relationship between the levels of inequality with 
the measures of functionings in general. In this case, it is necessary to control the 
influence of other variables in order to see more clearly the basic relationship of 
inequality with other functionings. In order to do so, a regression analysis will be 
performed. 
We start with our empirical model that shows a relationship between any of the 
available functionings with indices of inequality. The empirical model tool allows us to 
control for municipal characteristics that might potentially bias some part of the 
relationship. So, we want to be sure that the relationship is only related with the variables 
of functionings and with those of inequality measures. The basic model is the following: 
(11) 0 1 2i iF I Xλ γ i iβ β β= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ε   
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Where iFλ  is the general measurement of the functioningλ  in the municipality i. 
We perform a separate regression for each functioning, which are usually expressed in 
percentage terms, for instance, is the achieved functioning of electricity supply,  is 
the availability of clean water in the household, and so on. On the right hand side,  is 
the measurement of inequality 
1F 2F
iI γ
γ  in the municipality i, andγ denotes different inequality 
measures: Gini coefficient ( ) or Theil index ( ) are the most used examples.GI 1I
 Finally, 
is a vector of control variables. iX
An expanded model includes the consideration of regions, in order to control for 
the possible regional effect of inequality on the chosen functionings. This effect might 
differ among the several geographical locations; then the model becomes the following: 
(12) 0 1 2 1
1
_
r
i i i k
k
F I X region kλ γ i iβ β β δ
=
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +∑ ε  
Where the additional variable ‘region’ might be states within the country or 
predefined geographical regions. As is expected, r goes from 1 up to the number of 
possible regions minus one, in order to avoid the problem of multicollinearity. In this 
paper we use the 8 regions for the case of Mexico that are defined in chapter 4. 
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8.4 General Results. 
 
 I Causality. 
 
We conduct not only the regression model of inequality on the achieved 
functionings, but the other way around as well, which is the ‘reverse’ regression 
suggested by Maddala (1992). The results show that the estimated coefficients of the 
functionings on the variables of inequality are positive and significant. That fact would 
allow to introduce the main results of our regressions. This basic equation mainly studies 
how the achieved functionings might be explained at some extent by the inequality 
measures, including a set of additional explanatory variables on the right hand of the 
equation. Given the data limitation, the regressions of our models do not test empirically 
for a causal relationship, as it could be done with the use of the Grainger test (in Green, 
2003, p. 592), but we already clarify the causal relationship of inequality on the 
functionings with the intuitive explanation for the case of Mexico, and also with the 
support of the present arguments in development economics literature. So, we continue 
with our main results in the following part. 
 
 II Inequality and Achieved Functionings. 
 
The first round of results uses equations(11) and (12). The estimates of our model 
(Table 8-2) show a positive relationship of our main variable of inequality on each of the 
mentioned functionings. Lack of water supply and lack of drain service seems to be 
functionings that receive a bigger impact by the higher levels of inequality (.259 and .301 
respectively). The relationship of inequality with electricity supply is also positive, but 
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not statistically significant. The other covariates show intuitive results, which increase 
confidence in our results. So, higher levels of destitution in the functionings are inversely 
related to the mean income and the mean income of the poor. In general, the probability 
to be in rural areas is consistent with higher levels of destitution on the achieved 
functionings, such as the access to drainage supply and phone service. There seems to be 
a probability to have a better achieved functionings as long as the community shows a 
higher proportion of females; we will remain cautious about this last finding and we will 
see if that significance remains the same with the use of equivalence scales in one of the 
robustness checks at the end of this section. On the other hand, the inclusion of regions in 
the calculations (columns 2 and 4) strengthen our results and our main findings stay, so 
our results are free from any regional bias. 
 
Achieved Functionings
Electricity Deprivation Lack of water supply
1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t
Gini 0.013 0.4 0.020 0.6 0.259 3.6 0.253 3.4
Mean income -0.043 -9.2 -0.049 -9.8 -0.123 -11.2 -0.130 -11.0
Mean inc. (poor -0.006 -0.9 -0.003 -0.5 0.003 0.2 0.000 0.0
% rural -0.002 -0.3 -0.012 -1.6 -0.017 -1.0 -0.027 -1.5
% female -0.293 -4.4 -0.280 -4.1 -1.041 -6.7 -0.965 -5.9
Regions Yes - Yes -
R2=0.1664 F=  28.9 R2=0.1904 F=  14.0 R2=0.2518 F=  48.8 R2=0.2597 F=  21.0
Lack of drain service Lack of a telephone landline
1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t
Gini 0.301 3.0 0.393 4.0 0.001 0.0 -0.067 -0.5
Mean income -0.153 -10.1 -0.179 -11.4 0.011 0.6 0.020 1.0
Mean inc. (poor 0.043 2.2 0.048 2.4 0.152 6.2 0.144 5.6
% rural 0.126 5.5 0.116 4.9 0.245 8.6 0.238 7.8
% female -1.107 -5.2 -0.900 -4.2 0.138 0.5 0.099 0.4
Regions Yes - Yes -
R2=0.2753 F=  55.1 R2=0.3335 F=  29.9 R2=0.1086 F=  17.7 R2=0.1183 F=   8.0
2003. Own calculations.  
Table 8-2. Relationship of Inequality and Achieved Functionings, 2003. 
 
It is necessary to comment upon the functioning of phone service, which shows 
almost no impact from the variable of inequality (.001). For this functioning it is 
necessary to comment that the company that provides this service is not a governmental 
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institution but an authorized monopoly since 1990. Their decisions are driven mostly by 
the population density, as it can be clear when we see the higher impact of the variable of 
percentage of rural areas on the functioning. Even though in order to be privatized, the 
telecommunications company (TELMEX) acquired certain responsibilities agreed with 
the government, and one of these responsibilities stated to offer services to all, including 
the most remote communities, there are still things to be turned into a reality. For our 
purposes, it is clear that the company’s policy related to selection of communities where 
the service is provided, seems to be unrelated to the sentiment of inequality in the 
community, but only to the commercial decisions of the corporation; they seems to 
conduct business taking into account only the efficient use of their resources that will 
generate the highest payoff for their investment. The lack of significance of inequality in 
this functioning might also be related with the use of alternative ways of communication, 
as it could be the use of cellular phones, but that information is not captured by our data 
on the functioning of phone service, which only includes land lines. For our case, it is not 
surprising to have a very small effect of inequality related with telephone service 
functioning, because the decision of phone service allocation seems to be totally 
independent of what is happening in the community, and our hypothesis that inequality is 
related in the same direction with other measures of destitutions holds only when there is 
no artificial intervention by other parties. In this case, a private interest might be biasing 
the relationship. 
The results of the model are consistent with our dispersion analysis. We can see in 
Figure 8-2 that the relationship of inequality with any of the achieved functionings 
mentioned is consistently positive, but with the exception of the phone service 
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functioning because of the reasons explained above. This implies that higher levels of 
inequality are consistently related with higher levels of destitution for any of the basic 
services provided, such as electricity, water supply and drainage supply. 
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Figure 8-2. Dispersion Analysis, Inequality (Gini) with Achieved Functionings. 
 
 III Inequality and Functionings (2005). 
 
It would be interesting to know what the relationships of inequality with other 
types of functionings are. In Table 8-3 we show the results of the regressions for a 
selection of functionings for the year 2005. The first three cases are similar to the 
functionings just mentioned earlier, such as the provision of electricity, water supply and 
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drainage supply. The impact of inequality for these three functioning levels is 
consistently positive and statistically significant as it was the previous case. The other 
three functionings, which are measures of quality of living, show also a positive relation, 
which means higher levels of inequality correspondent to lower quality of well-being. 
This relationship is clear with the impact of inequality on measures of overcrowding 
(more than four people living in the same room), with the quality of dwelling 
(approximated with the quality of floor in the house), and with people with lower wages 
(persons in the household earning less than twice the minimum wage). In all six cases, the 
mean income is inversely related to the measure of destitution, and rural areas are also the 
most deprived. The results are consistent not only with those of the original model (11), 
but also with the consideration of regions, as it is explained in equation (12). The 
dispersion analysis is provided in the Appendix (Figure 8-5), with also a positive 
relationship of these functionings with the measure of income inequality. 
 
Capabilities available in the community measured at 2005.
Drainage Supply 2005 Electricity Supply 2005
1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t
Gini 0.168 4.0 0.135 3.2 0.045 1.9 0.034 1.4
Mean income -0.065 -10.3 -0.058 -8.7 -0.039 -10.7 -0.042 -10.7
Mean inc. (poor 0.010 1.3 0.008 0.9 -0.007 -1.5 -0.005 -1.0
% rural 0.046 4.8 0.045 4.4 0.006 1.1 -0.003 -0.5
% female -0.022 -0.2 -0.070 -0.8 -0.155 -3.0 -0.157 -2.9
Regions Yes - Yes -
R2=0.2659 F=  52.5 R2=0.2857 F=  23.9 R2=0.2316 F=  43.7 R2=0.2636 F=  21.4
Water Supply (2005) Overcrowding level (2005)
1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t
Gini 0.287 4.3 0.200 3.0 0.100 2.4 0.005 0.2
Mean income -0.110 -10.7 -0.096 -9.0 -0.107 -17.0 -0.090 -15.4
Mean inc. (poor -0.001 -0.1 -0.013 -1.0 0.072 8.7 0.044 5.9
% rural -0.004 -0.3 -0.003 -0.2 0.060 6.2 0.078 8.9
% female -0.285 -2.0 -0.351 -2.4 -0.174 -2.0 -0.164 -2.0
Regions Yes - Yes -
R2=0.2243 F=  41.9 R2=0.2799 F=  23.2 m    R2=0.40 23  F=  97 m    R2=0.56 18  F=  76
Dwelling Quality (2005) People employed with < 2 minimum wages (2005)
1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t
Gini 0.313 5.7 0.211 4.1 0.291 5.7 0.183 3.9
Mean income -0.137 -16.4 -0.126 -15.4 -0.182 -23.4 -0.155 -20.7
Mean inc. (poor 0.016 1.4 0.005 0.4 0.109 10.7 0.085 9.0
% rural 0.031 2.5 0.019 1.5 0.109 9.3 0.124 11.0
% female 0.027 0.2 -0.098 -0.9 0.425 3.9 0.300 2.9
Regions Yes - Yes -
oor    R2=0. 4068  F= oor    R2=0. 5093  F= R2=0.582 6  F= 202. R2=0.664 8  F= 118.
2003. Own calculations.  
Table 8-3. Relationship of Inequality and Functionings (2005). 
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  IV Inequality and Composite Indices. 
 
Another way for checking our inequality measurement, perhaps stronger, ,it 
would be to relate our measures of inequality with composite indices of overall well 
being, as are the Human Development Index (CONAPO, 2000) and the Index of 
Marginalization (CONAPO, 2005) provided by a governmental office. We can see in 
Table 8-4 that, after controlling for municipal characteristics, the positive relationship 
with composite indices is maintained. Our inequality measure shows a positive and 
statistically significant relationship with the marginalization index of 2005; such a thing 
implies that higher inequality is related with higher indicators of destitution. The 
relationship with the Human Development Index for 2000 seems to be negative, but we 
should remember that the nature of this index is different, because HDI shows 
improvement in well-being, and not a higher level of destitution. The ‘negative’ 
relationship just means that higher inequality is inversely related with higher levels of 
development, which is the same to say that inequality is positively related with lower 
development. The other covariates remain statistically significant, the mean income, 
percentage of rural communities in the municipality and percentage of females as 
explained above. The consideration of regions (column 2 and 4) made our results 
consistent, because the results remain the same. 
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Composite Indexes
HDI 2000 (Mortality, literacy and GDP) Marginalization index (2005)
1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t
Gini -0.065 -3.6 -0.039 -2.2 1.565 6.6 1.010 4.6
Mean income 0.071 26.0 0.066 23.5 -0.949 -26.2 -0.855 -24.4
Mean inc. (poor -0.017 -4.6 -0.012 -3.5 0.271 5.7 0.182 4.1
% rural -0.048 -11.5 -0.048 -11.3 0.576 10.5 0.570 10.8
% female -0.102 -2.6 -0.061 -1.6 0.326 0.6 -0.216 -0.4
Regions Yes - Yes -
R2=0.6523 F= 272.36 R2=0.6809 F= 127.87 R2=0.656 1  F= 277. R2=0.720 6  F= 154.
2003. Own calculations.  
Table 8-4. Relationship of Inequality and Composite Indices. 
 
The dispersion analysis presented in Figure 8-3 shows a positive relationship as 
well. It is noticed that the units of measurement for the composite indices are unique to 
every index, such thing is due to the endogenous nature of the method of construction of 
the indices; these indices are calculated according to the matrices of vectors using the 
principal component analysis. In order to show levels of destitutions, the units of the HDI 
of 2000 were reversed, so in both cases, the clear positive relationship of higher 
inequality with higher level of destitutions is also clear. 
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Figure 8-3. Dispersion Analysis, Inequality (Gini) with Composite Indices of 
Development. 
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8.5 Robustness checks. 
 
 I Assessment with Different Inequality Measures. 
 
The first question that might arise about the robustness of our results might be 
related to the measure of inequality chosen. Gini coefficient has been widely used in 
empirical analysis, but it could be interesting to know if other types of measures tell the 
same story. We chose a member of the family of entropy indices, which is the Theil 
index. The Theil index’s main characteristics are, on the one hand, its decomposability by 
population sub-group, on the other hand is that it attaches more importance to transfers 
done at the lower end of the scale, so it has ‘transfer sensitiveness’.195 The results of the 
regressions of model 1 and model 2 are consistent with the results; just showing slightly 
different levels of statistical significance, but the same positive direction. Of all the 
results that we previously obtained, the first 4 achieved functionings, the next 6 
functionings, and the two composite indices show exact similarity. In Table 8-5 we are 
showing only the check for the functioning of drainage supply as an example, because the 
rest of the functionings show the same positive relation with the measurement of 
inequality. In column 1 and column 2 the Gini coefficient is presented, and column 3 and 
4 show the Theil Index; from these is clear that the impact of inequality on the 
functioning is very similar. Now, we can assess that positive relationship of inequality 
with other functionings is positive regardless the type of inequality measure chosen.  
 
                                                 
195 Inequality measurement properties were discussed in chapter 2. 
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Lack of Drain Supply, 2003. compared with different Inequality Measures.
Both Urban and Rural
Inequality is the Gini Coefficient. Inequality is Theil Index
1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t
INEQUALITY 0.301 3.0 0.393 4.0 0.164 3.2 0.205 4.0
Mean income -0.153 -10.1 -0.179 -11.4 -0.151 -9.9 -0.176 -11.2
Mean inc. (poor) 0.043 2.2 0.048 2.4 0.044 2.2 0.049 2.5
% rural 0.126 5.5 0.116 4.9 0.128 5.6 0.118 5.0
% female -1.107 -5.2 -0.900 -4.2 -1.101 -5.1 -0.890 -4.1
Regions Yes - Yes -
R2=0.2753 F=  55.1 R2=0.3335 F=  29.9 R2=0.2760 F=  55.36 R2=0.3335 F=  29.98
2003. Own calculations.  
Table 8-5. Relationship of Inequality and Composite Indices. 
 
 II Urban-Rural considerations. 
 
Even though we include regional analysis in our regressions, the relationship of 
inequality with other functionings could be different when we divide the sample between 
urban and rural municipalities.196 The results show that in the urban sample, the effect of 
inequality on other functionings decreases significantly. The effect of inequality is still 
positive and significant, but with a lower value than in the national sample. The effect of 
inequality in the rural sample, as expected, remains around the same value as in the 
national sample, even with higher level of statistical significance. In this case, our result 
of the relationship of inequality with other measures of destitution is consistently 
positive, but it is clear that the effect is more accentuated in rural communities, which are 
the most destitute.  
 
                                                 
196 We need to clarify that some municipalities have both urban and rural communities, and these mixed 
municipalities are included in each urban and rural regression. The variable of percentage of rural areas (% 
rural) captures this degree of urbanization. 
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Comparisons of Urban Rural areas.
National sample. Urban Rural
Marginalization index (2005) t 2 t 3 t 4 t 5 t 6 t
Gini 1.565 6.6 1.010 4.6 0.799 2.0 0.544 1.4 1.828 6.6 1.243 4.8
Mean income -0.949 -26.2 -0.855 -24.4 -0.938 -13.0 -0.934 -12.7 -0.894 -20.9 -0.797 -19.4
Mean inc. (poor) 0.271 5.7 0.182 4.1 0.394 5.7 0.316 4.9 0.233 4.2 0.149 2.8
% rural 0.576 10.5 0.570 10.8 0.375 3.5 0.348 3.5 1.005 8.1 0.952 8.5
% female 0.326 0.6 -0.216 -0.4 0.451 0.5 -0.139 -0.2 0.159 0.3 -0.441 -0.8
Regions Yes - Yes - Yes -
R2=0.656 1  F= 277. R2=0.720 6  F= 154. n    R2=0.597 9  F=  57. n    R2=0.681 7  F=  33. n    R2=0.58 05  F= 159. n    R2=0.66 34  F=  93.2
Lack of drain service t 2 t 3 t 4 t 5 t 6 t
Gini 0.301 3.0 0.393 4.0 -0.014 -0.1 0.088 0.7 0.294 2.5 0.404 3.4
Mean income -0.153 -10.1 -0.179 -11.4 -0.076 -3.6 -0.111 -4.9 -0.160 -8.7 -0.185 -9.9
Mean inc. (poor) 0.043 2.2 0.048 2.4 -0.006 -0.3 0.007 0.3 0.054 2.3 0.052 2.2
% rural 0.126 5.5 0.116 4.9 0.163 5.1 0.163 5.3 0.133 2.5 0.151 3.0
% female -1.107 -5.2 -0.900 -4.2 -0.495 -1.9 -0.340 -1.3 -1.152 -4.6 -0.955 -3.7
Regions Yes - Yes - Yes -
R2=0.2753 F=  55.1 R2=0.3335 F=  29.9 R2=0.2100 F=  10.3 R2=0.3164 F=   7.2 R2=0.205 5  F=  29.74R2=0.276 1  F=  18.05
2003. Own calculations.  
Table 8-6. Inequality and Functionings, urban-rural comparison. 
 
 III Calculations with Equivalized Income. 
 
In chapter 4 we were careful to assess our results with the use of per capita 
income in the calculation of inequality. We suspected that some measurement errors 
might be taking place if the indicators of destitution did not reflect the consideration of 
intrahousehold distribution. However, the consideration of intrahousehold distributions 
can be incorporated in our inequality measures with the use of equivalence scales, as it is 
explained in chapter 7. In Table 8-7 we are showing two examples of functionings. The 
results are consistent with all the functionings presented earlier. The first group of rows 
shows a composite index, that is the measure of marginalization for 2005, and the second 
set of rows is the achieved functioning indicator for the lack of drain service. The first 
two columns are the results obtained using per capita income, available in previous 
tables. The next two columns are the results (1.454 and .264) that use weights provided 
by the Engel method in Teruel et al. (2005). The results of the last two columns use 
equivalized income (1.373 and .255) with the parametric method described in Deaton and 
Zaidi (2002). The results are consistent for our measures of inequality on the described 
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functionings, because the relationships are always positive and statistically significant, 
only the size of the coefficients changes a bit.  
 
Comparisons with Equivalence scales
Percapita Income Equivalized Income Equivalized Income
(Teruel et al. 2005, Engel w/scales) (Parametric NRC method 1995).
Marginalization index (2005) t 2 t 3 t 4 t 5 t 6 t
Gini 1.565 6.6 1.010 4.6 1.454 6.2 0.924 4.2 1.373 5.7 0.902 4.0
Mean income -0.949 -26.2 -0.855 -24.4 -0.891 -24.2 -0.823 -23.0 -0.865 -22.2 -0.804 -21.3
Mean inc. (poor) 0.271 5.7 0.182 4.1 0.248 7.1 0.182 5.5 0.255 8.0 0.193 6.3
% rural 0.576 10.5 0.570 10.8 0.581 10.7 0.566 10.8 0.581 10.6 0.578 10.8
% female 0.326 0.6 -0.216 -0.4 0.548 1.1 -0.059 -0.1 0.353 0.7 -0.277 -0.6
Regions Yes - Yes - Yes -
R2=0.656 1  F= 277. R2=0.720 6  F= 154. n    R2=0.667 1  F= 282.2 n    R2=0.727 0  F= 154.6 R2=0.676 1  F= 283.0 R2=0.731 5  F= 152.3
Lack of drain service t 2 t 3 t 4 t 5 t 6 t
Gini 0.301 3.0 0.393 4.0 0.264 2.6 0.366 3.7 0.255 2.5 0.353 3.5
Mean income -0.153 -10.1 -0.179 -11.4 -0.142 -9.2 -0.170 -10.6 -0.141 -8.5 -0.169 -10.0
Mean inc. (poor) 0.043 2.2 0.048 2.4 0.036 2.4 0.042 2.8 0.038 2.8 0.044 3.2
% rural 0.126 5.5 0.116 4.9 0.127 5.5 0.114 4.9 0.126 5.4 0.113 4.7
% female -1.107 -5.2 -0.900 -4.2 -1.034 -4.7 -0.804 -3.6 -1.015 -4.5 -0.764 -3.4
Regions Yes - Yes - Yes -
R2=0.2753 F=  55.1 R2=0.3335 F=  29.9 R2=0.2736 F=  53.02 R2=0.3356 F=  29.34 R2=0.2784 F=  52.32 R2=0.3452 F=  29.48
2003. Own calculations.  
Table 8-7. Inequality and Functionings, with equivalized income. 
 
The other covariates also remain consistent: rural areas are more likely to have 
higher deprivation, the possibility of deprivation in a particular functioning is lower as 
long as the general mean income is higher, and finally, against the traditional prediction 
in human development literature, there seems to be a higher probability of being better 
off (or not worse off) as long as the community have a higher proportion of females, even 
with the consideration of equivalence scales. However, the aim of this paper is not to 
explain the puzzling probability of higher development for females. We will only notice 
that this finding is consistent with those reported in the current literature on Mexican 
development. 197 The purpose of the inclusion of this variable was to show that the effect 
of inequality was free of any possible gender bias on the impact on the selected 
                                                 
197 The discussion of gender inequality in Mexico has been investigated in several literatures, however the 
results are inconclusive. See Nazar-Beutelspacher et al. (2005, p. 236), De Ferranti et al. (2004, p. 62, n. 
60) or Teruel et al. (2005, p. 22) among others. 
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functionings. For our case, we show that inequality measures, as an approximation of a 
social destitution, are consistently related in the same direction with other destitutions, 
even after controlling for municipal characteristics, regions, gender, different type of 
measures and the use of equivalence scales. 
 
8.6 Conclusions. 
 
The empirical exercise was helpful to support our main claim that inequality, as 
an indicator of social destitution, can be effectively related with deprivation on other 
functionings. The lack of services can be linked to the higher dispersion of the income 
distribution, which is captured by traditional measures of inequality. The measurement of 
inequality can be used as a measure of destitution when other types of measures, such as 
human development indices or poverty measures, are not available. It can be definitely 
suspected that in regions with higher income inequality, it is very likely that other sorts of 
destitution might be taking place. 
For the case of Mexico, the availability of services is related with social 
inequality. The public services that are more linked with inequality are water supply and 
drainage availability in the community. Electricity seems to play a role, but with a 
smaller impact than from the previous two functionings. On the quality of life within the 
household, the chosen functionings proved to be related with income inequality, such as 
the quality of dwelling and the levels of overcrowding. The relationship of inequality 
with the functioning that includes people with low earnings was not surprising; the 
relationship was positive and statistically significant as expected. The comparison of 
inequality with general levels of destitution, such as those measuring human development 
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or marginalization, made our results robust and strengthen our claim that inequality might 
appear to be intrinsically related with destitution overall. For the case of Mexico, the 
inequality relationship with other functionings is stronger for the rural areas, the effect of 
inequality remains consistent regardless of the type of measure chosen, and the inequality 
link is prevalent even with the consideration of equivalence scales within the household.  
All the previous issues made our results consistent, and help to support our assertion that 
inequality measurement should be studied and measured as an important side of human 
deprivation. 
 
8.7 Appendix. 
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Part III. General Concluding Remarks. 
 
Given the importance of the renewed interest in inequality measurement in 
developing countries, particularly in Latin America, the main goal of this work was to 
highlight several aspects in regards to the assessment of inequality in Mexico, using 
income inequality as an approximation for real social inequality in the country. The 
purpose of this research was to offer an additional view for the consideration of income 
distribution in Mexico with the inclusion of inequality assessments. The methods used in 
order to tackle this issue were twofold, methodological and empirical; from the general 
consideration to the particular point of view. 
One of the first remarks of this work, analyzing the philosophical context of the 
value judgments embedded in the consideration of inequality, is such that it is not 
necessary to endorse the particular view that inequality is an indubitable outcome of an 
unfair society, as the way might be understood from the Marxist tradition. For instance, a 
terrible natural disaster might produce an increase in inequality levels between regions, so 
that would only imply that the better-off people would have an opportunity to serve the 
people in a worse-off condition. The alternative schools of thought in regards to justice 
say that there exists other ways of explaining the phenomenon of inequality in terms of 
alternative grounds rather than exploitation only; so economic science should not be 
forced to take this particular view as if it were an axiomatic religious belief. It was shown 
that some branches of economic science follow the Marxist view of inequality as 
unfairness, but this view seems to be too simplistic and narrow in the light of the Greek 
and the Jewish tradition. In this sense, the study of social inequality should no longer be 
anymore a taboo for the government because of the fear of rebellion. After an accurate 
estimate of social inequality by region, the government should invite people to be part of 
the improvement of this situation, putting special emphasis on the measurement of trends 
of distributional changes through different periods of time. Some other aspects of the 
subjective perception of inequality have also been discussed in this dissertation. Despite 
the fact that income inequality can be calculated with mathematical precision, the value 
judgment that society assigns to certain levels of inequality is a subject that shall be 
discussed by every community, following the Aristotelian participation method. This 
issue is not a problem for interregional comparisons, but it might induce problems for the 
comparability of inequality measures among countries, because the values shared by 
every culture might be different.  
The discussion of the appropriate space for the calculation of social inequality 
should not be a confusing issue anymore. The capability approach of Sen (1985) rejected 
the utilitarian space of Bentham, and enlarged the Basic Needs Approach’s understanding 
of the appropriate space for the calculation of several types of destitution (Sen, 1984), but 
the measure of social inequality is not a subject matter for this discussion. The foundation 
of inequality measurement is different; inequality is a shape of destitution that might be 
approximated in almost any valid space, following the Smithian (1776) concept of being 
ashamed to be the only person to appear in society without a proper set of indispensable 
commodities. In this sense, income might be used as a space for measurement on the 
pragmatic approximation of social inequality. The relative ease of the availability of this 
information in survey data is an important advantage in order to measure inequality. On 
the one hand, this work do not discourage the pursuit of better ways to measure 
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destitution, not only on the contemporary traditional setting of human development 
indices (e.g. income, education and health), but also on the functionings that are 
important for the development of the community, such as the provision of better public 
services, and the exercise of more personal freedoms (Alkire, 2002, Kuklys, 2005). But 
on the other hand, this work emphasizes the need to have a better understanding of social 
inequality, as an additional form of social deprivation. The approximation of social 
inequality with pragmatic, normative or statistical methods that use income as the space 
for the calculations, would serve as a starting point in order to provide suitable indicators 
with the purpose of enlarging the communal strength produced by the practice of social 
cohesion. 
The review of the traditional indices to measure inequality has shown the vast 
variety of ways to approximate this phenomenon, but a limitation that has been 
recognized is that this traditional measurement mostly focuses on the relational and 
monadic attributes of inequality, leaving out for a variety of reasons the study of the 
processes and the value judgments included in the consideration of inequality altogether. 
We imagine there are two reasons why researchers step aside from the consideration of 
the processes of inequality and its value judgments, one is the complexity of the issue on 
methodological grounds and the other is the particular constraint imposed by the data 
availability. The review of this topic reminded us that distributional rankings might differ 
on the basis of the properties attached to the different inequality measures. On the one 
hand, normative measures pose difficulties on the grounds of the type of social utility 
function chosen, which might make it difficult to interpret the results for the policy 
maker. So the use of this kind of measures seems to be arbitrary at large extent. On the 
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other hand, there are pragmatic tools that have been widely used. One of these measures 
is the Gini coefficient, which has been a widely used tool that communicates in a simple 
manner the idea of inequality, but other tools, such as the Theil Index, might also be used 
when it is needed to identify which region contributes more to this phenomenon, because 
of the property of decomposability by population sub-group. The generalized Lorenz 
ranking, with useful properties of population invariance and mean independence, might 
also serve to rank distributions when the measurement is not very different among 
regions or not markedly different over time.  
On the basis of traditional consideration of distributional judgments it was made 
clear that it is better to keep inequality concerns separated from destitution measurement 
(e.g. poverty measurement). The measure of relative poverty is an example where the two 
concepts are mixed, so this type of measurement should be rejected for the sake of clarity. 
An implication of this discussion is such that deprivation measures that are distributional 
sensitive might be mixing again the consideration of inequality and destitution, so these 
measures, such as some newly proposed human development indices with distributional 
sensitiveness, might not be saying which part of destitution comes from inequality 
assessments, and which part of deprivation comes from absolute destitution concerns. 
Looking the other way around, such as inequality measures that show ‘poor 
sensitiveness’, there might also be a problem. When an inequality measure considers the 
transfers done at the lower end of the scale to be more important (e.g. third degree 
stochastic dominance or measures that use logarithmic transformations), this kind of 
inequality measure is mixing again the deprivation that comes from social inequality with 
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the destitution coming from the unachieved functioning, so it might not be clear which 
deprivation is more important in every particular case. 
There is a variety of operational decisions that should be considered on the 
calculations once that the empirical measurement is chosen to approximate social 
inequality. The reported levels of inequality are sensitive to these decisions. More than 
being supportive of a particular way to measure inequality, in this work it was argued that 
it is better to be clear from the beginning about ‘what’ among ‘whom’ is calculated 
(Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2000), and how these calculations are done (Medina, 2001). 
Most of the problems of comparison between inequality measures come from the, 
perhaps hidden, underlying assumptions taken on the technical and operational issues. 
Additional to those decisions, for our purposes we will consider that the spatial 
aggregation offered by income surveys proved to be an important asset for calculation of 
regional inequalities. The pragmatic aspect of inequality measurement has to offer clearer 
calculations of inequality for the policy makers, making them aware of the variety of 
methodological and technical decisions considered, such that the levels of inequality can 
be comparable.  
Applying some of the different operational decisions just discussed, for the case 
of Mexico it can be clear that the sensitivity analysis is also important for the calculations 
of inequality. The Gini coefficient, the Theil index and stochastic dominance were used, 
because of literature convention, decomposition by population sub-group, and the 
difficulty to rank distributions with different population size and different mean income 
respectively. Our calculations in general are consistent with present literature. As 
expected, the measurement was found to be sensitive to the recipient unit chosen and also 
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to the source of welfare chosen (e.g. income vs. expenditure data). The measures of 
inequality were sensitive with the correction made on intrahousehold distribution through 
the use of equivalence scales, and also with the imputation of values to the non-response 
observations. The measurement changed when respective regional price index was used, 
and finally, the different sample size also affected the measurement through the years; 
this last thing because of budget limitations on the data collection. These issues 
mentioned only reinforce our belief that a proper measurement of inequality, with clearer 
assumptions, should be presented along with any report of inequality. The limitation of 
the empirical calculation in this research might be alleviated in the future with a richer 
data set when it will be possible to have detailed individual data, in this case, we might be 
able to measure inequality not only across regions, but also over time with the 
construction of a non balanced pseudo panel data. An observation that might deserve 
special attention is the presentation of results. The normal use of tables is a common 
practice, but nowadays the graphical tools available, such as the presentation of 
geospatial maps constructed for this research, are practical and useful tools that serves the 
purpose to inform the policy maker about the status of destitution from an inter-regional 
perspective. 
The alleviation of poverty, unfortunately, might be a very good ‘business’. The 
assessment of destitution should be taken with care because of the huge governmental 
spending on these programs. The changes on the law should be an evolutionary process 
that converges in such a way that the most destitute are covered more by governmental 
programs, but the researchers should not be ignorant about the additional burden because 
of the political implications that the definition of destitution measurement entangles, in 
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addition to the natural frictions coming from academic discussions. There are political 
assets, important monetary interests and bureaucratic inertias that usually obstruct the 
advances of this kind of research. The Mexican case is an example of a changing process 
that is trying to measure more accurately the extent of human deprivation. There might be 
reasons to assume that the efforts for a better way to measure destitution were only 
related with the progress of scientific research in social welfare, but definitely for the case 
of Mexico, the establishment of a standardize poverty measurement was possible because 
of the de facto willingness of the new right-center ruling party, which gathered 
recognized academia and people from the public sector in order to make the process of 
theoretical, practical and methodological definitions of poverty measurement transparent, 
starting on the year 2000. There are still conflicts between the different regulations that 
measure destitution in Mexico, so the research is still an on-going agenda; in fact, a 
current topic from that agenda is the definition of the measurement of unequal 
distributions.  
The consideration of inequality measurement was considered an issue of 
secondary importance for the Mexican case. The measurement of poverty was prioritized 
(CTMP 2002). This issue gave space for this dissertation. The reasons to leave aside the 
consideration of distributional judgments were such that it was considered that the 
measurement of inequality could not properly assess human destitution. The work on this 
dissertation explained two things on this regards, first is that the literature used in order to 
found an ambiguous relationship of poverty and inequality were not very strong in such 
claim, and second, that the research used for such purposes was weak on the selection of 
inequality measures used, that it was unsure because of data constraints, and might have 
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judged improperly a set of measurement errors during an important period of crisis in 
Mexico. A simple empirical exercise showed that the relationship of inequality is such 
that, when the mean income is controlled, inequality measures covariate positively with 
poverty measures, in other words, inequality have the same substance of destitution than 
poverty. When a more detailed data set becomes available, it is expected to show a 
generalized result of inequality measurement covarying in the same way with poverty, 
not only in regional analyses, but also when a time trend is considered. In this case, the 
Mexican literature can again consider distributional judgments on measures of 
destitution, as has been seen recently with human development indicators that are 
inequality sensible (Foster et al., 2005). 
A final methodological issue was covered in this research because of the strong 
link with the Mexican literature: inequality considerations are embedded in both the 
capability approach of Sen and on the consideration of intrahousehold inequality with the 
use of equivalence of scales. The identification of dimensions in the capability approach 
served to see the fact that social inequality is indeed a dimension of well-being. This 
dimension, that is different from other deprivations (e.g. income poverty or health), can 
be approximated with traditional inequality measures on the income space. The 
‘incomplete’ definition of Sen, based on the Aristotelian participation method, was used 
in order to show that social inequality is a functioning that needs to be addressed, and this 
functioning is related with a particular capability for every society: the right to live in a 
society with more equal opportunities. On the other hand, the consideration of 
equivalence scales proved to be a pragmatic inequality concern because of the presence 
of natural inequalities among individuals (e.g. gender or age), so the assignment of 
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weights to individuals, make the calculations clear in order to know the amount of real 
inequality in a society. 
 The Mexican literature has been incorporating progressively the advances made 
in development literature, such as the use of equivalence scales or the capability approach 
of Sen. The consideration of equivalence scales on the Mexican literature show that 
poverty measurement has been overestimated (Teruel et al., 2005). This is a clear 
example of how important it is to separate inequality considerations from destitution 
assessments. The calculations of poverty after the consideration of intrahousehold 
heterogeneity give a clearer account of poverty. Considering Sen’s approach, in which 
the most important factor seems to be the multidimensional nature of well-being, the 
Mexican literature is not ignorant about this issue; the publication of the Human 
Development Reports on the 1990’s was an important influence. This dissertation 
covered some of the misunderstandings in the Mexican literature in these regards, for 
instance, the inclusion of a multidimensional idea of well-being in a one-dimensional 
space that is income. Like in any other country in the world, Mexico had a data constraint 
that delayed the full consideration of multidimensional measurement of well-being. The 
concern about multidimensional deprivation has been present in Mexico reflected in a 
variety of marginalization measures. These measures are mostly based on the principal 
component analysis methodology with the philosophy of social exclusion. The research is 
an on-going agenda that includes Human Development Indices and some sort of 
inequality judgments (Lopez-Calva and Székely, 2006, Foster et. al, 2005).  
The final step of this research show that inequality as a deprivation has an 
empirical positive correlation with other sorts of deprivation, as it was theoretically 
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expected. This would serve to explain the fact that in future human development 
assessments, the consideration of income inequality should be an important aspect of the 
social well-being that needs to be measured. The relationship of income inequality with 
other functionings is intuitive: the presence of public services in the community would 
make the population to enjoy better levels of health and a better quality of life, so those 
achieved functionings will influence the population with a set of better jobs and 
consequently better living conditions. This better standard of living would make in 
consequence a more equal distribution. That is the reason for which the levels of 
inequality can be also used as an additional measurement of destitution, because 
inequality indeed is one of the important aspects of deprivation in society. 
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